



The Infernal Desire Machines of Deleuze and Guattari

Angela Carter's Piqueresque Search for a Feminist Subjectivity

Raymond van de Wiel

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
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Illustrations

- Cover** Dali, Salvador *The Persistence of Memory* (1931) detail.
Gilbert and George *Cabbage Worship* (1982) detail.
Picasso, Pablo *Nessus and Djanira* (1920).
Raphael *School of Athens* (1510-11) detail.
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Das ist die Struktur des menschlichen Geistes

12.11.1970

Preface

Reading is just as creative an activity as writing and most intellectual development depends upon new readings of old texts.

—Angela Carter, 'Notes from the Front Line'

One can ask questions about the relevance of yet another interpretation of Angela Carter's *The Infernal Desire Machines of Doctor Hoffman*. I will refer simply to the quotation above which I subscribe wholeheartedly. Back in September 1996, while strolling through Waterstones Gower Street which I passed every day on my walk from the old oval reading-room of the British Library to Euston Square tube station, I came across Carter's aforementioned novel. I have, since then, put my teeth in the speculative relation between the theories of Gilles Deleuze and Carter's narrative simply because the title of her book reminded me of the 'desiring-machines' that Deleuze conceptualises in collaboration with Félix Guattari in their *Anti-Oedipus*. These are old texts, in fact, they are both exactly as old as I am, and the readings I will present in this thesis are, at least to some extent, new readings, for they are *my* readings in which resonate my personal views, preferences, and questions. And although I may not have come up with startling answers, this dialogue between *Anti-Oedipus* and *Dr Hoffman* has led to an extensive study of postmodern philosophy and literary theory which has not only broadened my theoretical horizon but also profoundly influenced my 'real' life in many ways (just as my real life has influenced the direction of my research). This iterative process has helped me to find my own voice, more libidinal and rhizomatic than before, and in that sense it has contributed to my intellectual development, and that is, basically, enough reason for yet another interpretation of *Dr Hoffman*.

However, having said this, I also wish to emphasise that, although I have no illusions, this interpretation is, in my view, pertinent for other reasons. Leafing through the pile of Carter criticism that I have gathered in the past three years, there is only one reference to Deleuze and Guattari's book. Mention is made of the very terminological similarity that had attracted my attention in that London bookstore, but before it is even seriously considered, any conscious relation between the two works is denounced.¹ I believe there *is* a conscious relation between *Dr Hoffman* and *Anti-Oedipus*, but it is not my primary aim to substantiate this conviction. What I do wish to corroborate, however, is that even if Carter had no knowledge of Deleuze and Guattari's theories whatsoever, bringing her fictional world in dialogue with their theoretical work is undeniably productive. It will, in my view, shed a new light on Carter's complicated narrative and on the specific feminist position it advocates, and it will, at the same time, add a distinctive voice to the choir of feminist critiques on Deleuze and Guattari's conceptualisations.

The attitudes of both Carter and Deleuze and Guattari vis-à-vis feminism have been terrains of vigorous debates. Deleuze and Guattari have always been declared proponents of the feminist struggle. Especially Guattari, a radical psychiatrist, has in his work and life shown a continuous sympathy for marginalised groups including, besides women, immigrants, gays, and psychiatric patients. Deleuze's work antecedent to *Anti-Oedipus* is very academic, but he organized, together with Michel Foucault, de *Groupe d'Information sur les Prisons*, which critically monitored prison circumstances, and demonstrated his solidarity with the calls for educational reform by joining the faculty of the University of Paris' experimental campus at Vincennes.² In *Anti-Oedipus* Deleuze and Guattari plant the seed for a revolutionary politics for 'minorities' among which they also gather the inhabitants of formerly colonised countries. This theory is

expounded in their *Kafka: For a Minor Literature* (1975) and has reverberated since then in many of their joint works, most prominently in the second volume of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia: A Thousand Plateaus* (1980). The productivity of their conceptualisations for feminism, however, has been questioned.

The same goes for Carter. She has been a self-confessed feminist, but this identification with the feminist struggle did not guarantee a secure repose in the bosom of sisterhood. Before *Dr Hoffman* Carter had written five novels, a collection of poetry, and various children's stories, but these were admittedly written as a 'male impersonator'.³ In the aftermath of the countercultural rebellion in 1968 she, however, rapidly radicalised as a feminist. This is explicitly evident in *The Passion of New Eve* (1977) and her non-fiction work *The Sadeian Woman: An Exercise in Cultural History* (1979). The former has, until recently, by and large been neglected⁴ and the latter has been heavily criticised by radical feminists for its ostensible celebration of pornography.⁵ Carter nevertheless persisted in writing eccentric fantasies and controversial commentaries, and even gained critical acclaim, especially with her collection of rewritten fairy-tales *The Bloody Chamber and Other Stories* (1979) and with her novels *Nights at the Circus* (1984) and *Wise Children* (1991). Critics, however, remained to have difficulty in situating her work in relation to feminism.

A dialogue between *Dr Hoffman* and *Anti-Oedipus* will, I believe, be helpful for the illumination of the respective positions of its writers towards feminism. I will, in this thesis, mainly focus on Carter's appropriation of Deleuze and Guattari's ideas about subjectivity. This will show that her 'ex-centric' position is a mixture of feminism and socialism which seems to mediate between French and British feminist positions, a search for a radically materialist and embodied subjectivity, a quest for de-essentialised female desire.

In the introductory chapter I will deal with the reception of *Dr Hoffman* and try to form my own ideas about the novel on the basis of these diverse readings. In Chapter Two I will characterise Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus* and try to explain it using some of their older work, focusing on their ideas about subjectivity. In Chapter Three, then, I will bring these two works into resonance, focusing on various feminist ideas about subjectivity. This, I believe, will in the end lead to an appreciation of the meaning of Deleuze and Guattari's work for feminism and an understanding of the novel as a search for a post-poststructuralist female subjectivity.

I wish extend my gratitude to many people but I will only name four women: firstly, Martine de Vos, who was, for a long time, my supervisor and gave me the freedom to experiment; secondly, Aleid Fokkema, my 'final' first supervisor who has helped to shape my mind and to work efficiently towards an ending; thirdly, Rosi Braidotti, who has commented upon my reading of Deleuze and Guattari, and finally, my mother Jeanne, who was my greatest inspiration for finishing this piece of writing.

Chapter One: Introduction

If I can't dance, I don't want to be part of your revolution.
—Emma Goldman

'I remember everything,' says Desiderio at the beginning of *The Infernal Desire Machines of Doctor Hoffman*, his attempt to chronicle the adventures that befell him when he was young. Now he is 'old and famous' and is asked to write down his memories of the 'Great War': 'I must unravel my life as if it were so much knitting and pick out from that tangle the single, original thread of my self, the self who as a young man happened to become a hero and then grew old.' (p. 1) What follows is a haunting and bewildering account of the 'kinetic times, the time of actualised desires' in which the 'diabolical' Dr Hoffman filled the city with mirages 'in order to drive us all mad':

Nothing in the city was what it seemed - nothing at all! Because Dr Hoffman, you see, was waging a massive campaign against human reason itself. (...) Hardly anything remained the same for more than a second and the city was no longer a conscious production of humanity; it had become the arbitrary realm of dream. (pp. 11, 18)

Dr Hoffman's first disruptive coup was effected in the Opera House where, during a performance of *The Magic Flute*, the entire audience, except Desiderio, was turned into peacocks. While, as Desiderio writes, the enemy was 'inside the barricades, and lived inside the minds of each of us', he himself remained immune. 'I could not abnegate my reality and lose myself for ever as others did, blasted to non-being by the ferocious artillery of unreason. I was too sardonic. I was too disaffected. (...) I believed perfection was, *per se*, impossible and so the most seductive phantoms could not allure me because I knew they were not true.' (pp 11-12) Because of his 'skill at crossword puzzles' which 'suggested a facility in the process of analogical thought which might lead me to the Doctor where everyone else failed' (p. 40), Desiderio is asked to become a secret agent for the Minister of Determination, the single-handed ruler of the city. This assignment results in a 'journey through space and time, up a river, across a mountain, over the sea, through a forrest', a quest that leads us from the 'masculine' city past the most bizarre civilisations and landscapes to the enemy headquarters where, finally, he is forced to choose between the harsh, logical positivism of the Minister of Determination and the kaleidoscopic unreality of Dr Hoffman and his beautiful daughter Albertina. After having been shown around the Doctor's desire machines and after having seen which place was assigned for him in them, he prefers the 'barren yet harmonious calm' to the 'fertile yet cacophonous tempest' and kills both the doctor and his beloved Albertina, concluding that 'the impossible is, *per se*, impossible.' (p. 221)

The novel is written shortly after the euphoria of the late 1960s which Angela Carter describes as 'a brief period of public philosophical awareness that occurs only very occasionally in human history; (...) truly it felt like Year One.'¹ Despite this seemingly positive appraisal of the period, *Dr Hoffman* can be seen as a disillusioned response to the counter-culture which emanated graffities like 'Be realistic: demand the impossible'.² This interpretation seems to be substantiated by the author in a 1985 interview in which she says that *Dr Hoffman* was meant to be a bleak celebration: 'It was clearly a departure from the 1960s. With regret and homesickness I ended up at the side of rationality, of logical positivism.'³

Several critics have pointed towards this allegorical reading. David Punter, for instance, writes that 'we can read the text as a series of figures for the defeat of the political aspirations of the 1960s, and in particular of the father-figures of liberation, Reich and Marcuse.'⁴ While Punter reads the novel elegiacally, Ricarda Smith reads it completely different, that is to say, as a critique of the counter-culture. 'Carter does not write about a revolution that went wrong, because (...) [the] reactionary forces were still too strong,' she argues, 'but about the painful insight that such a revolution would not be liberating.'⁵ Smith also sees the doctor as an allegory of Marcuse but asserts that Carter, instead of taking an ambiguous stance towards the Doctor/philosopher, critically 'contradicts Marcuse's optimistic view that (...) highly advanced productivity makes a "non-repressive civilisation" possible.'⁶

Susan Rubin Suleiman writes that she finds both Punter's and Smith's readings plausible, but she is 'surprised' that neither one mentions Surrealism, because 'Dr. Hoffman is, both textually and representationally, much more of a Surrealist than a Marcuse.'⁷ Although her main argument holds that *Dr Hoffman* is 'a novel of as well as about Surrealist imagination'⁸, and despite the fact that she repeatedly describes the 'Doctor-poet' as a 'Surrealist image-maker' she denounces the fact that he is simply an allegory of Surrealism. 'If he is an allegory of anything,' she suggests, 'it is of the technological appropriation (but I prefer the gallicism "recuperation") of Surrealism and liberal philosophy—precisely that recuperation that Marcuse himself, not at all optimistically, analyzed as early as the 1961 preface to the re-edition of *Eros and Civilization*.'⁹ So she denounces Punter's and Smith's readings but at the same time there is a truth to her statement that she finds both readings plausible, for she combines the tone of melancholy voiced by Punter with the disenchantment that Smith perceives. The liberating *potential* of the imagination of the counterculture is actual, she seems to say, but it simply fails to resist dialectical recuperation. The aspired triumph of the Pleasure Principle over the Reality Principle is obstructed by what Marcuse called 'repressive desublimation'. 'The immense capabilities of the advanced industrial society', writes Marcuse, 'are increasingly mobilized against the utilization of its own resources for the pacification of human existence. (...) The modes of domination have changed: they have become increasingly technological, productive, and even beneficial; consequently, in the most advanced areas of industrial society, the people have been co-ordinated and reconciled with the system of domination to an unprecedented degree.'¹⁰

Suleiman then turns to Guy Debord's *La Société du spectacle*, which mirrors Marcuse's pessimism. 'All the life of societies in which modern condition of production dominate presents itself as an immense accumulation of *spectacles*', claims Debord. 'Everything that was directly lived has distanced itself in a representation.'¹¹ Suleiman continues stating that '[i]f we now think of Dr. Hoffman's desire machines for projecting representations on the world, we may see in Carter's mad scientist the nightmarish synthesis of repressive desublimation and the society of the spectacle.'¹² What then, she asks, is the fate of Surrealist imagination in the society of the spectacle? It is not good, she concludes. 'At best,' she writes, "'la révolution surréaliste" becomes a private passion, not a means to change the world.'¹³ The same, she seems to say, goes for the counterculturalists, whose revolutionary aspirations had dissipated by the early 1970s. Having been embraced and, consequently, rendered null and void by mainstream common sense, their imagination too has proved unable to resist dialectical recuperation, or, as Régis Debray writes: 'The sincerity of the actors of May was accompanied, and overtaken, by a cunning of which they knew nothing (...) They accomplished the opposite of what they intended. (...) Capital's development strategy required the cultural revolution of May.'¹⁴

Whereas Suleiman and Debray see the revolutionary spirit of the 1960s as what Deleuze calls a 'deterritorialisation' which is immediately 'reterritorialised' by capitalism¹⁵, Daniel Bell regards the dominant culture and the opposition to it as two sides of the same coin:

The so-called counter-culture was a children's crushade that sought to eliminate the line between fantasy and reality and act out in life its impulses under a banner of liberation. It claimed to mock bourgeois prudishness, when it was only flaunting the closet behaviour of its liberal parents. It claimed to be new and daring when it was only repeating in more raucous form—its rock noise amplified in the electronic echo-chamber of the mass media—the youthful japes of a half-century before. It was less a counter-culture than a counterfeit culture.¹⁶

This interpretation of the counter-culture is more or less tantamount to some other critics' reading of *Dr Hoffman*. Elaine Jordan, for instance, who to some degree follows all aforementioned critics, writing that Hoffman is 'both the surreal, liberatory opposition to [the Minister] and capitalist control of desire through the media', concludes that 'in fact [Hoffman] and the Ministers are brothers really. Their war makes the world we live in.'¹⁷

With a reference to William Blake's prose poem *The Marriage of Heaven and Hell*, Colin Manlove comes to a similar conclusion:

It is the 'statis' (that is the word Carter uses) of the order of the city no more than the statis of the endless varieties of copulation at Dr Hoffman's castle and the multitudinous erotic images so generated that Angela Carter 'attacks'; she is party to neither side in the conflict, only viewing the conflict itself, as did Blake, as eternally necessary and eternally irresolvable: 'They should be enemies: whoever seeks to reconcile them seeks to destroy existence' (Blake). And equally, if one side 'wins', as Desiderio destroys Hoffman, Albertina and the castle, then 'what is gained', to paraphrase Edward Albee, 'is loss'.¹⁸

The text seems to substantiate this interpretation, presenting Albertina, rather literally, as the loss that comes with this choice. '[F]rom beyond the grave, her father has gained a tactical victory over me and forced on me at least the apprehension of an alternate world in which all the objects are emanations of a single desire. (...) At the game of metaphysical chess we played, I took away her father's queen and mated us both.' (p. 13-14)

On the basis of this stalemate in which the book ends Cornelia Bonca concludes that the novel is 'furiously pessimistic'.¹⁹ She agrees with Manlove that Carter has little sympathy with either side of the conflict: 'Carter's got no sympathy for [the Minister's] position. Yet it turns out she has little sympathy with Dr. Hoffman's revolutionary eroticism either. (...) The liberation of imagination and desire (...) creates its own power vacuum, which authoritative impulses rush to fill. So It's not just Reason that suppresses, as the liberal tradition insists; the images of Dr. Hoffman's desire machines, when totally unrestrained, create their own inexorable logic of domination.'²⁰ Because the novel 'offers no middle position where the powers of eros and the powers of reason can negotiate', because it 'lacks a vision that transcends the gap', Desiderio remains

'locked into the dialectic of excesses that characterizes the masculine power struggles of the minister and Dr. Hoffman'.²¹ This deadlock, Bonca concludes, simply 'overwhelms the possibilities of a positive vision.'²²

Andrzej Gasiorek agrees with Bonca that the Minister and Dr Hoffman are 'locked into a rigid dualism', but nevertheless concludes that Desiderio, 'as a result of the experiences that he undergoes (...) is enabled to see through the debilitating dichotomy of lawlessness and moralism' and that the book therefore *does* contain a positive vision.²³ He arrives at this conclusion by means of yet another allegorical, but highly original, reading of the novel:

Dr Hoffman works on many levels, but I want to focus primarily on its response to Plato's negative view of the poets in the *Republic*. That Carter has the *Republic* in mind is clear: (...) the conflict between Hoffman and the minister (...) replays the Platonic conflict between the appetitive and the rational parts of the soul. The figure of Desiderio, caught between two equally intransigent opponents, eventually moves beyond the dichotomous choice they propose, embracing a position that is closer to the Plato of *Phaedrus* than of the *Republic*.²⁴

Gasiorek claims that in the *Republic* Plato appears to oscillate between two negative conceptions of literature: on the one hand, it is trivial; on the other hand, it is extremely important because it can corrupt. 'Plato', he writes, 'seems to veer from the view that literature is outside the moral realm altogether to the view that it directly competes with philosophy's truth-claims and is therefore its most dangerous rival.'²⁵ The young Desiderio, as we have seen, conceives of the conflict between the Doctor/poet and Minister/philosopher in equally stark terms, saying the two alternatives could not possibly co-exist (p. 207). The old Desiderio, however, looking back on his life, thinks less of the benefits conferred by an ordered society than that of the price it exacts.²⁶ This price, of course, is Albertina, who, as Gasiorek suggests, is the evidence that 'eros may be energizing without being destructive.'²⁷ This loss, continues Gasiorek, 'helps to break down the assumption that the Minister and Hoffman offer a straightforward choice between morality and licentiousness' and thus enables Desiderio to see that both options are 'flip-sides of the same coin: totalitarianism.'²⁸ It is in this sense that the old Desiderio is closer to the Plato of *Phaedrus* than of the *Republic*:

[I]n *Phaedrus* [Plato] seems to acknowledge that [poetry] can express truths inaccessible to dialectic and that this means that the latter's claims to knowledge must be reappraised. Furthermore, his early view, in the *Ion*, for example, that poets are in the grip of a irrational possession that should be derided, is modified to one that accords such inspiration a high degree of respect. In the *Phaedrus* Socrates sees the frenzy that creates poetry as springing from a divine source. Like Plato, the elderly Desiderio's conception of the respective claims made by reason and desire, soul and body, philosophy and poetry, is more discriminating.²⁹

Gasiorek concludes that the novel's 'aporetic' form of closure resists a dualistic conception of reality that can only pit philosophy and poetry against one another. This hostility to binary thinking, he observes, is symptomatic for the 'theoretically explicit form of critical fiction' which Carter starts to write in the 1970s.

