Fidelity to the Radically New Zapatistas, Deleuze, Badiou

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Introduction
When the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) occupied the old colonial town of San Cristóbal, one of the main tourist attractions of the South-Western Mexican province of Chiapas, on January 1, 1994, this had an immediate effect on tourism. Carlos Tello Diaz recorded the following exchange:

‘Are you going to let us go?’ a foreign visitor to the town asks. [...] ‘Why do you want to go?’ replied [Subcomandante Marcos]. ‘Enjoy the city.’ [...] A guide obviously annoyed raised his voice to say that he had to take some tourists to see the ruins of Palenque. Marcos lost his patience but not his sense of humour. ‘The road to Palenque is closed,’ he said. [...] ‘We apologize for any inconvenience but this is a revolution.’

In the direct aftermath of this ‘revolution’ tour operators reported cancellations of several travel packages. In 1995, however, the number of international visitors to Chiapas was growing again, and hasn’t stopped growing ever since. Axel Kersten notes that a high percentage of these tourists are so called ‘alternative’ travellers from Europe and North America who, rather than sand and sun, are interested in ‘ethnic, cultural, adventure (…) and “politically correct” tourism’. Apparently the Zapatista rebellion, played a part in this increase. Not only has the Zapatista rebellion put Chiapas on the world map, it also attracts ‘revolutionary tourism’. Some organizations now promote ‘Zapatista tours’, the Lonely Planet details the Zapatista story and lists Zapatista sites, and street vendors, even those who do not sympathize with the EZLN, sell Zapatista dolls, posters and t-shirts because of the overwhelming demand.
The Sociologist Pierre van den Berghe wrote, shortly before the beginning of the Zapatista insurgency, that tourism in Chiapas was ‘the last wave of exploitative capitalist expansion into the remotest periphery of the world system. [...] Now even poverty becomes an exploitable commodity if it is colourful enough.’ Something similar could be said to be the case with the Zapatista revolt: a commodification of resistance, something that also happened to the Cuban revolution, which like the Chiapas region, was colourful and commodifiable. Slavoj Žižek alludes to the colourful street scenes from Havana with 1950s American cars and second-hand yellow school buses used for public transport. He links these images and the revolutionary iconography of today’s Cuba to what he calls ‘the passion for the Real’, identified by Alain Badiou as the key feature of the twentieth century. It is this desire for authenticity that brings throngs of backpackers to Chiapas to experience a ‘real’ revolution, albeit a colourful one, one deemed peaceful, joyful, even postmodern. And it is here that what Žižek calls the fundamental paradox of the ‘passion for the Real’ comes into view. It culminates in its apparent opposite: a war without warfare, a revolution without casualties (or so it appears), resistance deprived of its subversive substance, a marketable revolt—integrating a critical niche of ‘travellers’ (eager to distinguish themselves from tourists) into the logic of consumerism, appropriating, one could say, the revolution into the capitalist logic which it set out to defy.

It is exactly this movement that some have observed in poststructuralism or in the legacy of 1968 as a whole. Gilles Lipovetsky writes that the event of May ’68, was rather than a ‘antitechnocratic movement struggling for collective self-determination,’ a last ‘wild moment in our relentless descent into the world of modern individualism’ and the ‘irreversible privatisation of the social sphere’. The cynic might say that the nomad has been realized in the flex-worker and that the demand for freedom of choice has given us the dazzling array of consumer choices of modern consumer capitalism. As Thomas Frank writes: 'Consumerism is no longer about "conformity" but about "difference". [...] This imperative of endless difference is today at the heart of American capitalism, an eternal fleeting from "sameness" that satiates our thirst for the New with such achievements of civilization as the infinite brands of identical cola, the myriad colours and irrepressible variety of the cigarette rack at 7-eleven.' Following these readings, we could say that poststructuralist theories might have strengthened rather than weakened capitalism. Anthony Appiah and Arif Dirlik accordingly call poststructuralists ‘a comprador intelligentsia,’ or, even less equivocal, ‘the intelligentsia of global capitalism.’

On a more sympathetic note Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt ask:

what if a new paradigm of power, a postmodern sovereignty, has come to replace the modern paradigm and rule through differential hierarchies of the
hybrid and fragmentary subjectivities that these theorists celebrate? In this case, modern forms of sovereignty would no longer be at issue, and the postmodernist and postcolonialist strategies that appear to be liberatory would not challenge but in fact coincide with and even unwittingly reinforce the new strategies of rule!9

There is no reason, Negri and Hardt continue, to question the democratic, egalitarian, or anticapitalist credentials of most poststructuralist writers, but ‘it is important to investigate the utility of [their] theories in the context of the new paradigm of power.’10 Poststructuralism is a broad and diverging term, but Negri and Hardt identify one unifying tenet, that is their dismissal of the dialectic, which in the standard interpretation, subsumes the multiplicity of difference to binary oppositions and then further subsumes these oppositions to one unitary system.11 It is for this reason, they write, that liberation struggles such as the women’s, antiracist and gay movements are ‘all interpreted as the heritage of [poststructuralist] politics because they, too, aim at disrupting the order and the dualisms of modern sovereignty.’12

There is a revealing passage in Naomi Klein’s bestseller No Logo about the developments in these movements in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Concrete issues such as pay equity for women, police violence against blacks, and limited access (even in the West) to HIV-medicine were still not resolved.