Her novels from this era 'break down dichotomies such as (...) order/chaos, reason/passion, and exploit the ambiguous space that opens up between them. (...) Liminal states, thresholds, margins—all these surface again and again in Carter's work because they undermine intellectual certainties, thereby providing her with a point of entry for her own cultural critique.'³⁰

We are thus presented with various ideas about Carter's evaluation of the counterculture of the 1960s and its waning. They range from the melancholy Punter perceives to the disillusionment that Smith registers, from the pessimism voiced by Bonca to the optimism implicit in Gasiorek's realisation that eros may be energising without being destructive. Suleiman, as I pointed out before, combines melancholy with disillusionment about the libertarian movement which had been recuperated dialectically by the mainstream. This idea is shared by Sarah Gamble who writes:

Although Carter's exploitation of the fashion, settings, attitudes and politics of the counterculture was never straightforward, it did at least give her a discourse through which to articulate her differences with the mainstream. As she portrays it, however, this position is no longer satisfactory in the seventies. The political dissension of the counterculture has metamorphosed into an inarticulate hooliganism, and, can thus no longer function as a valid vehicle for protest.³¹

This reflects both melancholy, for it did give Carter a point of entry for her cultural critique, and a tone of disenchantment which parallels Desiderio's disillusionment when he realises that he 'might not want the Minister's world but [...] did not want the Doctor's world either', because the latter 'might know the nature of the inexhaustible plus, but, all the same, he was a totalitarian.' (p. 207) It left Carter, according to Gamble, 'on the edge', in an 'ex-centric' position—again, just like Desiderio. The action of the book, she writes, is motivated by Desiderio's contradictory engagement with his desire to move from margins to the centre. But 'while he dreams of inclusion, he does not actually want it,' she argues pointing at the murder of Albertina for proof. 'And certainly, on the terms offered by Albertina, inclusion is not an attractive prospect. (...) [H]e would [have to] exchange the dubious freedom of life on the margins for an even more dubious slavery to Dr Hoffman.'³² Gamble finally reads the book as a celebration of marginality, writing that Desiderio's 'inability to surrender his ex-centric position proves to be his salvation as well as his curse, showing that a place on the margin has its merits, after all. (...) [E]ver the inveterate observer, Desiderio, watches and narrates in horrified fascination from the sidelines.'³³

Here we see that Gamble not only integrates melancholy and disillusionment when trying to describe Carter's stance on the counterculture, but also parallels Gasiorek's optimism in that she seems to say that Carter, seeing through the debilitating dichotomy that appears to offer a straightforward choice between morality and licentiousness, has finally found her own voice. Carter, she writes, creates in her 1970s writings an authorial persona which 'publicly constructs her as a marginal subject on the personal, cultural and historical level.'³⁴ She tries to explain Carter's 'adoption of a "stranger's eye" with regard to her own culture' by means of her two-year period of voluntary exile starting in 1969. Travelling around the world on the proceeds of the Somerset Maugham Award for *Several Perceptions*, she ended up in Japan where she, tall and blond, obviously, remained an outsider. Carter's essay 'Fin the Siècle' seems to support Gamble's interpretation that she feels ill at ease in 1970s London in which graffiti 'chart the ideological blossoming,

waxing and waning of the consciousness of a decade, of the sixties.³⁵ She says she sees 'innumerable signs of change here—but no signs of growth. (...) Returning to London. It is like coming to a new city, where all the signs have changed and people speak another language.'³⁶ Gamble specifies these changes and Carter's reaction as following:

[W]hen she commented on the sixties, she was regarding a society which celebrated its own tendency to artifice, and made of it, in itself, an art form. George Melly describes sixties 'pop' culture as 'an ambivalent thing, part tongue in cheek, part sincere, but never unconscious', and it was this very self-consciousness which Carter both admired and adopted as her own. She regarded the seventies with a jaundiced eye, however, precisely because it seemed to her to have rediscovered the habit of 'universalisation', normalising cultural codes by encoding them as 'natural', and hence unchangeable. Her role, as an onlooker both alien and alienated, was to defamiliarise that which has been constructed as familiar.³⁷

Lorna Sage also observes that Carter was in the aftermath of the 1960s becoming more and more obsessed with the notion that 'what we accept as natural is the product of a particular history.'³⁸ Sage also sees Japan as triggering in this respect: 'Self-consciousness had been her bane from the start, hence the anorexia. But, while most women come out to the other side and learn to act naturally, she managed not to, and Japan is the shorthand, I think, for how. She discovered and retained a way of looking at herself, and other people, as unnatural.'³⁹

Suleiman, however, points at another reason for the foundering of the 'surrealist imagination' on the shoals of the society of the spectacle. She acknowledges, as we saw, that this imagination is recuperated dialectically because the people had been co-ordinated and reconciled with the system of domination to an unprecedented degree, and in this she parallels Punter analysis. At the same time, however, she seems to agree with Smith, that the novel is about the realisation that this revolutionary imagination would not be liberating. Dialectical recuperation is only possible when opposition remains partial, and as Bonca and Jordan point out, the Minister and Dr Hoffman are 'brothers' in their 'male conceptions of sexuality' and thus, Suleiman concludes, the revolutionary potential is not realised because of its inherent sexual politics. Carter allegedly comes to realise that the revolutionary imagination of the counterculture is not liberating *for women*.

Both Gamble and Sage acknowledge this turn to feminism as an second important explanation of Carter's new critical position. Carter herself combines these two explanations in various essays. 'In Japan', she wrote, 'I learnt what it was to be a woman and became radicalised.'⁴⁰ And: '[M]y female consciousness *was* being forged out of the contradictions of my experience as a traveller.'⁴¹ But the seed was planted in the sixties, as she writes in her 1983 article 'Notes from the Front Line':

I can date to that time and to some of those debates and to the sense of heightened awareness of the society around me in the summer of 1968, my own questioning of the nature of my reality as a *woman*. How that social fiction of my 'femininity' was created, by means outside my control, and palmed off on me as the real thing.

This investigation of the social fictions that regulate our lives—what Blake called the ‘mind forg’d manacles’—is what I’ve concerned myself with consciously since that time.⁴²

She continues with the statement that she is ‘in the demythologising business’ because myths are ‘consolatory nonsense’ and ‘extraordinary lies designed to make people unfree.’ Myths, she writes in the ‘polemical introduction’ to *The Sadeian Woman* (1979), deal in false universals, in order to ease the pain of particular circumstances. This, she claims, is especially true for the mythical representation of the relations between the sexes:

All archetypes are unreal, but some more than others. The sexual difference is undeniable but male and female behaviour can only partially be traced back to it, is relatively detached from it; these behavioural patterns are culturally determined variables which are fashioned into universals in common language. Furthermore, archetypes only draw attention away from the main issue: sexual relations are determined by history and by the historical fact of the economic dependence of women upon men. This fact now almost entirely belongs to the past. (...) Nevertheless, the economical dependence of women is a fiction in which one remains to believe and which allegedly is accompanied by an emotional dependence, which is seen as a (...) natural fact.⁴³

So, we can say, that Carter is in the denaturalising business: ‘stripped of their veneer of “naturalness”, [ideologies] can be exposed as the constructions they are, and thus capable of being dismantled and rebuilt in different forms.’⁴⁴ And in those ‘heady days of the early 1970s’ in which it was possible to ‘lump all the oppressive, life-denying systems together under one label—patriarchy’ her primary goal seemed to be the dismantling of that ‘social fiction’ called femininity, that mythical representation of the relations between the sexes.⁴⁵

There are only very few critics that completely disregard Carter’s feminist coming out when discussing *Dr Hoffman*.⁴⁶ There is, nevertheless, considerable disagreement on the question whether the book is, as Cornel Bonca claims, ‘Carter’s last novel where “sexuality” isn’t gendered’, or, rather, her first novel which, as Sarah Gamble writes, ‘finds [its] expression of protest in the language of feminism.’⁴⁷

David Punter, seeing the novel as a historical allegory, seems to agree with Bonca. He writes that both *Dr Hoffman* and Carter’s subsequent novel, *The Passion of New Eve* (1977), ‘are to do with the unconscious and its shapes, and thus to do with sexuality’ but, he continues, ‘what is new in *New Eve* is that the issue of sexuality is linked directly to the different issue of gender.’⁴⁸ He claims that the two novels relate to each other ‘precisely along the lines of the development of recent theoretical debate about [subject] construction, and specifically about the exact point at which gender enters as a structuring principle.’⁴⁹ Andrzej Gasiorek, portraying the development of Desiderio as parallel to that of Plato, does read in this narrative a deconstruction of the traditional dualistic conception of reality that separates reason from passion, but, like Punter, asserts that only Carter’s subsequent novels criticise traditional accounts of gender ‘suggesting that its representations (...) are deceptions, shadow dances behind which lie complex structures of power.’⁵⁰ What remains implicit in his analysis is explicated by Colin Manlove who writes that, in opposition to *New Eve* which, he claims, clearly has something to say about gender, *Dr Hoffman* has ‘no clear “theme”,

no evident social, political or even sexual meaning. The whole book seems to occur on a metaphysical level that puts it beyond ordinary concerns, seems too to be self contained, a fantasy that is about the making of fantasy itself.⁵¹

Gamble agrees that *Dr Hoffman* is a narrative about narrative but argues that 'it would be inaccurate to thus conclude that *Hoffman's* attention is focused totally inwards upon the issue of its own formation. On the contrary, it engages with the world of the "real" more radically than any of Carter's novels have done before.'⁵² And what it engages with, she claims, is precisely what Gasiorek identifies as being behind the shadow dances of the cultural iconography of the gender difference: 'this novel is an extremely politicised analysis of power and colonisation,' writes Gamble, and she finds kindred spirits for this opinion in Susan Suleiman, and Sally Robinson. 'Where culture's master narratives are losing their authority in this deconstructing textual world,' writes the latter, 'the power relations embedded within white capitalist patriarchy remain intact.'⁵³ And Suleiman, as we have seen, also points to the fact that women's place remains identical in both the Minister's logical positivism and Dr Hoffman's 'surrealist imagination'. 'Technology and capitalism change with the times—modern/postmodern, industrial, mechanical/digital', she writes, but 'sexual politics, by contrast, is timeless, transcultural, international.'⁵⁴

Carter's essay 'The Alchemy of the World' seems to confirm Suleiman's conviction that *Dr Hoffman* is a novel of and about surrealist imagination and Dr Hoffman is a surrealist. 'Like many libertarians, Breton had, in action, a marked authoritarian streak', she wrote. And: 'The surrealists were not good with women. That is why, although I thought they were wonderful, I had to give them up in the end. (...) When I realised that surrealist art did not recognise I had my own rights to liberty and love and vision as an autonomous being, not as a projected image, I got bored with it and wandered away.'⁵⁵ However, Carter comes to the same conclusion with regard to the sexual liberation of the sixties, which, she came to realise, did not equate with feminist liberation: 'Still and all there remained something out of joint and it turned out that it was, rather an important thing, that all the time I thought that things were going so well I was in reality a second-class citizen.'⁵⁶ Hence the tone of disenchantment.

Albertina could stand for Carter's ambiguous relation towards both surrealism and counterculturalism. About the surrealists she wrote, as I quoted above, that she thought they were wonderful, and about the graffiti of those 'dear dead days' of counterculturalism she writes that they are 'beautiful thoughts for the pure in heart.'⁵⁷ So, while she had to give them up in the end, she was left with a feeling of homesickness, mirroring the insatiable tears Desiderio sheds for Albertina. Hence the tone of melancholy.

All the same, as Carter herself says, 'writers like Marcuse and Adorno were as much part of my personal process of maturing into feminism as experiments with my sexual and emotional life and with various intellectual adventures in anarcho-surrealism.'⁵⁸ Thus, we could see the sixties and her initial admiration of 'anarcho-surrealism' as a necessary step towards the realisation that she was, as she writes, suffering a degree of 'colonisation of the mind'. It is in this sense that the battle between the Minister and Dr Hoffman, despite the fact that, as Elaine Jordan writes, they are 'brothers really' who are, in Bonca's words, locked in masculine power struggles, can be seen as productive and affirmative, not only in Gasiorek's metafictional evaluation, but also for feminism. It enabled her to mature into a truly authentic 'ex-centric' voice. Hence the tone of optimism.

It is ultimately unimportant whether *Dr Hoffman* is a novel of and about surrealist imagination or countercultural imagination, for I think both readings are possible. What is more important, I think, is to conclude whether or not it is a novel of and about feminist imagination. The answer to this question is two-fold and shines a light over the aforementioned discussion regarding this subject.

The answer is no when we, as mainstream feminism did at the time, define 'feminist imagination' as a separate ur-imagination of the sisterhood.⁵⁹ Carter, however, ex-centric as she was not only to the mainstream, but also to the margins, in this case feminism, has repeatedly distanced herself from such a position and calls it 'the Utopian aspect of traditional feminism.'⁶⁰ In 'The Language of the Sisterhood' she argues that a 'women only' language faces a curious paradox. It creates a universality which is both true and false. 'It is imaginative compensation for historical powerlessness yet is rooted in a perfectly real sense of camaraderie of impotent yet sensitive condition.' A concentration on the particularity of female experience, she writes, conceals the real economic nature of the—similarly real—bond between women.⁶¹ It would thus not be engaged in the decolonisation of 'our language and our basic habits of thought', not actively precipitate change, but rather mythologise things a bit more.⁶²

It is, I think, this denunciation of female essentialism that has led to the often fierce feminist criticism against Carter.⁶³ I think this also played a role in Bonca's reading of *Dr Hoffman*. The question that underlies her analysis is whether a text that so acutely details the dangerous economies of male desire lurking behind narrative and representation does not simply reinforce the power of these economies and thus closes off the possibilities of changing them.⁶⁴ 'How', in Robinson's words, 'can a text that seems so violently to foreclose on female subjectivity be read as a feminist critique of narrative structures?'⁶⁵ Carter's answer to this question lies, I think, in the assertion in *The Sadeian Woman* that 'sexual relations between men and women always render explicit the nature of social relations in the society in which they take place and if described explicitly, will form a critique of those relations.'⁶⁶ Thus, we could conclude, the extreme and violent misogyny which recurs throughout the novel, has a critical function. Robinson speaks of a 'strategic engagement' with traditional representations of women. This, she says, brings to the surface what usually remains underground: the complicities between desire and domination.⁶⁷

Thus, I think *Dr Hoffman* is a novel of and about feminist imagination, but it addresses this subject in a way which was highly uncommon at the time of writing. Reading Bonca's article carefully, one will see, at various points, references to an alleged need for a 'specifically female sexuality'.⁶⁸ Because there is no such thing in *Dr Hoffman*, the novel 'written at the tail end of an era that failed to bring many promises to fruition' would be 'furiously pessimistic'.⁶⁹ But this, I think, does not do right to Carter's ex-centric position which does not straightforwardly reprove the liberation of imagination and desire that was sought for by the counterculturalists (or the surrealists, for that matter). Rather, I would say, she continues this struggle, but does so on her own, feminist, terms. As she says, with regard to the surrealist revolution: '*La lutte continue*. It continues because it has to. This world is all we have.'⁷⁰

It is in this committed materialism in which she finds an ally in Gilles Deleuze. It is especially the parallels and divergences between *Dr Hoffman* and the first product of Deleuze's long-term collaboration with Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, that I want to consider. In this book, which is published in the same year as *Dr Hoffman*, Deleuze and Guattari conceptualise the *machines désirantes*, translated in 1977 as 'desiring-machines'. I believe that this terminological similarity should be read as one of the more important

intertextual references Carter makes in *Dr Hoffman*, but I do not propose to rest my case on a direct relationship between the two books. I intend, rather, to show that a dialogue between Deleuze and Guattari and Carter is productive. That is not to say that I deny the possibility of influence along similar lines from other sources—other poststructuralists such as Lacan, Derrida, Foucault, and Barthes have been identified as possible sources for Carter’s imaginative adventures in philosophy.⁷¹ Robinson’s acute study, for instance, charts the relations between Carter’s fictional critique and Derrida’s theoretical work. Her conclusion makes some points that are very similar to my conclusions. She too believes Carter is critical towards liberal humanist and poststructuralist discourses. Where she focuses on Derrida to illustrate this negotiation between positive politics and negative critique that is said to be typical of recent feminist attempts to theorise identity politics for women, I concentrate, instead, on Deleuze and Guattari.⁷² Although this, consequently, does not lead to revolutionary new insights about the underlying epistemological assumptions of the writer, I do believe it is, nevertheless, valuable because it is instrumental for the understanding of various specific parts of the narrative, such as the anthropological adventures with the river people and the centaurs, the philosophy of the count, and the description of the desire machines of Dr Hoffman. Because of the limited scope of this thesis I have only concentrated on this last detail on which I will focus in Chapter Three. What I want to demonstrate with this detailed reading of the last part of the novel is that, rather than a accidental verbal echo, the desire machines are a meaningful reference which can shed a light on Carter’s position vis-à-vis Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas on subjectivity, and consequently illuminate her feminist position. This is an ‘ex-centric’ position that is not so much idiosyncratic but rather anachronistic and very close to current feminist critics such as Rosi Braidotti, as we will also see in Chapter Three.⁷³ I will first, however, in Chapter Two, give a bird’s-eye view of the conceptualisations of Deleuze and Guattari which can be put in resonance with Carter’s fiction.

Chapter Two: Deleuze and Guattari

A book is simply the container of an idea—like a bottle
—Angela Carter, introduction to *Expletives Deleted*

Ideas as liquids; always in a state of flux, never in a definitive form. This could be the visualisation of the conception of ideas that is current in the theories of Deleuze. He argues for the existence of ideas ‘not in the Platonic sense of simple essences, but in the Kantian sense of “problems without solutions”.’¹ Deleuze’s ideas are not fully individuated and do not exist in a separate, transcendental realm like Platonic ideas. Rather they are metastable (or pre-individual) and subsist in a paradoxical place between existence and non-existence, because they are—like problems—immanent within, but irreducible to their ‘solutions’ or ‘actualisations’.

This paradoxical place is not an actual but a virtual realm in which ideas ‘subsist’ or ‘insist’ rather than exist because the Stoics, on whose philosophical system Deleuze constructs his ‘anti-system’ in *Logique du sens*, only accept the *existence* of a realm of causes but nonetheless recognize *subsistence* or *insistence* of certain (surface) effects.² The virtual realm of ideas is a problematic domain based on the interpretation of ideas as problems. A problem is characterized in Deleuze’s mathematical model by a singular point.³ ‘That point may be specified only after the various equations of its domain are solved, and hence the singular point appears to be a mere result of the solutions,’ while in actuality ‘the singular point precedes all solutions and is immanent within them, for it defines a virtual field of possible equations within which various specific equations and solutions may be actualized.’⁴ In other words, ideas, like problems, are at the same time mere surface-effects and a transcendental ground of possible actualisations. Belonging to neither the realm of causes (so strictly spoken they don’t exist) nor the realm of effects, ideas subsist in their own virtual domain—a groundless, unfounded chaos where they have ‘no fixed identity, function or location, but only a differential relation with other singular points and a potential for various forms of embodiment.’⁵

Take for instance the ‘phoneme’—the smallest unit of speech that can be used to make a word different from another that is the same in every other way.⁶ The Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure asserts in his influential *Cours de linguistique générale* that the identification of specific phonemes relies on its difference from other phonemes. In other words, what we consider to be ‘the same phoneme’ is not necessarily the same speech sound. This conceptualisation could be called a linguistic idea.

The phoneme is a notion, inhabiting the virtual domain of ideas, which is actualised in various utterances in different ways. It has no fixed identity (no positive physical features), but does have differential relations with other phonemes (based on opposition and contrast). It is not a simple essence that is copied in the real world, but it is a difference in itself that carries intensity, the potential energy of individuation, within itself. In this light we should consider Gilbert Simondon’s rewriting of the hylemorphic schema, or form-matter model, which has dominated Western thought about individuation since Aristotle’s interpretation of clay as matter and mould as form. Simondon argues that ‘the individuation of the brick, or the process whereby the clay assumes a specific stable form, should be described as follows:’⁷

the malleable clay, initially in a pre-individual, metastable state, possessed of potential energy and capable of assuming any number of stable shapes, interacts with an external milieu (the mould),

which sets up an internal resonance within the clay and allows the clay's uneven distribution of energy (potential energy) to assume an even distribution (the stable shape of the clay being possible only through the residual energy of the molecules that hold the clay together).⁸

The phoneme, in its metastable state as virtual idea, is—like clay—capable of assuming any number of actualisations, depending on the external milieu with which it interacts. In other words, the actually articulated sound will vary from one utterance to another, depending on its combination with other speech sounds, the loudness of the utterance, the speaker's dialect, etcetera. These different pronunciations are not merely actualisations of a single idea; the idea, as difference in itself, *implicates* (enfolds within itself) all possible embodiments and *explicates* (unfolds) those differences through the process of individuation.

An idea can thus be conceptualised as a malleable clay with an uneven distribution of energy, as a singular point which has no identity, function, or location. Deleuze literally compares these unconscious virtual ideas with 'drops of water in the sea'.⁹ Ideas, hence, as liquids; always in a state of flux, never in a definitive form.

Books, as the containers of ideas, consequently contain perpetually unstable contents. The printed text, however, the actual lettering, can hardly be called unstable. It is like the labelling of the bottle: when it says cola, you can expect the bottle to contain a carbonated, sweet, black soft-drink. That very liquid, however, means—as we have seen—different things in different situations. For a student who is working late in order to meet her deadline, it can be essential in order to stay awake. For another—basking in the sun on a warm summer afternoon—it is simply a pleasant refreshment. In first instance there appears to be a meaning (carbonated, sweet etc.) but in second instance, this meaning turns out to be illusory: you think you know what 'cola' means, but in fact its meaning remains perpetually unstable.

It is this volatility of meaning that Carter seems to refer to with her metaphor of books like bottles: the same text can mean different things, depending on the 'external milieu' with which it interacts. 'It seems to me that the times *shines through* certain writers,' she writes, 'so that we think they see more clearly than we do, whereas in reality they are making *us* see more clearly.'¹⁰

We are presented here with materialism which is much more like Simondon's hylemorphic schema than like Aristotle's, a post-structuralist materialism which is close to what Foucault describes as Deleuze's materialist metaphysics.¹¹ Carter's stance is, however, also very political, that is, it is not merely concerned with epistemological questions, but is rather connected directly to 'real life', committed to political changes. The same goes for Deleuze and Guattari's collaboration. Some say that this political dimension is Guattari's main attribution to their project, but I believe his impact on the philosophical dimension of their joint work should not be underestimated, as it often is, because he had, before he met Deleuze in 1969, developed a original body of theoretical concepts, formulated in a number of essays with a practical psychotherapeutic orientation.¹²

Before I will direct myself to *Anti-Oedipus*, the first book that results from their collaboration, I will sketch its writers' separate theoretical developments, starting with Guattari's thought up until 1969, and subsequently Deleuze's work antecedent to this year in which their conceptualisations converge. I believe this genealogical elaboration is necessary for a good understanding of the perplexing conceptualisations which they present in the first part of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*—the conceptualisations which I believe to be

criticised by Carter—and at the same time necessary for a good understanding of Carter's desire machines, as we will see in Chapter Three.

The path I follow for this exploration of Deleuze and Guattari's work is not an easy one¹³, for not only does it treat difficult concepts, but it also combines two separate (but connected) trails. On the one hand, it tries to mark a path through Deleuze and Guattari's oeuvre that tries to illuminate what I have interpreted as the most important aspect of their work, that is, the installment of a new ethics in various terrains (semiotics, politics) which would evade both fixity and (postmodern) nihilism—an ethics which escapes the 'old' structures of thought and initiates a search for new possibilities for thought and life. On the other hand, I have tried to lead this path alongside the various parts of these thinkers' poststructuralist sandbox which I believe to be relevant for the interpretation of *Dr Hoffman*. I think the first trail is pertinent because it is this mainly this search for new forms of life and thought that seems to be relevant or useful for feminism; the second track offers starting-points for my specific reading of the novel—although, as we will see, I will not develop all parallels in Chapter Three because of the limited scope of this thesis.

Guattari: From Institutional Therapeutics to Radical Politics

In 1953 Guattari started working in the Clinique de la Borde, an experimental psychiatric hospital which sought to establish 'more humane and creative forms of treatment and less hierarchical modes of interaction between patients and staff than those found in conventional institutions.'¹⁴ Also in 1953 he began attending Lacan's bimonthly seminars on psychoanalysis, which had in that year moved from the psychiatrist's apartment to a room in the psychiatric hospital Sainte-Anne because of the growing number of listeners. In the ensuing years he worked towards an understanding of the nature of the group within the psychiatric institution.

In his article 'Transversalité', Guattari synthesises some of his earlier writings into an exposition of the fundamentals for his militant therapeutic ideas which are based on Freud's recognition that the unconscious is marked in an indelible way by the structural relations of social groups and their diverse modes of communication.¹⁵ Guattari's elaboration of this suggestion, however, eventuates in a radical rejection of the 'totalizing and referential' myth of Oedipus—central to traditional psychoanalysis—because this myth affirms anxiety for the external and preeminence of the interior, that is to say, a multiplicity of libidinal attachments are constrained by the fear of castration and punishment to cluster round the pristine dimension of individual subjectivity.¹⁶ Instead of this originary subject, Guattari puts the realm of the social at the heart of his psychotherapeutic investigations, insisting that group subjectivity 'constitutes the *absolute preliminary* to the emergence of all individual subjectivity' and that all unconscious libidinal flows are immediately social.¹⁷ 'Since the ailing subject is a "citizen first, and individual afterwards," (...) to affect a cure, the subject must shift from his or her exterior, subjugated group association (that is, factory, club) to an institutional subject group constantly interpreting its own position.'¹⁸

The opposition between these two kinds of groups, the subjected group (*groupe assujetti*) and the subject group (*groupe sujet*) is central to Guattari's institutional therapeutics. The first is a group which enforces 'traditional roles, concepts, hierarchies, and modes of exclusion', like those delineated by the Oedipus-complex or by Lacan's 'symbolic order'.¹⁹ The second kind of group, by contrast, 'opens itself to its finitude, calls into question its goals, and attempts to articulate new significations and form new modes of interaction.'²⁰ It reinforces neither vertical, pyramidal hierarchies of command (leaders, assistants, etc.), nor

traditional horizontal distribution of roles. Instead, it aims to establish *transversality*: unorthodox, transversal relationships between patients themselves and between patients and the institution. 'So long as people remain fixated on themselves,' writes Guattari, 'they never see anything but themselves. (...) Only if there is a certain degree of transversality will it be possible—though only for a time, since all this is subject to continual re-thinking—to set going an analytic process giving individuals a real hope of using the group as a mirror.'²¹

The radical political implications of this kind of therapeutics are evident: it explicitly questions conventional power relations and institutionalised social codes. The theoretical significance of Guattari's conception of the social nature of the unconscious, should, however, not be underestimated. It is a first, but crucial, step towards the much more vigorous critique of traditional psychoanalysis that is formulated in *Anti-Oedipus*.

In his early articles, Guattari is still trying to establish a realignment of psychoanalysis and Marxism. Transversality is clearly posed as an alternative to psychoanalytic totalisation, which, in its Oedipal interpretation of all subjective histories, considers every deviation from its referential myth a corrigible aberration—obviously a conception antithetical to the ideas of gay rights activist Guattari. Transversality is also presented as an alternative to the orthodoxies of the Communist Party, which, for instance, also denounced homosexuality as an aberration, calling it a 'bourgeois perversity' and 'a symbol of decadence'.²² Guattari's radical theories could be employed to form a truly revolutionary party, which would articulate the authentic 'group desire' of the proletariat, and which would not perpetuate the structure of the State—a 'machine of repression' which 'produces *antiproduction*, that is signifiers which are there to close off and forbid the emergence of every subjective group process' and thereby leaves untouched the basic structure of capitalism, a 'concomitant process of de- and reterritorialisation'.²³

This political terminology returns in *Anti-Oedipus*. Much of the Lacanian terminology that Guattari had used in the formulation of his group psychology has, by that time, however, been replaced by an alternative language that owed little to Lacanian psychoanalysis.²⁴ He started with the conception of this new vocabulary somewhere in the late 1960s, resulting in his 1969 article 'Machine and Structure'. In this paper the term 'subject' has been replaced by 'machine'.²⁵ This notion is elucidated in its relationship to the term 'structure'. For the distinction between those two notions, Guattari turns to the model of structure that Deleuze had developed in his *Logique du sens*:

According to this model, structure 'positions its elements, including the subject or agent of action, in an all-encompassing system of references' consisting of two heterogeneous series which relate each element to the others and thereby enclose the ego-centered subject as but one of many other enclosed elements. In contrast, the machine is not such a structural representation, but an event or a point of convergence for the heterogeneous series to which the subject or agent of action remains remote, as the 'subject of the unconscious' which exists 'on the same side as the machine, or better, alongside the machine'.²⁶

What is referred to is the anti-system Deleuze builds on the philosophical system of the Stoics. Because the notion of the machine and its distinction from Deleuze's conceptualisation of structure is essential for the understanding of Deleuze and Guattari's collaboration—which followed soon after the publication of 'Machine and Structure'—I will elaborate these notions before returning to Guattari's essay.

Deleuze's Intellectual Project: Difference and Repetition

Deleuze had, in the twenty years before he became a public figure as the co-author of *Anti-Oedipus*, one of the world's best selling philosophical texts (53,000 copies sold in France alone), written over ten major works, ranging from monographs on various modern philosophers and artists through to unconventional studies of philosophical concepts like difference and meaning (*sens*).²⁷ His thought had evolved alongside the thought of people like Hume, Kant, Nietzsche, Bergson, Proust, Sascher-Masoch, and Spinoza. Claire Parnet calls this development a 'non-parallel evolution': 'It is always possible to break down dualities from within by drawing a line of flight which runs between two terms or two wholes, the small stream which belongs to neither the one or the other, but which draws both of them along in a non-parallel evolution.'²⁸ This is the way in which Deleuze approaches the philosophical tradition. He is a nomad who draws a line of flight for philosophy by becoming *in between*. His works are cartographies of the alternative lineages that arise from this becoming, always in between—in between the thought of the subjects of his monographs and his own thought:

What one consistently finds in Deleuze is a subtle shift in orientation from one work to the next, as if each of his creative transformations of another's thought brought with it a parallel transformation of his own. (...) [T]here is a sense in which every work of Deleuze's is an encounter, a collaboration that induces a decentering shift in the object of thought and in the thinker as well.²⁹

Becoming, writes Deleuze in *Dialogues*, is drawing a line of flight, is a deterritorialisation: 'Worlds can only be discovered by means of a long, broken flight.'³⁰ He discerns these flights primarily in the works of English-American writers like Hardy, Melville, Woolf, Fitzgerald, and Kerouac. 'The French,' he writes, 'cannot draw a line, follow a canal. They cannot break through the wall.'³¹ He claims that they are too fond of roots, trees, and branchings. This is exemplified, Deleuze writes, by structuralism, which he defines as a system of points and positions which constantly 'stops lines of flights, instead of follow them, draw them or connect them to a social field.'³²

Trying to evade these blockings of his streams of thought, Deleuze's project floods its boundaries and finds alternative routes, deforming the land they run through—drawing along bits and pieces—and at the same time being redirected by the specific marks and slides of the land it submerges. His characteristic method of transforming both his own and the other writer's ideas takes place by means of a discovery of the animating centre of a particular body of thought in an 'unexpected and unsettling locus; in a secondary correlate or subordinate doctrine.'³³ He writes:

The first principle [of a philosophy] is always a mask, a simple image, it doesn't exist; things only begin to move and come alive at the level of the second, third, fourth principle, and these aren't even principles any longer. Things only start to live in the middle.³⁴

In another section of *Dialogues*, Parnet also observes the importance of the middle:

[W]hat counts on a line, is always the middle, not the beginning or the end. We are always on the middle of the road, in the middle of something. The disturbing aspect of questions and answers, of

interviews, of conversations, is that it often deals with looking back: the past and the present, the present and the future. It is therefore always possible to say to an author that his first work already contained everything, or that he constantly rejuvenates, that he changes shape. Whatever, it is the theme of the embryo which evolves, either from a preformation in the seed, or by successive structurings. But the embryo, the evolution, are no good. Becoming doesn't go through that. Becomings have no past or future, even no present, there is no history. Becoming is about involution: neither regress nor progress. Becoming is an incessant movement towards sobriety, towards simplicity.³⁵

On the one hand, says Parnet, Deleuze's thought is a non-parallel evolution and on the other an involution. These terms, however, are not contradictory; on the contrary, they denote the fact that Deleuze's thought is a pure example of his own deterritorialisation of Nietzsche's 'eternal return', a concept that reappears in his entire corpus, but always in different guises—*Différence et répétition*.³⁶

Nietzsche against Hegel: The Inception of the In/Evolution

Nietzsche et la philosophie (1962) is Deleuze's first major work.³⁷ Before the publication of this book, he had written two studies on David Hume (one of them co-authored by André Cresson) and an important article on the conception of difference in the works of Henri Bergson. In between this article and the publication of *Nietzsche et la philosophie* yawns a gap of almost eight years. Deleuze has taken this time to work on a considerable reorientation of his thought, which becomes apparent when one compares the early article on Bergson with his more elaborate *Le Bergsonisme* of 1966.³⁸ *Nietzsche et la philosophie* is not only important because it stands at the head of a growing influence of Nietzsche's thought on French philosophy, but also because it provides Deleuze with the mainly ethical orientation that Foucault still detects in *Anti-Oedipus* and which lies at the basis of the entire development of his thought including his later turn to direct political engagement.³⁹ Every building block is already there: difference, force, desire, power, value, meaning, active creation, becoming; they are just waiting to be hooked up with other 'machines'—Spinoza, Kafka, Guattari; they are waiting to be combined with one another in various combinations—both by chance and necessity—similar to the throw of dices.

The dicethrow is the metaphor by which Deleuze explains the relation of the two concepts that he has put at the heart of Nietzschean thought: the 'will to power' and the 'eternal return'.⁴⁰ Through the innovative reading of these concepts, Deleuze breaks down the walls between the Nietzschean project and his own, and identifies as Nietzsche's main adversaries Plato, Hegel, and rationality (via Kant)—as we have seen, also his own primary antagonists.⁴¹

Nietzsche's critique of traditional philosophy and the concomitant celebration of rationality holds that it has focused merely on the concept of objective truth, just as Christianity is focused solely on heaven and thereby neglects earthly life. The world we encounter is just subjective 'appearance', we learn from the earlier critic of enlightenment rationality Immanuel Kant. This view, however, does not question the existence of ultimate referents like Platonic essences or its post-Kantian resurgence in Hegel's Absolute Spirit, but rather emphasises an opposition between this subjective world and its metaphysical, objective counterpart. 'Beneath this speculative opposition is a moral opposition of good knowledge and false life,' writes Ronald

Bogue, and thus behind metaphysics hides a moral justification for the excessive intellectualisation of the dark and mysterious world of instinctual desires.