But somehow, [these issues] didn’t seem terribly glamorous to students on many university campuses, for whom identity politics had evolved by the late eighties into something quite different. Many of the battles we fought were over issues of ‘representation’—a loosely defined set of grievances mostly lodged against the media, the curriculum and the English language. […] These issues have always been on the political agenda of both the civil-rights and the women’s movement […] but by the time my generation inherited these ideas […] representation was no longer one tool amongst many, it was the key. […] For a generation that grew up mediated, transforming the world through pop culture was second nature. The problem was that […] over time, campus identity politics became so consumed by personal politics that they eclipsed the rest of the world. The slogan ‘the personal is the political’ came to replace the economic as political and, in the end, the Political as political as well. […] In the absence of more tangible political goals, any movement that is about fighting for better social mirrors is going to eventually fall victim to its own narcissism.13

And thus The Silence of the Lambs and Basic Instinct were targeted for their ostensible ‘incorrectness’ (a transvestite and lesbian killer respectively), museums with African art
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exhibits were picketed for their purported colonial mindset, and TV networks were targeted for gay neighbours who never got laid, or worse, for lack of gay characters in primetime shows altogether.\textsuperscript{14} Klein quotes the prominent lesbian activist Torie Osborn, who, in 1993, the year of the ‘don’t ask don’t tell’-compromise, said that the most important issue for gays and lesbians was not same-sex spousal rights, nor even equal treatment in the military, but the invisibility of gays and lesbians in the media, ‘period’.\textsuperscript{15} It is the \textit{salonfähige} version of the 1987 ACT UP slogan ‘Silence = Death’, a complex, multidimensional and highly politicised statement, reduced to a straightforward, self-evident ‘truth’; deprived of its potentially subversive substance.

In the meantime, many non-representational issues were pushed to the background, economic issues, such as labour rights and poverty—both in the west and in developing countries—disappeared completely off the agenda. While the agenda of traditional Marxist countercultures was focused primarily and often singularly on economic issues, the agenda of the identity movement was too limited in that it focused primarily on representation. When the dust of the ‘campus culture wars’ settled, it became clear that the contemporary capitalist axiomatic seemed to have become resistant to the ‘liberatory’ methods of the protestors’ depoliticised politics of difference; in fact it seemed to thrive on them. A consumer research office wrote in a report on the so called ‘generation X’ in 1997 that ‘diversity in all its forms—cultural, political, sexual, radical, social—is a hallmark of this generation; [it is] the core of the perspective they bring to the marketplace.’\textsuperscript{16} It makes, in other words, for good niche marketing.

It is important to emphasize that, just like with the poststructuralists, there is no reason to doubt the progressive and subversive desires that motivated even the most depoliticised practices of these identity-based activists. It is rather that they are perceived no longer to be entirely effective theoretical perspectives or practical strategies in the face of the globalised capitalist system. The socialist alternative, with its emphasis on class-politics, which had always been available as a model for oppositional politics, had suddenly become obsolete with the abrupt collapse of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{17} With this paradigm and its concepts and vocabulary de-legitimated—both economically by triumphant free-market theorists and philosophically by the unimpeachable philosophers of poststructuralism, who, as we saw, dismissed the dialectic—it is not surprising that ‘old fashioned’ concepts such as class and solidarity were thrown off the agenda to be replaced by much sexier, more contemporary and closer-to-home subjects like sexual stereotyping and racial prejudices.

Despite appearances, the poststructuralists never ‘gave up’ on social-economic critique as such. Deleuze, for instance, maintained that he and Guattari have always remained Marxists, in the sense that they believe ‘that any political philosophy must turn on the analysis of capitalism and the way it has developed.’\textsuperscript{18} But wasn’t one of the poignant lessons of poststructuralism that the way things are perceived is inextricably
entangled with the way things are (or rather, become)? It is thus that Benjamin Shepard and Ronald Hayduk can write that much of the 1990s ‘saw a retreat of progressive ideology and practice’. But at the same time they note that ‘throughout the 1990s, rumblings of a new activism began to take shape, from the mountains of southern Mexico to the Lower East Side of New York.’ Rumblings that would end in a revitalized radical landscape. They quote an anti-sweatshop activist saying that there grew an understanding that many issues were tied up together: ‘that to separate culture and identity and race and gender from class and the concerns of working people is artificial, and divides us in unproductive ways.’

The revitalized radical landscape came in the full glare of media attention at the WTO meeting in Seattle in November 1999. The totally unexpected eruption of cheerful protest which effectively disrupted the WTO proceedings came as a surprise to many, not in the least the authorities. We could say that this new radicalisation simply took shape in response to the ever more ferocious global-economic ‘liberalization’ in the wake of such treaties as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade from 1993. L.A. Kauffman, in a reading sympathetic to poststructuralism, however, tries to explain this radical renewal by pointing to two historical tenets that came together in what she calls the new ‘global justice movement’. The first is exactly the breaking up of the 1960s protest movement into an array of single-issue movements with ‘little relevance beyond their particular sphere’. Like in France, by the end of the 1960s the American left was a seething cauldron of infighting factions and dogmatism. In France the ‘spontaneous’ student revolt of May ’68 was the definitive moment where a new generation of activists broke with the old ways of activism and were consequently criticized by the heroes of the older generation such as Louis Althusser, who described the students as victims of ‘infantile’ leftism. In America there wasn’t such a clear rupture, although the virtually forgotten May Day Protests of 1971, which led to more than 10,000 activists being arrested over a few days of fierce protest in Washington DC, is sometimes invoked as an important break with old forms of protest. Young activists experimented with smaller, non-hierarchical forms of organization. The May Day protests had no national leadership but was planned by various ‘affinity groups’ from different parts of the country. What followed from this decentralized, more pragmatic and local form of organization was also an affiliation around personally experienced oppressions. Socialist intellectuals tried to incorporate these movements into the main body of socialist critique, but eventually, their dogmatic insistence on the correctness of the basic economic postulates, their comprehensive worldview, and their elaboration of intricate political theories estranged the new radicals who opted for a sometimes somewhat naïve strategy of direct action against these perceived injustices rather than the practice of producing a ‘sound’ analysis of the underlying causes of the abuses. Their politics became, what the activist Ricardo Dominguez called, the politics of the question rather than the politics of the answer.
The second tenet Kauffman identifies in her overview of North-American radical protest movements is the development of collaborations and coalitions between these various movements without subsuming their diversity into an overarching theory, doctrine or organization. It is here that she identifies the development of groups like the Zapatistas, which fuse ecological, economic and racial concerns, as inspiration for this productive reinforcement of radical protest.

I would like to emphasize that Kauffman’s historical sketch is geographically limited; in Europe some radical protest movements followed different paths, and in other parts of the world, protest movements were developing along yet other lines. The image of a revitalized radical landscape where manifold interests come together in various temporary combinations is, however, a development that can be witnessed in the practice of progressive movements around the world. It is no longer imaginable to think of protesting against deforestation, without making links to groups struggling for indigenous rights in the affected areas and animal rights campaigners. Equally, campaigns for dept relief are supported by a broad coalition of NGO’s, from environmental groups to human rights campaigners and from health care organizations to labour unions. The global protest movement is a decentred, horizontal and vibrant network of autonomous organizations working together in various pragmatic coalitions.

Even thought this idea of the network-society is a concept that, like non-hierarchical, decentred forms of organization, could be said to spring from poststructuralist theory, the theoretical luminaries of the new global activists are those theorists who distinguish themselves clearly from poststructuralist thought. Whereas Negri and Hardt are to some extent still sympathetic to poststructuralism, Žižek, Badiou and Rancière, to name just a few, are much less so. When poststructuralism, parallel to post-1960s activism, could be seen as the response of a new generation of theorists to the dogmatism of Althusser and his fellow structuralists, this new paradigm of thought reflecting the new élan of global activism, could equally be seen as a departure from the anti-dialectical theories whose activist mirror-image seemed on the surface to have stranded in a depoliticised, somewhat trivial ‘political correctness’. They even return, although with critical distance to Althusser and the dialectic. ‘The celebrated “end of ideologies” heralded everywhere as the good news which opens up the way for the “return of ethics”,’ writes Badiou, ‘signifies in fact an espousal of the twistings and turnings of necessity [in the form of economic objectivity], and an extraordinary impoverishment of the active, militant value of principles.’ The very idea of a consensual ‘ethics’, Badiou continues, replaces ‘old ideological divisions’ and thus contributes to subjective resignation and acceptance of the status quo. ‘For what every emancipatory project does, what every emergence of hitherto unknown possibilities does, is to put an end to consensus.’ In other words, a non-dialectic thought has no emancipatory potential. And, even though his argument is necessarily reductive, he has a
point when he describes the ‘ethics of difference’ as a recognition of the Other, or as ‘multiculturalism’ which fights ‘against the imposition of a unified model of behaviour and intellectual approach’. This call for ‘tolerance’ is not only defeated in advance by its intolerance towards, say, racists or homophobes (and thus implicitly bases its emancipatory politics upon an oppositionary model). It also carries with it the possibility, Badiou explains, that the ‘de-votion’ to the Other is based on a mimetic recognition, resemblance or imitation and ‘thus leads us back to the logic of the Same.’

This same objection, however, could be made against both the contemporary theorists of the return to the dialectic as to the contemporary practice of network activism. Even though Kauffman is careful to point out that there is no overarching theory, doctrine or organization, the temporary coalitions imply that there is at least some sort of universal language of ‘progressive action’ which enables the different groups to comprehend each other. Similarly, while Badiou writes that it is the task of a philosophy to construct a ‘space of thought’ in which the different subjective types […] coexist,’ and cautiously adds, ‘but this coexistence is not a unification,’ he too runs the risk that his evental fidelity ultimately subsumes these differences as a result of some kind of erratic teleological reflex of the dialectic. James Tully warns us that there is ‘no view from nowhere. No matter how [inclusive] a language [or conceptual framework] may appear to be.’ This is clear in many actual challenges to constitutions whereby minorities claim constitutional recognition and varying degrees of autonomy. Tully, writing in 1994, speaks of an impasse and asks how the proponents of recognition can bring forth their claims ‘in a public forum in which their cultures have been excluded or demeaned for centuries?’ When they accept the authoritative language and institutions, he writes, they will be rejected by conservatives or ‘comprehended by progressives within the very languages and institutions whose sovereignty and impartiality they question’. On the other hand, he writes, ‘they can refuse to play the game, in which case they become marginal and reluctant conscripts or they take up arms.’

It is exactly between these options that the Zapatistas oscillate. In this paper I want to analyse how the Zapatistas try to circumvent the impasse described by Tully. Even though it is not to be expected that this trajectory brings a concrete solution to the complex situation in Chiapas in the short term, their balancing act might be of interest for the wider theory and practice of radical politics, which, as we saw, also have to walk a tight rope if they want to avoid either falling victim to totalizations on the one hand and depoliticised navel-gazing on the other.

Zapatistas
It is unclear who has first coined the term ‘postmodern revolution’ to describe the uprising of the EZLN, but the term has been in use since the earliest stages of the Zapatista insurgency. Right from the start it was clear that the EZLN was not your regular
Central American guerrilla, for one thing because they had no viable military strategy. Their declaration of war, the so-called ‘first declaration of the Lacandón jungle,’ in fact calls for ‘other powers of the nation […] to restore the legitimacy and the stability of the nation by overthrowing the dictator,’ before they, not without irony, order their ‘military forces’ to ‘advance to the capital of the country.’ In reality they retreated into the jungle within days after their symbolic occupation of San Cristóbal and a few other towns. For another thing, their public declarations were virtually free of the Marxist revolutionary rhetoric that most militia groups in Latin and Central America had adopted in the wake of the successful armed rebellion in Cuba. Instead, they seemed to be the opposite of dogmatic:

Our form of struggle is not the only one. Perhaps for many it may not even be an adequate one. There are many other valuable forms of struggle [and] other honest, progressive, independent organizations of great value. The EZLN has never pretended that our way of struggle is the only legitimate one. In fact, it is the only one we have been left with. The EZLN welcomes the honest and consistent development of all forms of struggle that take us all along the path of freedom, democracy, and justice. […] We don’t pretend to be the one, only, and true historic vanguard. We don’t pretend to group all honest Mexicans under our Zapatista flag. We offer our flag, but there is a much bigger and powerful flag with which we can all be covered. The flag of the national revolutionary movement where all the most diverse tendencies can fit, the most different thoughts, the different ways of struggling; yet there will only be one longing and one goal: freedom, democracy, and justice.