Behind this seemingly innocent search for truth, Nietzsche suspects a nihilistic will to correct life, to turn life against itself and make false life conform to good knowledge.⁴² That knowledge is labelled 'good' and life 'false' and as a result reason is celebrated and irrationality condemned, is, however, a result of an incompleteness of Kant's critique of Enlightenment rationality. Deleuze claims that Kant's critical endeavour is not taken to its extremes but remains partial: his transcendental system provides a sanctuary for established values. It thus serves as a static conservatory which at the same time rescues science and rationality from Hume's empiricism which undermined all scientific and rational 'certainties', and limits the most radical excesses of the Enlightenment by his assertion that we cannot know ultimate reality. 'We can have no knowledge of the thing-in-itself, that is of an object's ultimate or real nature, its nature as it is independently of the way we experience it, apart from the way our senses receive it.'⁴³ This limitation of the possibilities of science and reason gives primacy to the active and creative knower rather than to the objects of knowledge. Kant does not, however, extend this primacy of the subject to his 'form of the question'—the central question that animates philosophical inquiry. Kant's central question, says Deleuze, remains ultimately Platonic in that it asks 'Qu'est-ce que?' (what is) instead of 'Qui?' (who, which one). The earlier question, says Deleuze, will necessarily lead to a mere partial critique, whereas the latter will provide the total critique that is, according to Deleuze's Nietzsche, required in order to arrive at the productive moment of creation. Deleuze claims that Nietzsche's project is an effort to correct this 'fundamental error' in Kant's project and that he in the process renders both Hegel's dialectic and its most important radical heritage Marxism superfluous:

Nietzsche's relation to Kant is like Marx's to Hegel: Nietzsche stands critique on its feet, just as Marx does with the dialectic. (...) [T]he dialectic comes from the original Kantian form of critique. There would have been no need to put the dialectic back on its feet, nor 'to do' any form of dialectics if critique itself had not been standing on its head from the start.⁴⁴

This indirect attack on Hegel provides Deleuze a way to escape dialectic recuperation of opposition. He does, however, not eschew to effect a more direct attack, though still mediated by Nietzsche. He does so, for instance, in his reading of *On the Genealogy of Morals*: 'Nietzsche presents the dialectic as the speculation of the plebs, as the way of thinking of the slave: the abstract thought of contradiction prevails over the concrete feeling of positive difference.'⁴⁵ Let me explain.

The question 'Qui?' takes us from the static values of Platonic transcendentalism to the terrain of becoming, of flux, forces, will, and unstable identities and values. It takes us from the terrain of ontology, which was the focus of the early Bergson study—asking the question 'What is the negative logic of Being of Hegel?'—to the terrain of ethics and politics, because 'Qui?' does not 'refer to an individual, (...) but rather to an event, that is, to the forces in their various relationships in a proposition or a phenomenon, and the genetic relationship that determines these forces'. In other words, it does not refer to a person, a group, or even a social class, but to will and value, thus asking: Who wills a negative ontological movement?, or rather: Which one wills a negative ontological movement?⁴⁶ Deleuze claims that Nietzsche's answer to this question is: the slave.

The slave is one of the dramatic personae that lies at the basis of differential values. Its antagonist is the master, a more sceptical persona that questions fictions like unity, equality, substance, and causality.⁴⁷ The slave, says Nietzsche, is the inventor of the dialectic, likewise it is the inventor of Christianity.⁴⁸ It is the nihilist who turns life against itself and arrives at affirmation by means of a double negation. The basic opposition between the master and the slave is at the origin of differential values, for 'the values of a way of life permeate all things and give them their meaning.'⁴⁹ What the master considers morally 'correct' has nothing to do with what the slave considers morally 'correct'. We see here the importance of the question 'Qui?': we do not ask what is morally correct or incorrect, but we ask which mode of being, that is the slave or the master, lies at the origin of the valuation.

Let us now return to Deleuze's direct attack on Hegel. The slave is, in Nietzsche's conception, a reactive and negative (mode of) being; it resents the master and labels it bad. This initial action is a reaction. The master, by contrast, affirms itself, and labels itself good. It subsequently recognises its difference from the slave and affirms this difference by calling the slave bad: an affirmation of affirmation. The slave, on the other hand, 'needs to conceive of a non-ego, then to oppose himself [*sic*] to this non-ego in order finally to posit himself as self. This is the strange syllogism of the slave: he needs two negations in order to produce an appearance of affirmation.'⁵⁰ Thus the slave arrives at affirmation through a negation of negation.⁵¹

The master affirms its difference, claims Deleuze, and the slave denies that which differs. The slave's nihilism, like the dialectic, proceeds via contradiction and negation, not via affirmation:

The being of Hegelian logic is merely [abstract] being, pure and empty, that affirms itself by passing into its own opposite. But this being *was never different from its opposite* (...). Hegelian being is simple nothingness.⁵²

Dialectical difference is not real difference, only apparent difference. The charge that Hegelian being is abstract clearly refers to Bergson's critique of determination which holds that human actions cannot be fitted into a causal relationship. A causal relationship looks at the process that leads to an action from an external position. Bergson's account of decision-making looks at the process from the inside and thereby shows that there is only one way in which actions can truly be linked to a human being, and that is when they are not *caused* by one's thoughts, but rather *belong with them* in the total flow of one's life history. Bergson charges determinism with being abstract, by which he means that it is too much focused on generalisations and does not take the 'personal element' into account.⁵³ Both the affirmation of the slave and the determination of the dialectic are false movements that merely produce a 'subsistent exteriority.'⁵⁴ Thus, in the way of thinking of the slave and its derivative metaphysical speculation, abstract thought of contradiction prevails over concrete feelings of positive difference. As we have seen, this way of thinking is regarded reactive, and consequently Deleuze denounces the dialectic as a negative movement.

The Final Attack: With the Will to Power and the Eternal Return Towards Post-Dialectical Possibilities

Here we see the contours of Deleuze's philosophy of difference as difference as opposed to the dialectical conception of difference. With the help of his innovative reading of Nietzsche's analysis of power, however, Deleuze is able to develop an even more forceful attack on Hegel than the one he was able to effect on the basis of Bergsonian 'intuitive' metaphysicism.⁵⁵ It is this total and final attack on the dialectic which provides

the ground for the important redirection of his entire project. Deleuze here again operates in accordance with his own thought: 'the negative, destructive moment of the critique (*pars destruens*) that draws the total horizon into question and destabilizes previously existing powers must clear the terrain to allow the productive moment (*pars construens*) to release or create new powers—destruction opens the way for creation.'⁵⁶

As we have seen, Deleuze's Nietzsche does not ask 'Qu'est-ce que?' but 'Qui?'. This latter question does not refer to an individual, but to forces and their genetic determinants power. 'Qui?' leads us to a difference or distance in the origin (i.e. the master-slave dichotomy) which should consequently be interpreted as differential forces. Dialectical being, and thus the being of the slave, is, as we have also seen, labelled 'abstract nothingness' because it does not find its origin in difference, or, as Deleuze will later say, multiplicity. The being of the master affirms difference, and is thus based on a multiplicity of forces. This is in accordance with how Nietzsche sees the world: as an interrelated multiplicity of forces, as a world of becoming, of flux and change in which no entities (value, being, etc.) preserve a stable identity.⁵⁷

Deleuze says that every relationship of forces constitutes a body—chemical, biological, social, or political. In these bodies the 'superior or dominant forces are known as *active* and the inferior or dominated forces are known as *reactive*'—again a reference to the original dichotomy between the master and the slave.⁵⁸

Deleuze explains that the initial reaction of the slave—'the master is bad'—is not a logical negation, but a negative evaluation. The negative value is not given because the master is strong (it is not opposed with another force) but because it does not restrain that strength, which means, as we shall later see, that it will lead to the death of the slave. This evaluation, however, is, according to Deleuze, based on 'the fiction of a force separated from what it can do', which rests on a false conception of the nature of power.⁵⁹ The slave believes that power is a 'capacity, exterior or transcendent to the field of forces, that can be manifest in action or not.'⁶⁰ It maintains that force and manifestation are in an external causal relation to one another. The master, on the other hand, insists that power is internal to force and can therefore not be separated from its manifestation: 'concrete force is that which goes to its ultimate consequences, to the limit of power and desire.'⁶¹

Deleuze's source for the foundation of his claim of internal power is Spinozian ontology, which holds that power is the essence of being and that causality is always internal.⁶² As a result the conception of the slave is rendered as 'fictitious' and the conception of the master as 'the more substantial':

The master conception of power reveals being as the actual productivity; in other words, it expresses the essence of being as the actual and efficient (not merely possible or formal) power of being. (...) The entire discussion of power has little to do with strength or capacity, but with the relation between essence and manifestation.⁶³

A reactive force is not weak in itself, but rather separated from what it can do, and can therefore never lead to a real expression of substance. Active force, on the other hand, always goes to the end (*jusqu'au bout*)—the limit being its eventual manifestation. The master thereby becomes a villain in the eyes of Hegel, who thinks that the master's power (desire, consumption, etc.) will lead to the death of the slave. This fear is based in his conception of negation, which finds its origin in Kant's partial critique and is consequently also partial. In the

dialectic, negation must necessarily be partial because its basic operation involves no destruction but conservation: it involves a negation 'which supersedes in such a way as to preserve and maintain what is superseded.'⁶⁴ Thus, master negation and desire are too thorough for the dialectic: it would totally destroy the other, *in casu* the slave, and stop the historical determination toward the realisation of the Absolute Spirit.

Hegel then stages the slave as hero, because slave negation is the model of restraint; it is force and desire held in check by means of labour and interiorisation of force. This slave labour serves in a complicated partial negation of the master which allows master-desire to survive, but also causes the slave to survive this unrestrained desire, and thus perpetuates the movement of the dialectic.⁶⁵ What follows after this limitation of the force of the slave (its labour, we see here the political implications of Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche), a partial *pars destruens*, is not a new creative and affirmative productive moment, but rather a partial *pars construens*, that is, a self-realisation: the slave 'becomes conscious of what he [*sic*] truly is.'⁶⁶

It is in this interiority of the slave that Hegel locates the universal essence of being, because self-consciousness 'emerges victoriously from the dialectic'.⁶⁷ Nietzsche also seeks to locate essence in the movement of being, but he proceeds in precisely the opposite direction. Self-consciousness, asserts Deleuze, is force 'turned back inside, turned back against itself'.⁶⁸ Nietzsche proposes a force that emerges outside itself: from essence to manifestation, always to the limit of its powers, always in exteriority—being, thus, as actual productivity. The concepts which makes this coordinated movement of forces *jusqu'au bout* possible are the will to power and the eternal return.

The will to power is defined by Deleuze as the genealogical element of force. It is internal to force, but not reducible to it: 'La force est ce qui peut, la volonté de puissance est ce qui veut.'⁶⁹ The will, however, cannot be separated from forces; it is not a 'conscious agency of decision separable from the actions it motivates.'⁷⁰ Hence, it is as if the will to power is both immanent and transcendent in relation to forces.

The same goes for the qualities of the will to power. These qualities are not simply active or reactive but rather affirmative—that is *becoming* active—and negative—that is *becoming* reactive: 'It is as if affirmation and negation were both immanent and transcendent in relation to action and reaction; out of the web of forces they make up a chain of becoming.'⁷¹ The will to power, writes Bogue, can thus be seen as 'the power of becoming that plays through forces, differentiating them and linking them both spatially and temporally.'—differentiating, because it is the element from which derives multiplicity, and linking, because it is the principle of the synthesis of forces.⁷²

It is here that Deleuze's final attack on Hegel is effected. 'Pluralism', he writes, 'sometimes appears to be dialectical—but it is its most ferocious enemy, its only profound enemy.'⁷³ A concept of difference as difference, true multiplicity, is the end of the dialectic because it is irreducible to unity. However, the attack on dialectical order 'creates both the space for and the *need* for an organizational dynamic: the organization (...) of the multiplicity'.⁷⁴ Bergson does not provide Deleuze with an adequate notion of a synthesis of multiplicity, a flaw which makes him vulnerable for a Hegelian counterattack. Nietzsche's concepts of the will to power and the eternal return, however, enables him to smooth away this deficiency and to create a post-Hegelian philosophy of historical movement.

The eternal return is the synthesis of multiplicity which has the will to power as its principle. It is the 'expression' of the principle 'which serves as an explanation of diversity and its reproduction, of difference and its repetition.'⁷⁵ It is not a cyclical conception of return, a return of the same, but rather a return of

becoming and difference: '[t]he will to power is the differential element which puts forces in relation, and the eternal return is the affirmation of difference in the guise of multiplicity, becoming, and chance.'⁷⁶

The eternal return could be explicated by means of the example Nietzsche uses in his exposition of the concept in *Also Sprach Zarathustra*: the game of the dice. The dicethrow, he says, has two moments: the moment when the dice are thrown and the moment they fall back, that is, the moment they land and form a specific combination. The first moment is the affirmation of chance and multiplicity; nothing is preformed in the possibility of this moment—it is the becoming of being: pure multiplicity. The second moment is more obscure: 'The dice that are thrown once are the affirmation of *chance*, the combination that they form on falling is the affirmation of *necessity*. Necessity is affirmed of chance in exactly the same sense that being is affirmed of becoming and unity is affirmed of multiplicity.'⁷⁷ This second moment is the moment of synthesis, not a passive moment of revelation of necessity—that would be plain determinism—but the active creation of unity and being. 'The eternal return,' writes Deleuze, 'is the second moment, the result of the dicethrow, the affirmation of necessity, the number that brings together all the parts of chance. But it is also the return of the first moment, the repetition of the dicethrow, the reproduction and reaffirmation of chance itself.'⁷⁸

Michael Hardt comments as follows:

The dicethrow metaphor is admittedly somewhat strained at this point, but we must recognize the second moment as a moment of organisation that constructs unity, that constitutes being by bringing together 'all the parts of chance' created in the first moment—not according to a preformed order, but in an original organization. The return of the dice is an affirmation of the dicethrow in that it constitutes the original elements of chance in a coherent whole. Not only does the first moment (of multiplicity and becoming) imply the second moment (of unity and being), but this second moment is also the return of the first: the two moments imply one another as a perpetual series of shattering and gathering, as a centrifugal moment and a centripetal moment, as emanation and constitution.'⁷⁹

The will to power is inextricably entangled with the eternal return. The will is the principle of the eternal return in that it plays the role of primary cause, but the will cannot be separated from what it can do; the eternal return is internal to it. Hence, the will to power could be seen as the first moment of the dicethrow; it is the principle of the synthesis that marks the necessity of chance; it is the concept from which derives multiplicity, and it is as such indeterminate and unforeseeable which relationships between forces it will establish. It needs the second moment, the eternal return, to synthesise the ubiquitous becoming of forces.

This conception of the eternal return as the synthesis of forces which affirms becoming, multiplicity, and chance is the physical doctrine of the concept.⁸⁰ In this physical/(onto)logical tenet the will provides a foundation of being in that it plays the role of primary cause. The being of Nietzsche, however, does not merely have an ontological foundation, but also an ethical one. The eternal return of the will is an ethical principle inasmuch as it is a selective ontology, that is, a selective principle that could be formulated as a practical rule: 'Whatever you will, will it in such a way that you also will its eternal return.'⁸¹ However, we cannot possibly separate the will from the eternal return, so the rule leads to the selection of those forces which are not separated from what they can do, ergo active forces. The so-called *thought* of the eternal return eliminates all 'half-desires and hesitant yearnings (...) of a cautious and calculating will.'⁸² Being must also be willed, and this suspends the being of Hegel, which is prevented from going to its limit, therefore from

returning, and is hence doomed to roam the transcendental realm. The eternal return is thus the 'ethical pillar of a Nietzschean philosophy of being': it affirms a being of becoming which always goes to the limit, which goes from essence to manifestation and consequently provides for the 'necessity, substantiality, singularity, and univocity of being'—hence founding being firmly within the world of flux and becoming.⁸³

But being is not a stable state; its essence is the actual power of being, and this power is being affirmed eternally: 'a spiralling, infinite affirmation—affirmation being raised to the *n*th power.'⁸⁴ Nietzschean being is revealed as actual productivity; it could be seen as the *pars construens* that follows the *pars destruens* of Hegelian being. This destructive moment of dialectical being is not effected by Nietzsche's total critique, says Deleuze, but is achieved by this Hegelian being itself. He exposes the nihilism of the slave as the 'motor' of reactive forces: for Nietzsche, he argues, 'nihilism is not an event in history but the motor of the history of man [*sic*].'⁸⁵ In nihilism the negative will to power is a will to nothingness, and this will to power is everywhere triumphant over its affirmative counterpart. Human history, as a becoming reactive of forces, could be described as a progressive movement of nihilism. At first instance, nihilism creates a transcendental theological system and the 'will to nothingness is expressed in higher values that depreciate and devalue life.'⁸⁶ In a successive stage, reactive forces break their alliance with the negative will and rule alone: the reactive wo/man 'takes the place of God' and advances progress and happiness for all and 'the good of the community'.⁸⁷ Pity, the love of the weak, sick, reactive life, becomes the reigning principle of value and so life remains depreciated and devalued.⁸⁸ In a final stage of nihilism, reactive forces deny the negative will because it is, albeit negative, nevertheless a stimulus: a *becoming* reactive. The slave prefers 'not to will, [but rather] to fade away passively.'⁸⁹ However, the progression of nihilism towards passive fading away is stopped because the negative will, once separated from the reactive forces, 'inspires in man [*sic*] a new inclination: for destroying himself actively.'⁹⁰ The negative will to power, the becoming reactive, is separated from the reactive forces and consequently turns to active forces to continue its becoming reactive, thus its negative will to nothingness becomes an active will to nothingness; it becomes an act of active self-destruction, hence the being of Hegel effects its own active self-destruction. This active self-destruction, which causes the defeat of nihilism and the end of human being as a 'constructed interiority', functions simultaneously as the *pars destruens* of dialectical being and as the foundation of Nietzschean being. This being, then, is an active production, a creative moment which returns eternally: an infinite affirmation of the creation of new values and new ways of life, of new forms for the expression of thought.