Let me, before further analysing the activist methods of the Zapatistas, shortly sketch the pre-history of the Zapatista rebellion, named after one of the leading figures of the Mexican Revolution (1910–1917) Emiliano Zapata Salazar. Zapata, venerated as a national hero in Mexico, fought for land rights for indigenous and non-indigenous peasants in the south of Mexico during the revolutionary era. These land rights had been infringed by the economic policy of the dictator Porfirio Díaz which, for instance in Chiapas, saw most of the fertile lands held by indigenous people expropriated and sold to foreign investors in the 20 years before the revolution. The revolution is seen by many as the founding moment of modern Mexico. It inaugurated the beginning of the bureaucratic rule of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) which identified peasants as one of the three pillars of support for this system (together with workers and the middle-class) and article 27 of the new constitution guaranteed the state’s commitment to land reforms and the right to collective land ownership of the so-called ejidos. The government established intermediary organizations that on the one hand served to rally
support for the party and on the other developed a intricate system of patronage which offered privileged access to state institutions and resources.\textsuperscript{37}

Although these structures have been overwhelmingly successful in containing peasant dissatisfaction, this was only the official picture. The reality in Chiapas was that the land, which was slowly being returned to the indigenous communities from the late 1930s, onward barely kept pace with the population increases. The Indians, effectively, couldn’t move, but couldn’t live of the profits of their land either. They thus remained dependent on hugely underpaid seasonal plantation labor, a situation which worsened considerably when, during the 1970s, the agricultural economy saw a sharp downturn due to falling commodity prices and unfavourable exchange rates.\textsuperscript{38} There was less contract work available for a population which had increased rapidly. This caused two migrations: first it led to urbanization, resulting in rapidly extending exclusively indigenous neighbourhoods on the outskirts of cities like San Cristóbal and Tuxtla Gutiérrez. Secondly, it led to establishments of new agricultural colonies deep in the Lacandón jungle. By the 1990s more than 200.000 Indians had settled in the jungle in more than 1000 new, mostly self-governed communities, together forming an egalitarian, democratic confederation described by Rus et al., as ‘virtually a Maya state’.\textsuperscript{39}

Under the influence of liberation theology and Marxist ideologues trying to organize a socialist revolution in the wake of the violent crushing of the student protests of 1968, the indigenous communities of Chiapas gradually politicised during the 1970s and 1980s.\textsuperscript{40} The Indians themselves have started to refer to this period as the time of awakening, referring to the new politics of self-determination and the sense of self-consciousness and ethnic identity that developed during this period.\textsuperscript{41} New peasant movements sprung up all over Chiapas, including those that exclusively focused on Indian issues, calling for labour rights, cultural rights, health care and criticizing local politicians who allowed large landowners to monopolize access to the markets and credit.\textsuperscript{42} The construction of several hydroelectric dams, forcibly removing ten thousands of indigenous people and destroying fertile farmland, led to obstruction and resistance which was brutally repressed by the police and the federal army.

1982 brought more bad economic news in the form of a debt crisis which led to enormous inflation and massive unemployment figures throughout the 1980s. To tackle this economic crisis the government devised a program of neo-liberal reforms. In Chiapas this led to a further concentration of landownership in the hands of a few wealthy farmers, sometimes by legal means, sometimes by intimidation and force. Protests by peasant and indigenous organizations were violently broken up by the federal army and the paramilitary groups formed by the landowners.\textsuperscript{43} The slowly recovering economy in Chiapas saw yet another setback in 1989 when the international coffee market collapsed. When, in 1992, the government, in preparation for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), decided to revoke article 27, the communal land rights article,
from the constitution, this was the final blow. The climate of repression and enduring economical hardship due to aggressive liberalisation policies radicalised the already politicised indigenous people, especially in East Chiapas where a lingering guerrilla movement from the 1970s with a primarily defensive strategy had renamed themselves after Zapata in 1983. On January 1, 1994, the day that NAFTA came into effect, the EZLN presented itself to the world with a declaration of war as a ‘last resort’: ‘Today we say enough is enough—Ya Bastar’.

Their politics was not a politics of the answer, nor, I am tempted to say, of the question. There politics is the politics of the exclamation mark. And their ‘postmodern’ battle cry resonated all over the world.

But a postmodern war is not, as some seem to think, a war without casualties. On January 6 the EZLN reported a total of 36 dead (including fighters from the ‘enemy’) and 60 seriously wounded. Even after the official ceasefire of January 12 there were skirmishes with casualties and the intimidation and provocation campaigns by the military and paramilitary groups continued. The Zapatistas responded in October by breaking out of the military cordon that encircled their stronghold in the Lacandón jungle and peacefully occupied 38 autonomous municipalities. This again heightened the military repression and led in February of 1995 to a repeal of the ceasefire and a new offensive. After a huge public outcry, the government reverted its policy, and engaged in low-intensity war tactics outside of the public eye, with the massacre of Acteal, which left 45 indigenous civilians dead on 23 December 1997, as its most notable exception.

On the other hand, the ‘postmodern war’ label has some truth to it, because in a traditional war the EZLN could easily have been annihilated by the 15,000 military troops the government sent to Chiapas. It is only under pressure of the public opinion and huge demonstrations in Mexico city and around the country that the government sought a political solution to the conflict. Where did this sudden support throughout Mexico and from around the world come from? Certainly, the EZLN may have benefited from their charismatic and highly articulate spokesperson Subcomandante Marcos and they were certainly aware of the crucial role of information and the media, as the broadcasts from a captured regional radio station showed, but this doesn’t explain how this relatively small guerrilla force suddenly came to symbolize everything that was wrong in Mexico, that is, amongst others, a flawed democratic system and a singular fixation on economic rather than social progress. As the communiqués, interviews and letters of the enigmatic Subcomandante filled the newspapers, airwaves, and the then relatively new world wide web, and took hold of public discussions, the spirit of the Zapatista revolution boosted the hopes for freedom and justice of Mexicans around the country and subsequently of people around the world. ‘Mexico can and should take the opportunity to accelerate the transition to democracy, opening a clear perspective to social reform,’ wrote the well know leftist activist Adolfo Sanchez Rebolledo in *La Jornada*. On 8 February the New York Times reported that the Marcos’ writings ‘have built an unexpected bridge between
the radical Mayan Indian peasants who make up most of the insurgent army and an audience of urban Mexicans whose complaints about their country’s political and social problems would hardly seem to reach the point of support for armed revolution.’ It quoted the writer Carlos Monsivais saying that ‘wherever you go, with middle-class people, taxi drivers, whomever, everyone is talking about Subcomandante Marcos. He has taken [the Zapatistas] from a guerrilla force that was going to try to overthrow the Government to one that is carrying on a dialogue with public opinion.’

Although it seems hardly possible to analyse to the full what sparked this unexpected resonance, several causes can be identified which might at least partly explain the rebels’ sudden success in Mexico. First, Mexico was tired of the 65-year old rule of the PRI and many felt that the 1988 elections had been rigged. Second, while the economy was recovering from its crisis in the mid-1980s, the unbridled liberalization that had paralleled this development had led to larger social divisions across the country. Third, the 1992 commemoration of the arrival of Columbus in the America’s had put the matter of Indigenous oppression on the public and political agenda. As Courtney Jung explains, the Mexican government itself played a role in this by formally protesting the Spanish use of the word ‘discovery’ for the expedition, instead calling it ‘the encounter between two worlds’. The Indians themselves referred to the commemoration as the celebration of ‘five hundred years of resistance to oppression’. Araceli Burguete has commented that 1992 was a pivotal year for indigenous visibility: ‘If 1994 had happened in 1990, Mexican society would not have responded the same way to the Zapatista uprising.’ Finally, the Mexican government itself may have contributed to the credibility of the Zapatistas. On January 3, president Salinas said in parliament that the government was aware of the fact that inequalities persisted and that ‘the benefits and opportunities are not yet tangible realities for many.’ A week later the president acknowledged in a televised speech that he had made mistakes and announced changes in his cabinet because it ‘didn’t work as it should have.’ Two weeks later, on January 27, the government announced that it agreed to tougher campaign spending limits, equal access to media for opposition parties and a more transparent appointment procedure for election officials, reforms they had vehemently resisted since the 1988 elections. Instead of defusing the anti-PRI mood of the country, the agreement only highlighted the workings of the political system and implicitly endorsed the criticism of the Zapatistas. Last, but not least, Salinas appointed Manuel Camacho Soliz, an old political friend and until recently his anticipated successor, as the governments peace envoy. Camacho used his new position to put himself back in the spotlight. ‘Chiapas has moved everything’, commented Camacho, ‘It has moved people’s awareness that there were problems.’ In a populist fashion he publicly called on the government to respond to the Zapatistas’ demands for justice, civil rights and greater democracy. While he thus effectively substantiated the link between the insurgency and several national political issues, he
formally maintained the position that the rebels should limit their demands to indigenous matters in Chiapas.\textsuperscript{54}

Of course the rebels did anything but that. Instead their outlook seemed to broaden every day. In a communiqué of February 16 they declared about the upcoming peace negotiations:

\begin{quote}
We will not ask for forgiveness or implore, we will not beg for alms nor gather up crumbs that fall from the abundant tables of the powerful. We will go to demand that which is everyone's right and reason: freedom, justice, democracy. […] For all the Indigenous people, for all the campesinos, for all the workers, for all the students and teachers, for all the children, for all the elderly, for the women, for all the men, everything for everybody, […] nothing for us.
\end{quote}

A few days later, on the eve of the peace talks, Marcos in an interview even seemed to leave behind the nationalist rhetoric he had invoked earlier by stating that ‘what is at stake in Chiapas is no longer just about Chiapas or even Mexico, but perhaps even about the free trade agreement or the whole neoliberal project in Latin America.'\textsuperscript{56} So where they were speaking for the dispossessed Indians of Chiapas on January 1, a little over 6 weeks later they were ‘perhaps’ speaking for the dispossessed of a whole continent. This seems a preposterous statement by Marcos, but we should not forget that, as we have already seen, many see the Zapatistas as kicking off the struggle that later became known under the somewhat unfortunate name ‘anti-globalization’\textsuperscript{57}. This ever expanding resonance of the struggle in Chiapas only adds to the growing inability to answer the question why this specific local resistance movement suddenly became an inspiration for a wide array of marginalized groups around the world.

The Zapatistas never asked this question, but the developments did change their discourse profoundly in response to this unexpected success. One of the first things that was discarded, at least temporarily, was their militarism. Although we should not forget that the military route was hardly a viable one, and it was thus a pragmatic decision, this shift from an actual war to a rhetorical one even before the official peace talks had started was of course only possible due to their successful conquest of what we now know as the ‘harts and minds’ of the people.\textsuperscript{58} This shedding of their military logic also greatly enhanced the number of potential sympathizers around the world, who would be more comfortable with supporting a (purported) ‘bloodless’—or should I say virtual—war than with taking position in the moral hornet’s nest of a guerrilla war. The guerrilla infrastructure, rhetoric, and symbolism (the latter being one of the more attractive, ‘authentic’ elements of the Zapatista movement) remained. And the military option always remained an option in the background. ‘If the government manages to isolate us politically at the national level, to present us as extremist[s] […] that is where the military
option resurfaces,’ said Marcos. So peace was preached while dressed in military uniforms, and even though the peace agreement that was brokered by the EZLN representatives was rejected in a consultation of all Zapatistas, and thus they are up to this day formally an illegal combatant organization, they increasingly dissociated themselves from actual militarism. When in June 1996 the Revolutionary Popular Army (EPR) was created in reaction to violent suppression of peasant protests in this state, the EZLN distanced themselves from this struggle in unequivocal terms after the ERP offered the Zapatistas their support. The response is revealing and nicely sums up the trajectory of the EZLN from their declaration of war to their position in 1996.

We do not want your support. We do not need it, we do not seek it. […] The support which we seek and need, is that of national and international civil society, their peaceful and civic mobilizations is what we await. […] We have not fallen into the game of the dominant power which promotes the confrontation between the "good" and the "bad" guerrilla. […] We did not win our legitimacy with our weapons; we won it with long years of political labor with those who are now our leaders: the indigenous communities, and with the dialogue (which we have sought even at the risk of our own security, autonomy and independence) with national and international civil society. […] The difference [between us] is that our political proposals are diametrically different and this is evident in the discourse and the practice of the two organizations. Thanks to your appearance, now many people can understand that what makes us different from existing political organizations are not the weapons and the ski-masks, but the political proposals. We have carved out a new and radical path […] You struggle for power. We struggle for democracy, liberty and justice. This is not the same thing.