So Deleuze interprets Nietzsche's project as a victory of ethics over ontology. With a creative use of the will to power and the eternal return he tries to build a theory of difference which is non-hierarchical, that is, which derives not from the static values of a transcendental system, but from a terrain of becoming, flux, and unstable identities and values—an ethical ground which originates in different ways of life of those who judge and evaluate. It is this turn to an ethical orientation which determines most, if not all, of his subsequent philosophical investigations. In this sense, *Nietzsche et la philosophie* is Deleuze's 'first work' which already contains everything: from his interpretative strategies to his political involvement. It lies at the origin of both the 'non-parallel evolution' and the 'involution' via which his thought develops. On the one hand it seems to proceed as a line of flight by means of a continual becoming *in between*—his creative transmutations of other thinkers' thought bringing about a parallel movement of his own—on the other hand it is a repeated affirmation of that becoming—not a cyclical return of the same, but rather a spiralling affirmation of the search for new ways of life and new values to replace the old certainties which were preserved by the

philosophical tradition from Plato to Hegel and an affirmation to the *n*th power of the pursuit for new forms for the expression of thought—forms which are appropriate for a post-dialectical philosophy of difference.⁹¹

Interpretation as Creative Activity: Towards an Involuntary Philosophy

‘Sciences, arts, and philosophies are all equally creative,’ write Deleuze and Guattari in their 1991 *Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?*⁹² This is an idea that recurs throughout their body of writing and which finds its first enunciation in *Nietzsche et la philosophie*. It is in the image of thought that Deleuze advances the equal status of ‘fact’ and ‘fiction’ and objectivity and subjectivity. As we have seen, Nietzsche’s goal is no longer the illumination of truth. Instead, he proposes to replace the traditional will to truth with an affirmative will to falsehood. A thought informed by such a will would no longer oppose ‘good’ knowledge to ‘bad’ life, and as a result depreciate life and ‘confine [it] within the narrow bounds of rational knowledge.’⁹³ ‘Rather, in such a thought life would become “the active force of life” and thought would become “the affirmative power of life (...) Thinking would then mean *discovering, inventing, new possibilities of life*.”’⁹⁴ Hence, all manifestations of thought belong to a single realm.

Deleuze is especially careful to establish an affinity between *interpretation* and *evaluation* on the one hand, and the will to power and the eternal return on the other. As I have said before, the values of a way of life permeate all things and *give them their meaning*. The meaning (*sens*) of something is a function of ‘the force which appropriates the thing, which exploits it.’⁹⁵ Signs, Deleuze asserts—and this is where he differs from structuralism but also from a poststructuralist thinker like Derrida—are not arbitrary entities, but rather manifestations of forces. That is, the world is not a text in which signs only refer to other signs, but a network of forces from which the meaning of signs is derived. Nietzsche, says Deleuze, interprets the meaning of a phenomenon in his aphorisms, and determines the hierarchical value of various meanings in his poems.⁹⁶ But the aphorisms and poems are themselves again objects of interpretation and evaluation. In this sense, they have two dimensions, ‘the second also being the return of the first, the return of the aphorism or the cycle of the poem.’⁹⁷ Thus, there is a direct correlation between that which interprets and evaluates and the will to power, and their return and the eternal return:

The problem of interpretation is to ‘estimate the quality of force that gives meaning to a given phenomenon, or event and from that to measure the relation of the forces which are present’. The problem of evaluation ‘is to determine the will to power which gives value to a thing.’ (...) The will to power, as differential element of force, is that which determines the qualities of force, and thus that which interprets. The will to power, as either force of affirmation or force of negation, is that which bestows value, and thus that which evaluates.⁹⁸

Like the will to power and the eternal return, interpretation and evaluation are essentially creative. This conclusion, along with the erasure of the boundaries between the different manifestations of thought, puts art and literary criticism at the heart of the creative activity of thinking. It is therefore no surprise that Deleuze repeatedly turns to various artists and art forms in his subsequent writings, starting with Proust in his *Marcel Proust et les signes* from 1964.

Like the book on Nietzsche, *Marcel Proust et les signes* was received with exceptional acclaim.⁹⁹ The book is different from earlier Proust criticism in that it refrains from a psychoanalytical or

phenomenological analysis. Deleuze differs from many of his contemporaries in that his book contains neither a text-based nor a reader-oriented criticism. Rather, it portrays the enterprise of Proust's life work *A la recherche du temps perdu* as a quest 'in which the would-be author learns progressively to decipher and ultimately to disregard the signs of worldliness and the signs of love, reaching the illuminating conclusion that the signs of art alone offer a kind of fulfilment.'¹⁰⁰ Deleuze, despite Proust's warning that 'criticism frequently makes the vulgar error of confusing the interest attached to the work with the incidental information to be derived from studying the author's biography,' turns to a more-or-less author-oriented reading, although he doesn't always clearly separate Proust the autobiographical subject from Marcel the narrator.¹⁰¹ Deleuze does not, however, slip into the pitfall that Proust sketches, because he goes far beyond the traditional conception of the authorial institution as a constitutive element. Instead, he advances a theory of 'alogical' or 'supralogical' essences which are not created by an author, but only revealed. These essences not only go beyond the author, but also 'beyond objects, beyond intelligible and formulated truths, [and] beyond subjective chains of association.'¹⁰² Thus, Deleuze does not only repudiate traditional interpretative strategies but also structuralist criticism *and*, as early as 1964, the arbitrary and abstract reader-oriented strategies of deconstruction. This does not contradict his earlier claim that interpretation is at the heart of the creative activity of thinking, but rather emphasises that the truth of essences, which he designates as the goal of the *Recherche*, cannot be gained through method or free will of the thinker, but only through chance:

In Proust, thought always begins with a force that impinges on the hero—a troubling remark of M. de Charlus, a glance of Albertine's that fills him with jealousy, the taste of a madeleine, a theme from the Vinteuil sonata. (...) Proustian truths are the products of (...) the fortuitous encounter with a sign that forces the subject to think. Such truths are necessary and particular, not arbitrary and abstract, those of a singular encounter in which the subject is, as it were, 'elected', chosen and compelled to the explication of a specific essence.¹⁰³

We see here the outlines of Deleuze's 'involuntary' philosophical method, a more 'libidinal,' personal method which could be described as a personal search—philosophy as a question that seizes the questioner, not as an abstract search for an answer, a wish to control the question in passing.¹⁰⁴ We are seized by signs, forced to think about its meaning. This 'force of the sign that compels the subject to think parallels the active will to power that seizes thought', and thus, again, this idea finds its first enunciation in *Nietzsche et la philosophie*—another actualisation of difference and repetition.¹⁰⁵

A Theory of Signs: The Enveloped World and its Time

Signs are *en vogue* in France in the 1960s. Deleuze's semiotic theory, however, differs distinctly from the structuralist appropriation heralded by Barthes. He distinguishes four different types of signs, namely *worldly signs*, *signs of love*, *signs of sense experience*, and *signs of art*. These categories are associated with Marcel's apprenticeship as an artist, which teaches him to decipher the various signs in subsequent stages and denounce them one after the other until his *Bildung* is completed and he has learned that only the signs of art provide a full and stable revelation of essences and reveal time in its purest form—*le temps retrouvé* (as the last volume of the *Recherche* is called): the signs of art represent 'the culmination of the search for truth and

provide a retrospective illumination of the true nature of the other three kinds of signs,' that is, they reveal the truth or nature of Proustian essences and these essences reveal the nature of Proustian signs.¹⁰⁶

Proustian signs express meaning in two contrasting but complementary ways, that is, they envelop or imply meaning and they unfold or explicate meaning. In other words, signs 'contain' meaning; meaning is enveloped in the sign. The interpretation of the sign is the explication or unfolding of the meaning. However, this unrolled meaning has enveloped within it the imprint of the sign. Thus, inasmuch as expression is 'an explicative or centrifugal movement, it is also a complicative or centripetal movement.'¹⁰⁷ Deleuze claims that these movements are part of a single process and explains this with the terms of medieval philosophy in his *Spinoza et le problème de l'expression* in which he cites the medieval theologian Nicholas of Cusa who says that 'God is the universal complication, in the sense that everything is in it; and the universal explication, in the sense that it is in everything.'¹⁰⁸ Thus God is, in his view, the complication which underlies all explication and implication. The question now is what it is that holds the sign and its meaning *in complication*? The answer to this question is, according to Deleuze's Proust, essence—the originary complication which is manifested in the concomitant explication and implication of the work of art.

Essence is another example of Deleuze's characteristic method of difference and repetition—a concomitant evolution and involution. Essence is, he writes, difference—absolute internal difference. It is consequently described as an originary chaos, as a 'complication of spatial and temporal multiplicity, that incarnates itself in substance by unfolding itself, diversifying itself in ever-expanding entities. Each stage of diversification is an explication of the same difference, a repetition of that internal difference of essence.'¹⁰⁹ Essence is thus a reappearance of the eternal return in a different guise. The appropriation of Proust then takes Nietzschean terms from the terrain of ethics into a semiotic terrain. This is very appropriate when we consider Deleuze's project as a search for new non-hierarchical values and new ways of life. The interpretative strategy he performs, develops a sign-theory in which the relation sign/meaning is neither fixed nor free-floating, that is, it is not based on transcendental truths, nor on negative difference. Instead signs in Deleuze's semiotic theory are incarnations of the eternal affirmation of positive difference, actualisations of the world of flux and becoming. The interpretation of signs thus leads us to the discovery of different worlds—worlds that we have not seen before and which could lead the way towards new ways of life, being, and new values. Interpretation which is, as we have seen, at the heart of the creative activity of thinking is not an illumination of truth, but rather of essences, of enveloped worlds which could point the way to new possibilities of life.

'Thanks to art,' writes Proust, 'instead of seeing a single world, our own, we see it multiply, and as many original artists as there are, so many worlds will we have at our disposal, more different from each other than those which circle the void.'¹¹⁰ Imagination, of course, offers a fairly direct insight into other worlds; works of art reveal essences unequivocally. Furthermore, they reveal the original time which is the time of essences, the time which lies coiled within essence itself. The signs of art, thus, are the highest signs, leading directly to essences and regaining the *temps perdu*. This complicated time is the pure time which grounds the movement of time. Deleuze's argumentation regarding the concept of time is complex but nevertheless needs to be addressed in order to be able to follow his line of thinking.

The eternal return already served as a synthesis of time in that the common-sense notion of time in which past was distinguished from future by their relationship to the present no longer holds if the present is a moment of becoming. The present is simultaneously past-becoming-present and present-becoming-future,

hence the past and future coexist within the present. This synthesis, which founds the relation of various moments of time to one another, returns in a somewhat different guise in Deleuze's later work as the first synthesis of time. It is described as a contraction of successive independent instants into one another, thereby constituting the living present, which contains both the past and the future because preceding instants are retained and expectations are anticipated in the imagination, defined here as a contractile power. Although the first synthesis of time constitutes the living present as the only element of time (past and future are mere dimensions of this present), it is none the less intratemporal, which means that this present passes. 'We could no doubt conceive of a perpetual present,' writes Deleuze, 'but such a present is not physically possible'.¹¹¹

Time does not escape the present, but the present does not stop moving by leaps and bounds which encroach upon one another. This is the paradox of the present: to constitute time while passing in the time constituted. We cannot avoid the necessary conclusion—that *there must be another time in which the first synthesis of time can occur*.¹¹²

The synthesis of the eternal return, which suggests coexistence of past, present, and future, thus returns as the time of imagination. This first synthesis implies a second synthesis, that is to say, an in-itself of time which grounds the passage of time of the first synthesis. Deleuze claims that it is this pure time that the *Recherche* tries to regain. He links this *a priori* element of all time to Bergson's conception of a pure past. The question that Deleuze raises regarding this pure past is how we can save it for ourselves: 'how can we penetrate that in-itself without reducing it to the former present that it was, or to the present present in relation to which it is past?'¹¹³ This, he says, is where Proust intervenes.

Proust offers a lucid, albeit fleeting, revelation of the pure past in the famous passage in which Marcel is seized by a *mémoire involuntaire* while eating the 'petite madeleine' which is offered to him by Aunt Léonie. This little madeleine cake compels him to think of the madeleine he received from his mother in Combray. The passage, however, only offers a momentary glimpse of the realm of essences and pure time, because it involves a sense experience. Whereas the signs of art are immaterial signs which transform the substance of art (words, paint, sounds) until they become so 'ductile, so kneaded and refined that they become entirely spiritual', the signs of sensations, love, and the world are incarnated in increasingly intractable and contingent matter, thus revealing essences and their time in an increasingly general and obscure way.¹¹⁴ The signs of sense experience are the closest to the signs of art: they are linked to intransigent matter (like the madeleine or the cobblestones of the Guermantes courtyard and those at St Mark's, Venice), but they evoke an involuntary memory which is virtually intangible. This involuntary memory is referred to as the passive synthesis of memory, that is to say, it is prior to the active synthesis of memory because it *occurs in* the mind that contemplates rather than carried out by it, that is, actively retrieved by the voluntary memory and its reflective function. The essence that arises is not the essence of a madeleine, but the essence of the involuntary memory, since, as Deleuze notices, perceptual syntheses (sense experiences) essentially refer back to the passive synthesis of memory.¹¹⁵ Ergo, the generative internal difference which incarnates itself in past and present madeleine experiences is the essence of Combray:

Combray reappears, not as it was or as it could be, but in a splendour which was never lived, like a pure past (...) Combray reappears in the form of a past which was never present: the in-itself of

Combray. If there is an in-itself of the past, then reminiscence is its noumenon or the thought with which it is invested. Reminiscence does not simply refer us back from a present present to former ones, from recent lovers to infantile ones, from our lovers to our mothers. (...) It rather refers, beyond the lover and beyond the mother (...), to the never-lived reality of the Virgin.¹¹⁶

The passive synthesis of memory, the involuntary memory or reminiscence, is the fundamental synthesis of time which serves as the ground for the pure past, the in-itself of time that grounds the passage of time. Hence, involuntary memory offers an evanescent intimation of essences and pure time despite its link to intransigent matter. In *Différence et répétition*, however, Deleuze observes that even after the proposition of the second synthesis of time many questions remain unanswered. Why is it, for instance, he wonders, that every exploration of the pure past is erotic? 'Unless we have not yet found the last word, unless there is a third synthesis of time...'¹¹⁷ This third synthesis, however, will have to wait until I have explicated Deleuze's appropriation of the signs of love and their various dimensions.

The Different Dimensions of Love: The Serial Repetition of Difference from a Hermaphroditic Essence

'To recollect through the senses is just the same as being in love,' writes Kristeva in her book on Proustian time.¹¹⁸ Indeed, there is a relation between the involuntary memory and being in love, as Marcel himself observes contemplating his *mémoire involontaire*:

An exquisite pleasure had invaded my senses, something isolated, detached, with no suggestion of its origin. (...) And at once the vicissitudes of life had become indifferent to me (...) this new sensation having had on me the effect which love has of filling me with a precious essence; or rather this essence was not in me, it was me. I had ceased now to feel mediocre, contingent, mortal.¹¹⁹

The truth of the signs of love also ultimately resides in essences, says Deleuze. The difference that is enveloped in this essence emanates a series of loves, the first of which is, of course, the mother. This primary love is not, however, as in psychoanalytic theory the original love which initiates a desire for intimacy, but merely the first actualisation of the essence that informs the series. Later incarnations are, in the case of Proust's narrator, the mysterious Gilberte and the ever so enigmatic Albertine. However, these loves in themselves are incarnations of absolute difference and thus mere pluralities:

The questing, anxious, exacting way that we have of looking at the person we love [makes] our observation, in the beloved object's presence, too tremulous to be able to carry away a clear impression of her. Perhaps, also, that activity of all the senses at once which endeavours to learn from the visible aspect alone what lies behind it is over-indulgent to the thousand forms, to the changing fragrance, to the movements of the living person whom we as a rule, when we are not in love, we regard as fixed in one permanent position. Whereas the beloved model does not stay still; and our mental photographs of her are always blurred.¹²⁰

In other words, being in love hinders common sense experiences, eventually enabling Marcel to see, through the series of loves, that they are informed by an essence. Nevertheless, the signs of love do not provide a

stable revelation of the essence, nor even an evanescent intimation, because they are indispensably connected to contingent 'matter', that is to say Gilberte or Albertine; it is only through the most intensive love for a person (*l'amour le plus exclusif pour une personne*) that one can attain the enveloped worlds of love.¹²¹

'Aimer, c'est chercher à *expliquer*, à *développer* ces mondes inconnus qui restent enveloppés dans l'aimé,' writes Deleuze.¹²² The search for these enveloped worlds and their time is, according to Proust, the reason why we love:

Once we believe that a fellow-creature has a share in some unknown existence to which that creature's love for ourselves can win us admission, that is of all preliminary conditions which Love exacts, the one to which [it] attaches most importance, the one which makes [it] generous or indifferent as to the rest.¹²³

Here, however, we stumble upon a complication because the signs of love, as we have seen, can never fully unfold the enveloped 'unknown existence'. Every series of relationships inevitably tends towards suffering and jealousy—exemplified by Swann's love for Odette and Saint-Loup's for Rachel—because, as George Poulet writes, 'each creature is exterior to all others, and nevertheless enclosed within himself [*sic*], without possibility of communication.'¹²⁴ This is the paradox of love: on the one hand one desires to 'get out of oneself', to open the 'communicating doors' between the self and the loved one, but on the other hand 'man [*sic*] is a creature that cannot emerge from himself'.¹²⁵ We cannot ultimately know the other person, s/he will remain a mystery, as Proust also observes:

I realised the impossibility against which love is powerless. We imagine that love has as its object a person whom we can see lying down there before our eyes, enclosed in a human body. Alas, it is the extension of that person to all the points in space and time which the person has occupied and will occupy. If we do not possess its contact with this or that place, this or that hour, we do not possess it. But we cannot touch all these points. If only they were indicated to us, we might perhaps contrive to reach out to them. But we grope for them without finding them. Hence mistrust, jealousy, persecutions.¹²⁶

Deleuze, now, claims that the signs of love are inherently deceptive because they lead one to desire something which is impossible: to know the 'unknown existence', to unroll the worlds enveloped within the loved one, while these complicated worlds inevitably exclude the lover.¹²⁷ This is the first level of reading the signs of love as deceptive. It is what Marcel experiences when he is confronted with the *petite bande* of adolescent girls during his first stay at Balbec, and especially with Albertine's glance: 'I caught her smiling, sidelong glance, aimed from the centre of that inhuman world which enclosed the life of this little tribe, an inaccessible, unknown world.'¹²⁸

The second level of reading the signs of love is connected to the first. Deleuze offers an explanation for the fact why the worlds enveloped within women will remain largely unknown to men and vice versa: 'les amours intersexuelles sont moins profondes que l'homosexualité, elles trouvent leur vérité dans l'homosexualité.'¹²⁹ The separate worlds of Sodome and Gomorrah underlie the separation of the sexes. This is what Marcel discovers when Albertine tells him about her acquaintance with both Mlle Vinteuil and her best

friend who are like 'two big sisters' to her. This revelation causes Marcel to experience another involuntary memory, that is, of the homosexual and sadistic acts he saw performed by Mlle Vinteuil and her friend one afternoon when he found himself before a window of the Vinteuil mansion in Combray.¹³⁰ It invigorates his jealousy, but this time it has a different character:

C'était une *terra incognita* terrible où je venais d'atterrir, une phase nouvelle de souffrances insoupçonnées qui s'ouvrait. Et pourtant ce déluge de la réalité qui nous submerge, s'il est énorme auprès de nos timides suppositions, il était pressenti par elles. (...) Le rival n'était pas semblable à moi, ses armes étaient différentes, je ne pouvais pas lutter sur le même terrain, donner à Albertine les mêmes plaisirs.¹³¹

Deleuze then introduces a third level of the signs of love. He asserts that there is an even more profound reality underlying the worlds of Sodom and Gomorrah:

A l'infini de nos amours, il y a l'Hermaphrodite originel. Mais l'Hermaphrodite n'est pas l'être capable de se féconder lui-même. Loin de réunir les sexes, il les sépare, il est la source dont découlent continûment les deux séries homosexuelles divergentes, celle de Sodome et celle de Gomorrhe.