The EPR is clearly a different organization than the EZLN. Not only do they posses real military power (whereas some of the Zapatista rebels marched into San Cristóbal with wooden toy guns), they also work within a Marxist-Leninist ideology. On their website they call for the ‘seizure of political power,’ and ‘the instauration of the proletarian dictatorship.’ While the Zapatistas also have their roots in a socialist discourse, the remnants of these (allegedly Maoist) roots, although the basic outlook that it inspired has not evaporated, had already crystallized around a more moderate emphasis on justice, freedom, democracy and autonomy, a development which was only strengthened by the resonance these demands created in the ‘national and international civil society’. The option of overthrowing the undemocratic government and replacing them by a truly democratic one, never a realist option, was almost immediately abandoned. Instead they opted for bringing about change from within ‘the system’ as soon as their success seemed
to open up this possibility, while at the same time remaining an outside force as a non-parliamentary opposition. They seem to seek dialogue over radical action and thus choose the path of reform over revolution. This shift, as they acknowledge themselves, comes at a risk. Not only do they risk their security, autonomy and independence, but also their radical momentum. Working, for instance, from within the legal framework, notes Mihalis Mentinis in one of his more sympathetic moments, (commenting that the language of law is a bourgeois language) could be ‘understood, at least partly, in terms of an attempt to unite the various sectors of the Mexican working class, and define a common ground of resistance for all these sectors.’ On the other hand, he writes, this ‘building [of] unity, has entailed the pacification of antagonism and the silencing of the most radical voices.' It privileges, as he contends, certain discourses over others. He sees the denunciation of the struggle of the EPR as a clear example of this silencing of radicalism.

It is, however, I would suggest, exactly this steering clear of the politico-economic radicalism that Mentinis laments which has been so invigorating about the Zapatista discourse. In embracing the language of justice and democracy they have dodged the pitfall of what Engels called a ‘mere political’ revolution. Rather, they were able to create a broad social revolution due to the successful connection they forged between egalitarian social politics of redistribution and the discourse of cultural politics. Where the ‘first declaration’ of January 1 does not yet contain any direct mention (albeit plenty indirect references) to the specific indigenous character of the uprising, the informal interviews and statements are outspokenly clear about it. The communiqué of January 6, called ‘Responses to Government Lies’, sees the need to respond to the governments denunciation of the uprising as an indigenous struggle:

The commanders and troop elements of the EZLN are mostly Indians from Chiapas. […] We are thousands of armed Indigenous people, and behind us there are tens of thousands of our families. Therefore, there are tens of thousands of Indigenous people in struggle. The government says it is not an Indigenous uprising, but we believe that if thousands of Indigenous people rise up in arms, then yes, it is an Indigenous uprising.

The Zapatistas did not, Courtney Jung observes, ‘anticipate the potential of a specifically indigenous challenge to the Mexican state, or of an identity-based analysis of oppression.’ It seems, however, that the leadership soon realized that this characteristic of their revolt was one of the distinguishing features which generated much sympathy and should thus be emphasized in the communication. By the time of the formulation of the demands for the peace negotiations, respect for indigenous rights and dignity and
recognition of indigenous culture and tradition to be recognized had become central conditions for peace.68

This integration of cultural politics and political-economic discourse had several effects. First it counterbalanced the danger of a relapse into the simple antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat of traditional Marxist theory, a danger that by no means had completely been averted at the time of the insurrection. Second, it reinvigorated, that is, repoliticised, identity politics which, while stranded in overly pragmatic and often innocuous direct action, had also pioneered, as we have seen, decentralized, non-hierarchical forms of organization. Third, it created an enormous pool of people and organizations which could identify itself with the uprising. Had the Zapatistas remained a purely political-economic oriented organization, they would never have had the immediate widespread sympathy from all over the world, from human and indigenous rights organizations and environmental campaigners to feminist groups and queer activists. At the same time, had the uprising not also addressed the political-economic situation of the Chiapas Indians, they would not have connected so easily with the broad diversity of political organizations in Mexico and abroad—labour organizations, student movements, peace groups and campaigners for democratic reforms to name just a few. Four, it also prevented any easy appropriation or dismissal by the government as they had no clear-cut strategy how to deal with this kind of new, multifaceted resistance movement—militarist yet calling for peace, indigenous yet inclusive, political yet extra-parliamentary, anti-capitalist yet ‘spectacular’, local yet global. It is exactly this elusiveness yet recognizability that enabled this relatively small rebellion to grown to an event of enormous proportions, an event that inspired radical activists, brought struggles together and reformed the face of activism around the world. This is the final effect of this creative weaving together of these to heretofore separated discourses: it recaptured the activist imagination and envisioned a ‘better’, or should I say other, world, without, in advance, defining this world—a Utopianism without Utopia, a fidelity to the unknown and infinite, in short, to the radically new.

**Badiou and Deleuze**

While the radical landscape of activism started shifting in the late 1990s, academia seemed to lag behind. The fields of cultural studies and political theory remained, after some advances in the 1960s and 1970s, largely, although not completely, disjointed. Poststructuralist discourse is, as we have seen, linked to ‘identity politics’, which is clearly not seen as real politics, and holds sway over a host of other cultural discourses such as literary theory and media studies. Political theory, on the other hand, is monopolized by the analytic tradition and discusses subjects such as justice, democracy and international relations largely in social studies departments with research methods very different from humanities research. ‘The possibility of an engagement between
poststructuralist concerns with a politics of difference and Marxism has been for a long
time dominated, at least in Anglo-American cultural studies, by neo-Gramscian post-
Marxism,’ writes Nicholas Thoburn, identifying Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe as its most prominent theorists.69

A radical new practice, however, calls for a new theory as well. Mentinis
analyses how various theoretical discourses, amongst which that of Laclau and Mouffe,
have tried to appropriate and explain the Zapatista rebellion. He concludes, however, that
all of these readings ‘fail to see that the Chiapas rebellion is something more than a case
study that proves a certain theory,’ and concludes that ‘no ready-made theoretical
approach, with an emphasis on hegemonic practices, identity politics […] or otherwise,
can grasp the totality of the Zapatista insurrection. We have to move on and invent new
corcepts and frameworks for understanding not only the Zapatistas but also [explain and
push forward] the new cycle of anti-capitalist struggle worldwide.’70 In his book Mentinis
subsequently turns to the new paradigm in continental philosophy, associated with
political thinkers such as Badiou, Rancière and Negri, to develop these new concepts and
frameworks. Although he, quite rightly, concludes that their concepts also do not offer
adequate theoretical tools for understanding the Zapatistas, he implies that these thinker
at least offer better starting points for the development of these tools.71

I agree with Mentinis that some of these ‘new’ theories might indeed provide
good starting points for the developments of new tools, although this is to a certain extent
a self-sufficient promise as these theories, as I have pointed out before, are widely read
amongst radical activists and I believe in the cross-fertilization between theory and
practice. Mentinis writes that Badiou’s ethics of fidelity provides an innovative, albeit
limited, explanation of subject-becoming and political action, and boldly tries to expand
Badiou’s theory to include the opening up towards a possible future event as a
satisfactory precondition for the production of (collective) subjects, which in his/her/their
dynamic fidelity to the initial (semi?)event, realize another event.72 This, however, does
not solve the somewhat elliptical nature of Badiou’s theory of the event, but it does
significantly open the door to the danger of the event becoming a ‘transcendental’
organizing structure, a danger that is even without this conceptual innovation already one
of the points of criticism that can and has, as we will see, be levelled against Badiou’s
conceptualisation.73 I would instead propose a different route, which is to disregard
Badiou’s sometimes strategic but often rhetorical dialecticism, in order to open up a
productive dialogue between his thought and the conceptualisations of poststructuralism
and thus to mirror the developments we have identified before in the field of praxis.
Badiou’s polemical tendency to create adversaries (the ethical turn, democracy, the
philosophies of difference, to name just a few74), while a ‘fidelity’ to his own ethics of
rupture, obstructs our appreciation of the continuities between his theories and the
conceptualisations of his ‘enemies’. A particularly productive way to open up this
dialogue is, I believe, an exploration of the parallels and divergences between the theories of Badiou and Deleuze. I will henceforth venture on this path, not with the illusion to develop here a full-fledged theoretical synthesis which can comprehensively explain and push forward contemporary radical activism, but rather in the hope to outline a first stage of the long trajectory that might eventually lead to a sufficient (though never exhaustive) understanding of these events.

After a lecture Badiou gave in Buenos Aires in 2003 someone from the audience asked Badiou what are the ‘points of contact between your position and Deleuze’s thought, in relation to the Zapatista movement?’ Badiou answered as follows:

It is evident that there is something in common. There is a contact point, which is the following: a political process must unfold in a creative way, it must not be in contradiction with something. In other words, political creation is not forcibly dialectical. For example, the Zapatista movement is independent from the Mexican State, it is not defined by the contradiction with the state, and in this point we are in full agreement. Politics needs to be defined positively and not by its contradiction with something else. […] From that point on there would be discussions. The discussion would be about the question of rupture. In Deleuze’s philosophy there is a powerful continuity, there is no negation; there is the creation of life, becoming. I think, of course, that politics needs to be its own affirmation, but also that this affirmation presupposes rupture.75

To extend the point of agreement Badiou identified, I would say both Deleuze’s and Badiou’s projects can arguably be characterized as investigations into the creative possibilities of philosophy and praxis to produce the radically new. In other words, they could be summarized as ontologies of change. In its simplest terms then, as I have said before*, the dispute between Deleuze and Badiou is about how the radically new can come to be. For Badiou the new cannot be truly new if it does not break radically with the past. For Deleuze on the other hand, the new cannot be conceived outside of the continuous and immanent multiplicity of the virtual or what Bergson has called, ‘duration’, or ‘creative evolution’. Doing so runs the risk of reintroducing transcendence into philosophy.76 An event is for Badiou a radical break with what came before the event. Thus conceiving the event within a continuity as Deleuze does, is a bridge too far for Badiou. Furthermore, Badiou talks of events as exceptional happening while Deleuze

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*I repeat here and in some of the following paragraphs some arguments and formulations that I have used before in my paper ‘Beehives and Invertebrates, Worldmaking Through Biological Metaphors’, presented at the European Summer School for Cultural Studies (Giessen, Germany) on 30 July 2007.<www.raymondvandewiel.nl/biological_metaphors.pdf>
sees the world as a continuous stream of events, affirming, Badiou would say, the One chaotic Event of life. Badiou thus concludes that Deleuze’s immanent virtuality is a return of the metaphysical One, or the Whole or Substance if you will, while Deleuze, on the other hand, concludes that it is precisely Badiou’s evental truth-procedure that will reintroduce the transcendental in the guise of the multiple. Their disagreement could thus be summarized in the question whose metaphysics of the multiple is the most productive one? It is this ‘inherent philosophical tension’ between their two ontologies that, according to Badiou, ‘characterizes our turn of the century.’ He places Deleuze in a lineage that goes back to the Stoics and further includes Spinoza, Nietzsche and Bergson. He doesn’t specify his own ‘lineage’, but we could at least say that he stands in the tradition of Bachelard, whose discussions with Bergson in the 1930s mirror today’s dispute between Badiou and Deleuze.

Badiou describes another way in which their ‘quarrel’ can be formulated: ‘We could approach it by way of [the question]: how is it that, for Deleuze, politics is not an autonomous form of thought, a singular section of chaos, one that differs from art, science and philosophy? This is a criticism that Badiou has formulated more often against Deleuze. ‘In generalizing politics everywhere, Deleuze’s system lacks a specifically political register of thought’, this in contrast to the fields of art, science and politics that Deleuze and Guattari distinguish in their What is Philosophy? For Badiou, as Nicholas Thoburn points out, the marker of a political register is the commitment to an analysis which takes capitalism as its central feature. As we have seen above, Deleuze maintains that capitalism has always remained central to his analyses, but Badiou nevertheless reads the fact that Deleuze does not carve out an isolated field for politics as a sign that his politics in last instance lacks an immanent creative power. So even though they agree on the fact that a political process must unfold creatively, he suggests Deleuze’s theory ultimately cannot deliver such a creative unfolding of the radically new.