In other words, the signs of love envelop an original sexuality, says Deleuze: a hermaphroditic one, which is the essence of human subjectivity. Every individual is a hermaphrodite enveloping the separated, partitioned sexes. This absolute internal difference emanates the two divergent series of Sodom and Gomorrah which in their turn underlie a series of deceptions and jealousy. This ties in with the poststructuralist aversion to binary oppositions; both men and women stem from one original sexuality.

This way of thinking clearly foreshadows Deleuze's later conceptualisations of a subjectivity which defies binary logic. We should note, however, that throughout European history many theoretical frameworks that did adhere to this logic did, nevertheless, also propose a single original sexuality, viz. masculinity. I will try to distinguish Deleuze's ideas on this point by a consideration of his critique on the transcendental ground of this tradition.

A Succession of Tricks: The Polemic History of Categorical Thought

The book of Genesis, the *Origin of Species* of Christianity, teaches us that woman was created from a man's rib. God is presented as the separator, the creator of categories, the transcendental power that establishes differences and watches over them in tempest or at night, a reactive will to power which enforces the eternal return of the same. Darwin does not challenge this categorical thinking but merely builds a theory which accounts for its structural changes over time. He creates a new God: the power which separates, which directs the categories, their divergence or convergence or extinction, and he names it 'natural selection' or 'survival of the fittest'.

When the Enlightenment threatens the authority of Christianity, and thus the reign of pity and reactive life (as we have seen in Nietzsche's reading of European history), Darwinism only apparently takes

up its role at the side of the active forces. In reality, I would say, it sides with Hegel's model of restraint; the struggle for existence in the economic and political reality of the nineteenth century, seen as natural and unavoidable by Social Darwinists, obliges many to work hard and to refrain from extravagant lifestyles. Whereas God depreciates life by the promise of an afterlife, Social Darwinism propels the desire for more, better, and bigger, thus essentially also putting current life in the shadow of a luminous but remote future. Together with its dialectical opposite, the benevolence of the thought of the philosophes, instilling a feeling of guilt towards the 'weak' in the supposedly 'strong', life remains essentially reactive.¹³²

The 'desire for more' is these days more widespread than ever, but its dialectical counterpart is in the process of being disposed of. While the bourgeoisie with its paternalism strongly reinforced the values of the philosophes, the rise of the middle class seems to have replaced traditional values of solidarity by an unbridled liberalism that advances an excessive form of individuality. But what sort of individuality is this when it can easily be characterised by a desire to be the same (as the neighbours, as the trend-setters)? Why is it that despite the promises carried in Darwinism and other Enlightenment theories, life in the twentieth century remains essentially depreciated? Was Nietzsche wrong when he sketched his apocalyptic future of active, self-destructing reactive beings providing a ground for true affirmative beings? If so, why does Deleuze reiterate this scenario? If not so, why did it not yet materialise?

Nietzsche was not wrong; the enemy was indeed wearing itself out. The (post)Enlightenment/historical being of Hegel—the rational, self-conscious, pitying, and self-abnegating being—could have vanished with the waning of the bourgeoisie and the growing means for the masses. However, Deleuze seems to say, the reactive forces came up with a new trick, a trick which would evade the triumph of the active forces. This trick is called psychoanalysis.

The Austrian-Jewish physician Freud leaves the diachronic study of the species as installed by Darwin for what it is and engages in a synchronic one. In this he parallels the research of Saussure which also shifted from an historical and comparative orientation to the study of the system of a single language at a particular time. Freud, obviously, focused on human subjectivity, which he, in contradiction to his Enlightenment predecessors, did not equate with rational consciousness. His rejection of the Cartesian *cogito* and advancement of the primacy of the unconscious was nevertheless not an act of anti-rationalism; on the contrary: he tried to comprehend the irrational drives of the unconscious scientifically in the interests of civilisation, which he, as a true heir of the Enlightenment, did identify with reason.

How does Freud, however, catch irrationality rationally? These are two wholly different orders which are involved in a highly complex relation, if they are related at all. Saussure also discerns this problem when he tries to relate the word-sign to meaning:

Here as in political economy we are confronted with the notion of *value*; both [linguistics and economy] are concerned with *a system for equating things of different orders*—labour and wages in [the former] and a signified and a signifier in the [latter].¹³³

The notion of value is important here. Saussure is aware of the absolute individuality of the *parole*: it has a unique 'psychological' content (my example of cola as beverage or pep-drink is only the most basic exposition of Saussure's term) and has a similarly unique concrete pronunciation. Each *parole* is, nevertheless, assigned a place within the underlying *langue*. This procedure is in contradiction to the

etymological meaning of the 'individual' which is 'impartable' and thus 'unimpartable', as Manfred Frank observes:

It is not indivisible in the sense of the classical model of the atom, where it is a matter of indivisibility of an infinitesimally small substance that entertains relations 'only' with itself (...), rather the individual is 'indivisible' in the sense that it exists without a double and therefore without reference, and thus it literally has no equals.¹³⁴

This would have serious consequences for the relationship between the signifier and the signified because it is by nature unstable: every repetition of a signifier would necessarily change the signified because of the indivisible character of the signifier. Every repetition of a truly individual sign would axiomatically involve difference of meaning because the individual sign has no equals.

To ground individual phonic distributions and *concept mentaux* in an underlying linguistic framework and to prevent a perpetual loss of meaning, Saussure turns, as we have seen, to the notion of value, which implies a possibility of equivalent exchange. Here the parallel with political economy is very appropriate: the value of every object (and in neo-liberal thought also the value of subjects) is expressed in money—Marx's 'universal equivalent'. The unique individual character of the object is thus reduced via abstraction to an 'exchange commodity'; the individual object turns out to have a common feature after all: value. The object is thus not truly 'indivisible': through a process of infinite gradation we can always ground the individual in the general—the individual product in the economical system of the free market, the *parole* in the *langue*. In one stroke it also prevents the recurrent loss of meaning: a repetition of an individual case which corresponds with (or conforms to) the general rules of an underlying system—in other words, can be abstracted to a common, universal ground—does not necessarily (as is the case with true individuality) have to be a repetition of difference. On the contrary, as Frank remarks, if (to remain in the field of linguistics) neither the phonic chains nor the significations of a word would remain identical from one linguistic utterance to the next, the scientifically masterable system of language would collapse.¹³⁵

Freud, now, uses similar techniques to catch the irrational rationally. He devises a model of human subjectivity in which individual conscious actions can always be grounded in the unconscious. Freud claims that the unconscious is individual, but he also acknowledges, as we have seen before, that it is marked in an indelible way by the structural relations of social groups and their diverse modes of communication. In fact—and Jung understood this correctly—the unconscious is universal: through a process of infinite gradation (psychoanalysis) we can always ground the individual in the general—we can abstract all human actions to general laws like the law of Oedipus. In this way true individuality is crushed by psychoanalysis: it is precisely not the individuality of the subject of which it takes account, but rather the feature they all have in common, the central concern, which gathers an infinite number of individually different elements in the unity of one single viewpoint.¹³⁶

This is where I should link the previous exposition to the conceptualisations of Deleuze. Reading carefully, one might already have guessed that much of the foregoing theory has a close affinity with the thought Deleuze unfolds in *Différence et répétition*. Similarly, one could have imagined that the instability of meaning as a consequence of the impossibility of repetition of the same can be linked to the concerns of *Logique du sens*. One could even have surmised that the similitude between the concerns of linguistics,

psychoanalysis and political economy that was exposed by Saussure, foreshadows the turn to politics in *Capitalism et Schizophrénie*. At this very point, however, Deleuze highlights another affiliation: the categorical image of thought as repressive system of reactive forces.

What we have hitherto called individuality (as opposed to true individuality) is according to Deleuze in fact *particularity*. The particular is, he claims, an element which can be conceived as an applied instance of the general system; it necessarily refers to the common aspect of what can be thought and what can be experienced; it obliterates any regard for the (true) individual (or singular) which is, as we saw before, indivisible.¹³⁷ Although there have been more attempts which tried to differentiate both concepts, classical philosophy (the dialectical ‘other’ of Christianity) has insisted that every particularity of the individual can be grounded in the universal. Obviously, Plato’s theory of ideas subscribes to this view, and so do his ideas on the citizen, as we will see later. The same goes for many doctrines, for instance, the one of Saint Thomas Aquinas, which says that the individual is centred on God and can communicate with one another by means of God. Here he corresponds to Leibnitz who claims that the universal and the singular are of the same species and that God—as the highest genus—has a priori the concept of all individuals at his disposal.¹³⁸

But God is, as we have seen, not the only transcendental system underlying categorical thought. The idea of a self-enclosed system which underlies all ‘individuality’ (particularity) is just as binding for the theories of Darwin, Hegel, Saussure, Freud, or, for that matter, for the rationality of our modern sciences. Is it not true that a scientist (whether physicist, biologist, or anthropologist) would never maintain about a result s/he has arrived at over the course of his or her work that it has the status of ‘knowledge’ if it were not capable of also laying claim to generalisability? Real individuality does not attain the right to existence in the logic of research; it should always refer to the common aspect of what can be thought. When it does not, it endangers the scientifically masterable, the specific ethics of rationality. That is why individuality is under thought prohibition. Plato and Aristotle already distinguished the true citizen—who immediately recognises his or her private matter as a public issue, i.e. as a fact that is subject to regularities—from the private person, the *idiôtês*.¹³⁹ Foucault sketches the same proscription in ‘*Theatrum Philosophicum*’, his magnificent reading of *Différence et répétition* and *Logique du sens*:

[We can] isolate a use of categories that may not be immediately apparent; by creating a space for the operation of truth and falsity, by situating the free supplement of error, categories silently reject stupidity. In a commanding voice, they instruct us in the ways of knowledge and solemnly alert us to the possibilities of error, while in a whisper they guarantee our intelligence and form the a priori of excluded stupidity. Thus we court danger in wanting to be freed from categories; no sooner do we abandon their organizing principle than we face the magma of stupidity.¹⁴⁰

It is this ethics of rationality which Deleuze attacks, first in *Différence et répétition* with his conceptualisation of acategorical thought, and later in *Anti-Oedipus* through his conceptualisation of schizophrenia. Both works show convincingly that the subjectivity which surfaces from psychoanalysis is the new trick from the slave which maintains the subjection of the subject through the forging of an unconscious that works as the general law which prevents the affirmative will to power to go *jusqu’au bout*. The ‘desire for more’ forces us cumulatively to project satisfaction into a future which ever more corresponds with the world of TV-

commercials. Meanwhile, the Western middle-class capitalist no longer feels much pity for the unfortunate, but bathes, instead, in self-pity.

In his criticism of the categorical image of thought Deleuze constructs a new subject: an acategorical subject which defies the possibility of being abstracted towards a general law. A subject, therefore, which defies the specific ethics of rational thought and which, as such, opens up possibilities for women. Under the rule of categorical thought they have always been reduced to the position of the Other. So much has not changed since the early days when women were created from the rib of men: in psychoanalysis women are still theorised as derivatives of men, that is to say, are only constructed as the Other in relation to 'normal,' male subjectivity. We will see in Chapter Three that Deleuze's conceptualisations to some extent reiterate this disappearance or objectification of 'woman' and the 'feminine' and how his criticism of the categorical image of thought can, nonetheless, be put to use for feminism. I will first, in the remainder of this chapter, concentrate on the specific characteristics of Deleuze's proposals for a new subjectivity and the ways in which these change when Deleuze 'couples' his conceptualisations to the theories of Guattari.

The Groundless Ground: The Metaphysics of Acategorical Subjectivity

At the beginning of this chapter I compared Carter's conception of ideas as liquids with Deleuze's virtual realm of ideas. The intent of this comparison was the confirmation of a relation between the thought of Carter and the premises of poststructuralism with regard to the volatility of meaning. This instability of meaning is addressed throughout Deleuze's work: the virtual realm that is conceptualised in *Logique du sens* is pioneered in *Différence et répétition* and this precursor, in its turn, neither arrived with a bolt of lightning, but rather as an innovation—a return in a different guise of the absolute chaos of essences. The theoretical considerations regarding the notion of the virtual realm are, again, rather complex, but are, nevertheless, essential for my line of reasoning, because it is at this point that Deleuze, so to say, deconstructs Freud's conception of subject-construction, and consequently precipitates the search for new forms of subjectivity. It is at this point that I wish to return to the conceptualisation of the third synthesis of time, because this is the synthesis which is also committed to the yet-to-come, to the future, to absolute and complete novelty.

We can see history in the Nietzschean sense as a progressive movement of nihilism which eventually wears itself out—an Aristotelian tragedy in three acts. In this depiction, we could say, paraphrasing Foucault, Nietzsche inherits the narrative historicism of the nineteenth century. Foucault situates a fissure at the beginning of that century, separating the tabular, classifying conception of how reality is composed in the early Enlightenment from the 'historical' and 'narrative' conception of reality of the late or post-Enlightenment—the fault line which introduces time into the categorical image of thought—just like he places one at the turn of the twentieth century, of which Nietzsche, Freud, and Mallarmé are personifications.¹⁴¹ Deleuze implicitly acknowledges the fissure between the two phases of the Enlightenment in his discussion of the Kantian reappropriation of the Cartesian Cogito. 'The entire Kantian critique amounts to objecting against Descartes that it is impossible for determination to bear directly upon the undetermined,' he writes.¹⁴² Descartes's famous dictum 'I think therefore I am,'—a supposedly incontrovertible truth—serves as the basis of a philosophical system which, similar to geometry, could be deduced by rational reasoning from an indubitable axiom. The determination (I think) implies an undetermined existence (I am) because in order to think one must be, but it simultaneously determines the undetermined existence, that is to say, the 'I think' determines the 'I am' as a thinking subject. Kant agrees with the first implication of Descartes's Cogito, but

opposes, as we have seen, the second consequence. He suggests a third value, the 'determinable', or rather, the form in which the undetermined is determinable by the 'I think', to solve the problem. This determinable is transcendental in relation to determination and the undetermined; it establishes an a priori relation between thought and being.

Kant, now, fits in the Foucauldian blueprint in that he holds that the form under which undetermined existence is determinable by determination is *time*; in other words, one's undetermined existence can only be determined within time, or again in other words, one's being can only be thought in time. This being, however, is necessarily a passive being because time a priori excludes the possibility that it is active, that is, thinking. Thus, time establishes a passive self which experiences its own thought (by which it is able to say 'I') as occurring in it rather than being carried out by it. It is here that *the I becomes an Other*, that is to say, the passive subject experiences the effects of thought (the activity which can found the 'I') as if it is an Other within itself. 'It is as though the *I* were fractured from one end to the other: fractured by the pure and empty form of time,' concludes Deleuze who considers this fractured I as constitutive for the transcendentalism in the thought of Kant. Pure reason in an age where God has speculatively died—that is in the (early) Enlightenment—will necessarily lead to a fractured I because the supposed identity of the Cartesian Cogito has no other guarantee than the unity of God himself.¹⁴³ This is, of course, a clear example of categorical thinking. Nevertheless, Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* does not criticise this image of thought; rather it saves it from the clutches of sceptics like Hume who denounced claims that this seemingly orderly universe required a mind to design it. In this sense we can say that Kant's introduction of time and its consequential transcendentalism is the trick of the reactive forces to sustain an instance of generalisability; to maintain a unity of the I in a transcendental realm.