Here Thoburn comes to Deleuze’s rescue and argues that Deleuze’s project does develop a politics of invention specifically geared towards (or should I say geared against) capital. ‘And it is the very difficulty of, and commitment to, this project that necessitates that Deleuze does not delineate [a] specifically political register of thought.’ Deleuze’s conception of politics, he writes, is linked to what Deleuze and Guattari described as the calling forth of a ‘new earth’ and a ‘new people’ and is thus not reducible to politics proper: it is not about representation but about creation, undetermined and continually open, but not abstract. Rather it develops as a practical and active project that is yet to be formed, always escapes and thus in a way breaks with that which is already formed, in a continual and inventive engagement with the ‘real’ world, by thinking and acting within ‘world-wide assemblages’.

This conception of politics has several structural parallels to Badiou’s concept of politics or ‘metapolitics,’ as he calls it. First, of course, (despite Badiou’s contestation) it
also focuses on the creative unfolding of the new. Also, it, just like Badiou’s politics, couldn’t be further from the daily chatter of democratic fora, it too wants to escape what Deleuze called ‘opinion-doxa’. The two thinkers are furthermore both vehemently opposed to the logic of the State which arrests concepts like democracy but also justice and freedom, and which imposes, in Deleuze’s words, models and forms. Of course there still seem to be enough points of divergence, but it is unclear to me why Badiou would say that exactly this ‘point’ of the non-specificity of politics ‘bears witness to our divergence’ and that ‘there is a sense in which everything can be said to follow from it.’

In his new book Logics of Worlds of 2006, Badiou seems to have revised his opinion on Deleuze’s politics. In the introduction he sets up an opposition. ‘Today, natural belief can be summarized in a single statement: There are only bodies and languages.’ This statement, or its anthropological variation ‘there are only individuals and communities’ is, according to Badiou, ‘the axiom of our contemporary conviction’. Badiou proposes to name this conviction democratic materialism. Later he also calls it a materialism of life, a bio-materialism. Badiou then proposes to counter this kind of materialism with what he calls a ‘materialistic dialectic’ which he summarizes as follows: ‘There are only bodies and languages, except that there are truths.’

Deleuze, as part of what Badiou describes as the organicist paradigm of Nietzsche, Bergson and Deleuze (the modern representatives of the lineage that we have seen before) is clearly the inspiration for democratic materialism. Badiou has in no unclear terms distinguished himself in earlier works from this organicist tradition which he opposes to his own mathematical paradigm. At the same time, however, Deleuze is said to stubbornly resist the ‘devastating gains made by democratic materialism’ and is consequently enlisted, together with the whole organicist lineage which is renamed ‘vitalist mysticism’, in the fight against democratic materialism and thus headed under the materialist dialectic, despite Deleuze’s vehement criticism of the dialectic in any form.

This, I would suggest, is part of a substantial reorientation of Badiou’s project that he undertakes in Logics of Worlds. In this book he aims to extend the purely ontological conclusions on the level of pure being and the abstract form of the subject that we find in Being and Event towards more concrete forms of being-there, of the subject at the level of embodied points of truth or of the world. It is here, thus, that his politics come even closer to Deleuze’s who also, as we saw, champions an engagement with the ‘real’ world, by thinking and acting within world-wide assemblages. The reorientation is not limited to Badiou’s politics, however, but also comprises his ontology. Peter Hallward made the following observation in his 2003 book Badiou: A Subject to Truth:

Deleuze delights in describing mechanisms of transformation between the most varied levels of ontological intensity and the most disparate registers of being
(chemical, cosmic, animal, mechanical, molecular, and so on. His is a univocity that aligns these very different sorts of reality on the same ‘plane of consistency’. Badiou’s univocity operates, on the contrary, by disregarding the particularity of beings in favor of the abstract homogeneity of their being as being. When push comes to shove […] his ontology cannot itself then describe the steps whereby univocity is maintained over the expansion of its field of inquiry to include the various concrete situations that compose material or historical existence. […] In order to match Deleuze’s comprehensive embrace, Badiou will need to develop a logic of material or organic situations that demonstrates how their structurings are indeed consistent with the basic axioms of set theory.  

This deficiency is corrected in Logics of Worlds with the development of a logic of affective-concrete, material or organic ‘bodies’ consistent with the abstract punctualism of Badiou’s mathematising idealism. And this at the cost, I would suggest, of the abstract adherence to rupture.

Again I emphasize that there are still many points of division, but all in all we can conclude that Badiou’s and Deleuze’s projects are not as far removed from each other as it might seem at a first glance. It is, in my view, a task of utmost importance to further develop an integration of these two discourses so as to be able to forge the creation of new concepts that will creatively ‘push forward’ both critical thought and praxis. For even though Badiou is mildly positive about the current developments in radical activism, writing that ‘we are entering into a long period of recomposition, both for emancipatory political thought and for those effective practical forces that correspond to it,’ his scepticism about the anti-globalization [altermondialisme] movement should be read as a warning that the integration between the cultural politics and political-economic discourse should not be glorified as the endpoint of innovation. In fact, we need only look at the object of this paper to see that without a constant creative production of the radically new, even monumental events can easily lose their momentum.

Today the Zapatistas have lost much of their original flair. They are no longer a leading voice in the radical landscape in Mexico, let alone in the world. The reasons for this demise are manifold and I will not go into them here. There is, however, no reason to lament, because as Deleuze would say, ‘even if they […] become assimilated into new forms of knowledge, for a while […] they [had] a real rebellious spontaneity. […] they [appeared] for a moment, and it’s that moment that matters, it’s the chance we must seize.’ Even if the material traces of that rebellious spontaneity are wiped out by capitalism, it leaves something behind: ‘An event can be turned around, repressed, co-opted, betrayed, but there is still something that cannot be outdated. […] It is an opening
onto the possible.' And it is, says Deleuze, a matter of hanging on to this ‘possible’, in
the words of Badiou ‘Keep going!’ It is here that the politics and the praxis of
the exclamation mark merge and together face the promise of another world.

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Cf. Golden (February 8, 1994)

Golden (February 8, 1994)

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84 Thoburn, p. 5.
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