However, poststructuralism convincingly demonstrates that the transcendental ego fails to serve as a unity that is prior to difference. Derrida does this for instance in his seemingly minimal reinterpretation of Husserlian phenomenology. Derrida, like Deleuze, conceives of a history of metaphysics which is 'dogmatically committed' to a specific rational system which he calls logocentrism. The 'ultimate referent' that grounds this image of thought, ascertains Derrida, is always a mysterious bodiless self-appresentation—from Aristotle's definition of the divine spirit to Hegel's self-consciousness of the absolute spirit. This self-consciousness, however, in its Husserlian conception a reflection, is necessarily differential: there is a subject of reflection and an object of reflection—a duality that is already implied in the semantics of the pronouns 'self' and 'itself'. Something refers to itself by taking a detour—in Husserl's words 'a Logos [retakes] possession of *itself* through this consciousness.'¹⁴⁴ This differentiability undermines the idea of a transcendental ego as a unity prior to difference because this ego, in Husserlian phenomenology, founds itself as an absolute principle, that is, as something internal which is antecedent to any exteriority.¹⁴⁵ In other words, the transcendental ego founds itself as something internal that does not owe its knowledge to the mediation of something external and is thus *present to itself* (*sich-gegenwärtig-sein*), i.e., self-conscious. This self-consciousness cannot be attained by means of a mediation by the Other of itself (a difference which evolves only on the basis of a prior unity, and which remains bound up with this unity, that is, a *virtual* difference) but only by the actual difference between that which reflects and that which is reflected. Thus the transcendental ego cannot be an absolute primordial unity, which serves Derrida's cause in that it cannot reduce the materiality of language to a domain of preexpressive meaning, that is, a world of pure signifieds not borne by signifiers.

Deleuze comes to identical conclusions regarding the transcendental ego. Whereas Kant proposes the transcendental ego as an active synthetic identity ('The knowing subject (...) is not a *tabula rasa* (...) which passively receives sense impressions, but an active instrument, which structures, organizes, and interprets the chaotic streams of sensations coming to it.') which transcendently reduces the fractured I to a unity, Deleuze affirms the synthetic potential of the passive self.¹⁴⁶ In other words, he subscribes to Kant's conclusion that the Cartesian Cogito has failed, but he rejects Kant's practical resurrection of the Cogito effected by the proposal of the transcendental ego. What he proposes instead is a metaphysics freed from its original profundity as well as from a supreme being—a metaphysics of difference. And here we see that Deleuze's appropriation of Kant is, as a first principle is supposed to be according to himself, merely the mask of a more profound goal, which is, according to Foucault, the inspiration of all philosophy: the reversal of Platonism:

To reverse Platonism with Deleuze is to displace oneself insidiously within it, to descend a notch, to descend to its smallest gestures, discrete but *moral*—which serve to exclude the simulacrum; it is also to deviate slightly from it, to encourage from either side the small talk it excluded; it is to initiate another disconnected and divergent series; it is to construct, by way of this small lateral leap, a dethroned para-Platonism. To convert Platonism (...) is to increase its compassion for reality, for the world, and for time.¹⁴⁷

Plato is said to have distinguished between the idea and its physical embodiment, between the sun of truth and the shadows of the cave. Deleuze, however, finds another distinction in the *Statesman* which he claims to be antecedent to the discovery of essences, videlicet, the passage in which Plato distinguishes 'the true statesman or the well-founded aspirer, then relatives, auxiliaries, and slaves, down to simulacra and counterfeits.'¹⁴⁸ 'The simulacrum and the good representation—the copy or [particularity]—may then be seen as constituting a series with one another,' writes Hassan Melehy.¹⁴⁹ Is it possible then, we could ask, following Melehy, that the 'original' (the essence, the idea) is instituted through a ruse on the part of those in 'second' place to maintain their place in hierarchy, and that they designate the false pretenders (the simulacra, the phantasms) as dangerous because in principle the latter are the same as they are and their nature as simulacrum threatens the stable order. Plato and his disciples did not separate the false from the authentic by discovering a law of the true and false, but by looking beyond these manifestations to a model, a metaphysical essence. This is the trick: propose an essence that approximates the good representation so that this good copy inevitably measures itself against it. Then propose this essence so forcefully that the false copy crumbles in its presence. In Foucault's words: 'With the appearance of Ulysses, the eternal husband, the false suitors disappear. *Exeunt simulacra*.'¹⁵⁰

But Deleuze sees through the wool:

[I]t may be that the end of the *Sophist* contains the most extraordinary adventure of Platonism: as a consequence of searching in the direction of the simulacrum and of leaning over its abyss, Plato discovers, in a flash of an instant, that the simulacrum is not simply a false copy, but that it places in question the very notions of copy and model. The final definition of the Sophist leads us to the point where we can no longer distinguish him from Socrates himself—the ironist working in private by

means of brief arguments. Was it not necessary to push irony to the extreme? Was it not Plato himself who pointed out the direction for the reversal of Platonism.¹⁵¹

The ruse by which the value of the simulacrum is hidden lies at the foundation of Western philosophy. Reinstating the rights of the simulacrum, affirming its anarchical character—defying hierarchy, possessing irreducible individuality, having no internal or specular double, being contradictory, revealing a dimension of unlimited and illogical becoming—in other words, overturning Platonism, is thus to free philosophy from the restrictions it has placed on itself from the outset.

The false now becomes the mode of exploration of the truth. This directs our study to concern not the level of answers and solutions but rather the level of problems and questions because the play of the true and false occurs in the very space of its essential disguise or its fundamental displacement, that is, as we have seen, in the realm of the virtual. This realm, as we will see, corresponds to the unconscious (even Oedipus's conflicts depend upon the Sphinx's question). Problems and questions thus belong to the unconscious, but a reconsidered unconscious: one which is differential and iterative by nature (because the insistence, the transcendence, and the ontological bearing of questions and problems is expressed not in the form of the finality of a sufficient reason but in the discrete form of difference and repetition); an unconscious which is serial, problematic and questioning.¹⁵²

Deleuze turns to Freud in order to explore the virtual realm. 'Biopsychical life,' he writes, 'implies a field of individuation in which differences in intensity are distributed here and there in the form of excitations. The quantitative and qualitative process of the resolution of such differences is what we call pleasure.'¹⁵³ It is in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* that Freud seeks an answer to the question how pleasure ceases to be a process in order to become a principle. His conclusion is that the excitation in the form of free difference must, in some sense, be 'invested', 'tied', or bound in such a way that its resolution becomes systematically possible.¹⁵⁴ Scattered resolutions become integrated; a second layer of the Id—the name Freud gave to the mobile distribution of differences and local resolutions within an intensive field—emerges: the beginning of an organisation. This second layer corresponds to the first (passive) synthesis of the ego (corresponding in its turn to the first synthesis of time): 'Investments, bindings or integrations are passive syntheses or contemplations (...) At the level of each binding, an ego is formed in the Id; a passive, partial, larval, contemplative and contracting ego. The Id is populated by local egos which constitute the time peculiar to the Id, the time of the living present there where the binding integrations are carried out.'¹⁵⁵ Because the binding of different excitations is a necessary condition for the pleasure principle to exist, we could say that this second layer of the Id precedes the principle and renders it possible. In other words, the (first) passive synthesis of binding is 'beyond' the pleasure principle.

On the basis of this passive synthesis a twofold development emerges. On the one hand we can see the materialisation of an active synthesis for which the passive synthesis serves as a foundation. The active synthesis denotes an activity which is carried out by the contemplative mind rather than occurs in it. It is an attempt to relate the bound excitations (the drives from the Id) to reality or a real object. 'Active synthesis is defined by the test of reality in an "objectal" relation,' writes Deleuze, 'and it is precisely according to the reality principle that the Ego tends to "be activated", to be actively unified, to unite all its small composing and contemplative passive egos, and to be topologically distinguished from the Id.'¹⁵⁶ In other words, moving

beyond the binding in the direction of a real object entails moving beyond all the local (passive) egos towards a unified conception of the 'active self' as an integrated whole.

On the other hand and at the same time, however, there is a movement towards another direction, that is, an extension of the passive synthesis towards the *virtual*. Excitation as a difference was already the contraction of an elementary repetition. It is to this more elementary difference that the passive synthesis—while remaining passive—extends simultaneously and on its own account, finding new formulae at once both dissymmetrical and complementary with the activity.¹⁵⁷ Deleuze substantiates this concept with various examples from childhood (like mirror-writing, handling books back to front, and sucking fingers) which he then loads with a considerable burden of validation.¹⁵⁸ Consequentially he writes of a 'duality of centres' and an 'elliptical infantile world' (rather than a circular or egocentric one) with the ego situated at the point of connection between two intersecting asymmetrical circles: the circle of real objects and that of the virtual objects or centres.¹⁵⁹

It is Bergson who, in *Matter and Memory*, proposes the schema of a world with two centres, one real and one virtual, that gradually shade into one another. In Deleuze's words, from these two centres emanate on the one hand a series of perception-images, and on the other a series of 'memory-images' which are correlative and complementary: they borrow from and feed into one another. There is however a difference between the virtual and the real: 'Whereas active synthesis points beyond passive synthesis towards global integrations and the supposition of identical totalisable objects, passive synthesis, as it develops, points beyond itself towards the contemplation of partial objects which remain non-totalisable.'¹⁶⁰ The virtual object is thus a partial object; it is a shred of the pure past. It is Eros, writes Deleuze, which tears virtual objects out of the pure past and gives them to us in order that they may be lived.¹⁶¹

Here we return to the concept of series that we have seen in our treatment of Deleuze's appropriation of Proust. And again the theory is used to criticise the psychoanalytical concept of repetition which holds that there are complex points, traumas, primal scenes—fixation and regression. This theory of repetition, Deleuze argues, is subjected to the concept of the general, restricted by the law of Plato; it boils down to a repetition of the same. 'Consider the two presents, the two scenes or the two events (infantile and adult) in their reality separated by time,' writes Deleuze, 'how can the former present act at a distance upon the present one?' And: 'How can it provide a model for it, when all its effectiveness is retrospectively received from the later one?' Or: '[I]f we invoke the indispensable imaginary operations required to fill the temporal space, how could these operations fail ultimately to absorb the entire reality of the two presents, leaving the repetition to subsist only as the illusion of a solipsistic subject?'¹⁶² These problems which are aligned to the psychoanalytical concept of repetition evaporate when we consider Deleuze's conceptualisation:

[W]hile it may seem that two presents are successive, at a variable difference apart in the series of reals, in fact they form, rather, *two real series which coexist in relation to a virtual object of another kind*, one which constantly circulates and is displaced in them (even if the characters, the subjects which give rise to the positions, the terms and the relations of each series, remain, for their part, temporally distinct). Repetition is constituted not from one present to another, but between the two coexistent series that these presents form in function of the virtual object (...). It is because this object constantly circulates, always displaced in relation to itself, that it determines transformations

of terms and modifications of imaginary relations within the two real series in which it appears, and therefore between the two presents.¹⁶³

Difference is thus placed at the very centre of repetition. Or, in other words, difference is shown to be a *decentering* that inhabits all repetition. Repetition, consequently, is presented as a function of displacement and disguise. It does not simply repeat a primordial essence, but it rather incessantly displaces the virtual object which circulates the series of reals. This conception of difference and repetition contests the psychoanalytical conception of these terms and thus the very notion of original models.

But what, then, should we think of the pure past from which emanate various series of Proustian signs? Despite the fact that this pure past was never present, it will inevitably be accused, and not erroneously so, of being an original model. After all, it is a ground which remains relative to what it grounds, borrows the characteristics from what it grounds, and is proved by these.¹⁶⁴ Deleuze acknowledges this shortcoming and conceives of a yet more profound synthesis to evade the equivocal position of the second synthesis which, as an in-itself remains a correlate of representational thought.

This third synthesis is the 'unground' of time—time out of joint, as Hamlet says—which places difference at the heart of repetition. This third synthesis points towards the new, the future, because it ensures the decentering of repetition: there is no original point, says Deleuze, only a primary difference or rather a primary system of differences (the so called dark precursor which enables two heterogeneous series to resonate without recourse to the identity of a third, a relational ground). It causes only the yet-to-come to return and thereby necessarily supersedes any ground, replacing it by a groundlessness which constitutes a nebulous time that is pure and empty. It is the line of flight from the circular conception of time (the intolerable image that is the last sign of a higher form of thought) which the second synthesis inevitably resuscitates. It seems, writes Deleuze, as if this circle has 'unrolled, straightened itself and assumed the ultimate shape of the labyrinth, the straight-line labyrinth which is, as Borges says, "invisible, incessant"'.¹⁶⁵

What the third synthesis represents is the eternal return freed from the restrictions which Plato had established. It is metaphysics, all right, but metaphysics freed from originary models and profundity, freed from the primacy of the Same and the Similar, and from concepts like resemblance, identity, analogy, and opposition which are now considered as mere effects, products of a primary multiplicity of differences. The third synthesis serves as the transcendental differenciator which differentiates between the different things spoken of, relating these immediately to one another in series which it causes to resonate.¹⁶⁶ It is an acategorical differenciator which denies the existence of a fixed underlying or overarching notion—be that the transcendental ego, an unconscious complex, or God—but instead advances a free and fluid multiplicity which can never be reduced but which always affirms difference, becoming Other, becoming new. To paraphrase Foucault, new thought is possible, thought is again possible after Deleuze.¹⁶⁷

Being, now, is the recurrence of difference, the return freed from the curvature of the circle (the image of identity). Not only difference is freed from the law of the Same through the reversal of categorical thought, but also being, which is liberated from the tyranny of the conceptual hierarchy of species and genus. The subject is released from the subjected position that it was assigned since Plato and Aristotle, through to Descartes, Kant, and finally Freud and Lacan. *Différence et répétition* leaves the categorical subjectivity of psychoanalysis behind in ruin, and opens up possibilities for the conceptualisation of a new, more fluid, molecular subjectivity which will point towards new possibilities for life. The search for new subjectivities,

however, only effectively begins in *L'Anti-Oedipe*—and what a magnificent pursuit it is. Where *Diffence et répétition* is commanding and exalted but still, in Deleuze's own words, 'full of an academic apparatus' and 'laborious', *L'Anti-Oedipe* is glittering and sparkling, marking the turn from gnosis to praxis.¹⁶⁸ It is a 'consciously Dadaist' and 'carnavalesque' attempt to bring pedantic philosophy in line with the political (post-Marxist, anarchistic), economic (capitalist), and cultural (postmodern) reality of the street. In the following paragraphs I will try to delineate the main lines of reasoning of the book, paying special attention to its proposals for a new, post-categorical, nomadic, subjectivity.

Anti-Oedipus: Towards a History of Desire Production

'A schizophrenic out for a walk is a better model than a neurotic lying on the analyst's couch,' issue Deleuze and Guattari as one of the opening statements of *L'Anti-Oedipe*.¹⁶⁹ It situates them immediately: it places them diametrically opposite of psychoanalysis and other forms of categorical thought:

A breath of fresh air, a relationship with the outside world. Lenz's stroll, for example, as reconstructed by Büchner. This walk outdoors is different from the moments when Lenz finds himself closeted with his pastor, who forces him to situate himself socially, in relation to the God of established religion, in relationship to his father, to his mother. While taking a stroll outdoors, on the other hand, he is in the mountains, amid falling snowflakes, with other gods or without any gods at all, without a family, without a father or a mother, with nature. 'What does my father want? Can he offer me more than that? Impossible. Leave me in peace.'¹⁷⁰

It relates the book to what Deleuze describes in his letter to Michel Cressole as 'the trend which is going to grow, according to which people are more and more fed up with being told about "papa, mama, Oedipus, castration, regression," and with the properly imbecile image of sexuality (...) that they are offered.'¹⁷¹ These people, claims Deleuze, already criticise psychoanalysis, but do this, paradoxically, in psychoanalytical terms ('What on earth are they doing on that couch?').¹⁷² *L'Anti-Oedipe*, now, offers them a way out of this stranglehold. It provides various tools that could help them to walk away from that couch, take a walk in their exteriority, find paths never noticed before, and make motionless trips to the limits of the familiar.

For many people it seemed to have worked this way, says Deleuze, referring to the great number of letters he and Guattari have received, but for others, especially the better educated, 'those spoiled by psychoanalysis', it didn't seem to work; nothing happened.¹⁷³ Deleuze expounds this by associating these different groups to different reading practices:

There are (...) two ways of reading a book: either we consider it a box which refers us to an inside, and in that case we look for the signified; if we are still more perverse or corrupted, we search for the signifier. (...) And we can comment, and interpret, and ask for explanations, we can write about the book and so on endlessly. Or the other way: we consider the book a small a-signifying machine; the only problem is 'does it work and how does it work? How does it work for you?' If it doesn't function, if nothing happens, take another book.¹⁷⁴

Many critics have not taken this word of advice, for *L'Anti-Oedipe* has been prodigiously carped at, more often than not in an aggressive, hostile and unacademical way (for instance by Cressole who attacks Deleuze, amongst other things, on his long and untrimmed nails). To some extent, the more serious critics are correct in asserting that *L'Anti-Oedipe* is only based on the most reductive and orthodox version of Oedipus as a complex and does not paint a very acute picture of psychoanalysis in its multiformity.¹⁷⁵ Similarly, they are correct in stating that the more or less positive picture of schizophrenia that Deleuze and Guattari present is, despite Guattari's expertise on the subject, an abstract, romantic sketch which is not very considerate to the people who actually suffer from the disease, nor attentive to the many-sidedness of the affliction.¹⁷⁶ It is, however, too easy to denounce the book simply on these grounds, for behind its mask of playfulness and parody, underneath its surface of polemical political and theoretical sympathies which are nowadays often decried as quixotic and vogueish, lies a serious and in-depth analysis of desire in our capitalist age. This is not to say that *L'Anti-Oedipe* should be read as *the* new theoretical reference ('you know that much heralded theory that finally encompasses everything, that finally totalizes and reassures'), but it does, in my view, deserve more credit than Manfred Frank gives it in his depiction of the book as a 'symptom' of the 'discontent' of the 'younger generation', a phenomenon that 'should not be overestimated'.¹⁷⁷ What Frank, writing in 1984, could not know, is that *Capitalisme et schizophrénie*, would become a 'symptom' that can hardly be overestimated; the 'whisperings of fan clubs or sectlike groups on the margins of the academic scene' would slowly but steadily grow into a penetrating buzz, a strong undercurrent of our postmodern condition, resonating in philosophy, a wide variety of human and social sciences, the arts (especially 'new' arts like video- and mixed-media-art) and art criticism, but also in lifestyle, management training, and informational technology.¹⁷⁸ The conceptualisations that Deleuze and Guattari coin seem to dip into everyday life, to yield answers to concrete questions. In this sense, *L'Anti-Oedipe*, is indeed a toolbox, as Deleuze and Guattari described it: a toolbox for living, an eclectic travelguide for the exploration of the yet-to-come—always motivating us to go further, to draw lines of flight, to become nomadic.

It all starts with Deleuze and Guattari's meeting in the autumn of 1969. Guattari had the impression that Deleuze was very much ahead of him, because he was not tied to psychoanalysis—unlike most theoreticians at that time—but rather thought it was pathetic, or better even, an hilarious joke.¹⁷⁹ Conversely, Deleuze thought that Guattari was in the vanguard because, as he says in an interview, 'Felix m'a parlé de ce qu'il appelait déjà les machines désirantes: toute une conception théorique et pratique de l'inconscient-machine, de l'inconscient schizophrénique.'¹⁸⁰

A first draft of this theory was formulated in the aforementioned article 'Machine and Structure', written earlier that year, in which Guattari establishes a distinction between machines and structures in an attempt to 'identify the peculiar positions of subjectivity in relation to events and to history.'¹⁸¹ For this he adopts the complementary categories of series and singularities that Deleuze suggested in *Différence et répétition* and *Logique du sens*. Structure, then, relates to the generality characterized by a position of exchange or substitution of particularities, whereas, the machine relates to the order of repetition 'as behaviour and viewpoint relative to a singularity that cannot be changed or replaced'.¹⁸² Structure, thus, positions its elements, including the subject or the agent of action, in an all-encompassing system of references consisting of 'two heterogenous series which relate each element to the others and thereby enclose the ego-centered subject as but one of many other enclosed elements.'¹⁸³ In contrast, the machine is not such a

structural representation, but rather an event or a point of convergence for the heterogeneous series to which the subject remains remote:

For the machine, the subject of history is elsewhere, in the structure. In fact the subject of the structure (...) should rather be seen in relation to a phenomenon of 'being an ego'—the ego here being in contrast with the subject of the unconscious as it corresponds to the principle stated by Lacan: a signifier represents it for another signifier. The unconscious subject as such will be on the same side of the machine, or perhaps better, *alongside* the machine.¹⁸⁴

Guattari's analysis now seems to parallel the research of the philosophers of the Frankfurt School, which also talks about people 'disconnected from their roots' that are forced to function alongside machines.¹⁸⁵ Guattari, however, emphasises the revolutionary possibilities of the machine. The essence of the machine, he writes, is its function of detaching a signifier from the unconscious structural chain, making it into a representative different in kind from the structurally established order, a differentiator. It is this essence that 'binds the machine to both the desiring subject and to its status as the basis of the various structural orders corresponding to it'.¹⁸⁶

The machine, as a repetition of the particular, is a mode—perhaps indeed the only possible mode—of univocal representation of the various forms of subjectivity in the order of generality on the individual or collective plane.¹⁸⁷

Guattari concludes that this machine process could be a new weapon in the struggle against social and state structures which, as we have seen before, tend to close off and forbid the emergence of every subjective group process or true individuality. Deleuze agrees that the machine process could have revolutionary potential, but comments that Guattari's conceptualisations are still confined in Lacan's psychoanalytic terminology, subjected to the symbolic law of the father:

C'est forcé, puisqu'il devait tant de choses à Lacan (moi aussi). Mais je me disais que ça irait encore mieux si l'on trouvait les concepts adéquats, au lieu de se servir des notions qui ne sont même pas celles de Lacan créateur, mais celles d'une orthodoxie qui s'est faite autour de lui.¹⁸⁸

Deleuze and Guattari decided to work together in order to produce conceptualisations which would be able to elude possible recuperation by the categorical image of thought, conceptualisations which are necessarily devoid of such terms as structure, signifier, and phallus. This leads to the complicated phraesology that they bring into play in *L'Anti-Oedipe*. However, behind this bewildering nomenclature lies a relatively simple thesis which follows a well known proverb from Deleuze and Guattari's mutual hero Antonin Artaud: '[C]e n'est pas l'homme mais le monde qui est devenu un anormal'.¹⁸⁹ The world, Deleuze and Guattari assert, has become schizophrenic in yet another historical tragedy in three acts. The schizophrenic individual, on the other hand, is not abnormal but rather a paragon that points the way towards liberation from the tyranny of psychoanalysis, the Oedipal yoke, the primary system which helps to enforce the restriction of desire in capitalist societies.

Deleuze and Guattari assign this romantic role to the schizophrenic because s/he, they say, has long since ceased to believe in Freud's tripartite formula mommy-daddy-me. 'Freud doesn't like schizophrenics,' they continue, 'He doesn't like their resistance to being oedipalized.'¹⁹⁰ In Freud's conception, human beings that do not channel their libidinal energies should not be valued above animal beings who also act upon their desires without moderation. The channelling of desire, the constitution of a subjectivity, takes place within the above-mentioned triangular family-structure. That is why psychoanalysis brings everything back to the family. When, for instance, in Kurt Vonnegut's *Slaughterhouse 5* Billy Pilgrim goes crazy shortly after his homecoming from the second World War, the doctors 'didn't think it had anything to do with the war. They were sure Billy was going to pieces because his father had thrown him into the deep end of the YMCA swimming pool.'¹⁹¹

This psychic plane of ego-constitution through the Oedipal encounter is connected by Deleuze and Guattari to the political plane of creating a subjectivity suited for capitalist economy. This latter system is, in their view, the third and final stage of a long history of social desire production—or, desire repression—which could be described as a synthesis of a Nietzschean history of the internalisation of debt (comparable to the internalisation of guilt that we have seen in his history of the becoming reactive of wo/man) and a history of representation which describes the various ways in which signs are cut into the flesh of desire—from the primitive initiation rites involving scarification, tattoos, and piercings, through to the castration of Oedipus as a symbolic but ever so forceful violence for the establishment of a fixed socio-political order.

The first, savage, stage comprises primitive societies in which kinship relations channel, restrict, and code the flow of people, privileges, goods, and prestige, turning individuals immediately into representatives of the social. Filiation and alliance territorialises archaic deterritorialised (or I would say preterritorialised) desire, but not in any way comparable to the much more efficient and rigid channelling that takes place in the subsequent barbaric stage. This second stage, which introduces the organisation of the state, the *Urstaat* (after the biblical city of Ur, which was not formed in progressive stages but appears 'fully armed, a master stroke executed all at once') does not evolve from primitive societies, but befalls on them from without ('lays its terrible claws upon a populace perhaps tremendously superior in numbers but still formless').¹⁹² The barbaric society is organised as a pyramid that has the despot at its apex, with a bureaucratic apparatus as its lateral surface and the villagers at its base.¹⁹³ The barbaric society is ruled in relation to the despot (be that a King, Emperor, or Pope) who introduces two new repressive entities, videlicet, money and writing.

In primitive societies, Deleuze and Guattari assert, the lateral structure (that of alliance) is maintained by a continuing chain of debt relationships (think, for instance, of the comical reversed chains of gifts and counter-gifts that maintained relations between neighbouring islands of the Trobriand archipelago as described by Malinowski). This debt becomes manifest by bargaining rather than by fixing an equivalent. In barbaric societies, on the other hand, debt is rendered indefinite by the invention of money—as we have seen before, the universal equivalent. It is, however, not the marketplace which necessitates this new, more flexible system of exchange, but the state itself, which can, eventually, only maintain its bureaucratic and military apparatuses by collecting taxes which are not paid in kind. Whereas the primitive social machine territorialises archaic desire by means of primitive capital ('fixed capital or filiative stock and circulating capital or mobile blocks of debts') the despotic machine deterritorialises them again by demanding direct filiation to the despot and direct alliance to the state.¹⁹⁴

Far from seeing in the State the principle of territorialization that would inscribe people according to their residence, we should see in the principle of residence the effect of a movement of deterritorialization that divides the earth as an object and subjects men [*sic*] to the new imperial inscription, to the new full body [of the despot], to the new socius.¹⁹⁵

This imperial inscription 'countersects all the alliances and filiations, prolongs them, makes them converge into the direct filiation of the despot with the deity, and the new alliance of the despot with the people.'¹⁹⁶ All the coded flows of the primitive machine, Deleuze and Guattari continue, are forced into a bottleneck where the despotic machine *overcodes* them. This overcoding is put to work in order to end the dread of flows of desire that would resist coding; it makes all flows of desire into the property of the sovereign.

Deleuze and Guattari then turn to despotic representation which is closely connected to inscription. While the mobile blocks of desire which determine territorial inscription are compared to bricks, imperial inscription is compared to the cement that fixes these bricks into an immobile organisation (that of the pyramid). A similar operation takes place when the despot introduces writing. Primitive inscription, could be said to be related to a graphic system (a mark on the body, a drawing on the wall, a dance on the earth) which is independent of but nevertheless connected to the oral system of the primitive society. Territorial representation is thus made up of two heterogeneous elements which are in a connotative relation to each other: voice and graphism. The heterogeneity, the divergence of these two elements is resolved by a third element: the eye.¹⁹⁷ Here, Deleuze and Guattari reappropriate Jean-François Lyotard's theory of designation which holds that the eye can bridge the gap between the two elements: 'the eye jumps'.¹⁹⁸ The connotative order—a magic triangle with three sides—establishes a chain of signs which is continually jumping from one element to another, a polyvocal network radiating in all directions, which cannot be contained within an order of meaning, still less within a signifier.¹⁹⁹ This surface organisation of representation changes radically when the despot aligns graphism to the voice; graphism, at one and the same time, subordinates itself to the voice in order to subordinate the voice. 'The subordination of graphism to the voice,' write Deleuze and Guattari, 'induced a fictitious voice from on high which, inversely, no longer expresses itself except through the writing signs that it emits.'²⁰⁰ The voice no longer sings (as it often does in oral societies) but dictates; the graphic system no longer inscribes itself into the flesh (it ceases to dance on the earth) but is set into writing on tablets, stones, and books; the eye sets itself to reading. The bricks are being piled and cemented; the magic triangle thus becomes the base of the pyramid, all of whose sides cause the vocal, the graphic, and the visual to converge toward the eminent unity of the despot.²⁰¹ The order of connotation no longer exists; it has been replaced by an order of subordination which caused the linearisation of the chain of signs, the series that we can now call the chain of the signifier.

What, now, is this despotic signifier in relation to the nonsignifying territorial sign? It is, Deleuze and Guattari argue, a detached partial object which jumps outside the territorialised network and superimposes linearity; it forms the transcendent dimension from which all the signs uniformly emerge in a deterritorialised flow of writing. The despotic signifier has become a sign of the territorial sign; it is the deterritorialised sign itself, the sign made *letter*.²⁰²

This surface organisation of representation, on which inscriptions are carved and sounds recoil, shares its fate with the in-depth dimension of representation, where desires reside. In primitive societies desire is restrained by making the individual into a direct representative of the social. This territorial 'organisation'

of desire, however, remains, like the connotative order, dispersed and haphazard as a result of the multidimensional character of the rhizomatic social network. In the subsequent despotic stage an individual jumps from this network of filiation and alliance and creates a transcendental position which organises a more systematic repression—not of desire itself, but of deterritorialised desire. Enter Oedipus, the repressing representation, the transcendental representative of deterritorialised desire—absent desire, desire as *lack*.

In a Whiggish attempt we are now led to believe that everything is and always was Oedipal. Deleuze and Guattari, however, turn to Victor Turner's anthropological study into the healing process of the Ndembu tribe in Africa in order to reverse this universalising sophistry.²⁰³ At first everything indeed appears to be Oedipal: the sick K. is treated by the soothsayer and the medicine man because he is preyed upon by the ghost of his maternal grandfather, that cruelly reproaches him. It is not the familial, Oedipal relation between K. and his grandfather that causes distress, argue Deleuze and Guattari, but rather the social order in which the latter had occupied the position of the chief:

Ndembu analysis was never Oedipal: it was directly plugged into the social organisation and disorganisation; sexuality itself, through the women and the marriages, was just such an investment of desire; the parents played the role of stimuli in it, and not the role of group organizers (...)—the role held by the chief and his personages. Rather than everything being reduced to the name of the father, or that of the maternal grandfather, the latter opened up onto all the names of history. *Instead of everything being projected onto the grotesque hiatus of castration, everything was scattered in the thousand break-flows of the chieftainship, the lineages, the relations of colonization.*²⁰⁴

It is under the effect of colonisation (that which befalls from without) that the analysis becomes Oedipal in part; for it is the coloniser who says: 'Your father is your father and nothing else, or your maternal grandfather—don't mistake them for chiefs; you can go have yourself triangulated in your corner, (...) your family is your family and nothing else; sexual reproduction no longer passes through those points, although we rightly need your family to furnish a material that will be subjected to a new order of reproduction.'²⁰⁵

This colonisation is still taking place in the peripheral zones of the third stage of the history of desire-repression that Deleuze and Guattari sketch: capitalism. There Oedipus is still satisfied with pouncing his terrible claws on the populace from without. But at the 'soft centre' of capitalism he no longer wants to be merely a repressing representation for high above, for he knows too well that, as Abram Kardiner remarks, people can dream of Oedipus without 'having the complex'.²⁰⁶ To secure his primacy, he must migrate to the heart of desire, cuddling the population rather than pouncing on them, becoming intimate with them until he arrives at their interior, until he comes to occupy the position of the representative of desire. Thereafter there is no longer any need to burden individuals from the outside, they shoulder their own burden, desire their own repression—is that schizophrenic or what?²⁰⁷ Not that the individual steps into this pitfall consciously; rather s/he is lured into it by the social organisation of capitalism, the social mechanism of which the individual is, according to Marx, but one of the wheels. Thus Artaud's proverb could be said to be correct, it is not the individual but society that has gone crazy. Capitalism is the final stage of the history of becoming-decadent that Deleuze and Guattari sketch; it is the end of history, or to quote Heiner Müller rephrasing Artaud:

‘Denken am Ende der Aufklärung, das mit dem Tod Gottes begonnen hat, sei der Sarg, in dem er begraben wurde, faulend mit dem Leichnam. Leben, eigesperrt in diesen Sarg.’²⁰⁸

The Final Stage: Capitalism as the End of History

Müller, in his *Medea* adaptation, expresses his idea that the individual is nothing personal—is always invested collectively, would Deleuze and Guattari say—through Jason who expounds on the impossibility to ‘speak from the I’. Everyone carries the burden of history and reflects the culture one is part of. Thus Jason doesn’t speak for himself, remarks Robert Steijn, which is emphasised by Müller’s subtext which states that his comment should be uttered collectively:

In every utterance, society has its say—also in the remorse of the perpetrators. They also play a part in history, without being able to change its cause, even not when they would publicly take the blame. Jason’s voice reflects the collective confession of humanity working on its own downfall. Humanity is caught in structures which it has brought down on itself, and because it is well aware of this, it is condemned to defeatism. People unconditionally believe in the downfall of their history. This pessimism has, in Müller’s words, ‘cut wounds in the brain.’²⁰⁹

This pessimism is evident in the works of many historians and critics of the Enlightenment and of our (post)industrial civilisation—Nietzsche (of course), Spengler, Huizinga, Adorno, and Baudrillard, to name just a few; they exhibit a yearning for a glorious—but distant—past (which is not incompatible with progressiveness). This also applies to Müller and Deleuze and Guattari, but they differ from some of the above-mentioned writers in that they adhere to a positive, active nihilism rather than to a negative, reactive one.²¹⁰ In *Die Hamletmaschine*, Müller formulates a utopian line of flight which is strikingly similar to the concept Deleuze and Guattari come up with: the machine-human. ‘Ich will eine Maschine sein,’ says a genuinely schizophrenic Hamlet, ‘kein Schmerz kein Gedanke.’²¹¹ Hamlet can only survive as a machine, a machine that runs on blood, that excretes shit, as if he wants to say: ‘My blood flows (so does my shit, and also my sperm), therefore I am’—that is to say, I am not dead, not thinking, just functioning (‘Arme zu greifen Beine zu gehn’); I am a human-machine.²¹²

In a similar way, the flows of desire are essential to Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the *desiring-machines*: ‘I desire, therefore I am’ (not ‘I love my mother and want to kill my father, therefore I am’). These machines likewise merely function, producing flows of desire which simply flow, with no aim or meaning whatsoever (it is production of production, desire to desire). Everything comes as a flow, even writing, as we have seen before. ‘Ere I could make a prologue to my brains,/ They had begun the play,’ says Hamlet, and this is similar to how Deleuze and Guattari describe their writing-process: as a becoming in-between, as a depersonalised flow, the hand as a writing-machine producing a flow of letters, words, sentences—without theological directedness or intentionality.²¹³

Here we indeed touch upon the most depersonalised part of the book—its opening chapter—where Guattari’s machines and Deleuze’s virtual realm are effectively linked up; the part which, I would say, also lays the most claim to the designation Dadaist because the rest of the book, although it builds on this first part and is indisputably an illustration of the *Merz*-totality Kurt Schwitters sought for, is still more analytic than

creative ('still belongs to the university,' as Deleuze described it). This first chapter, which is called 'the desiring-machines', conceives of an imaginative assemblage of desiring-machines and *bodies without organs* which opposes the reign of the *Gehirnschubkästen*—the Dada-term for the classifying mind which tries to solidify all flows and becomings.²¹⁴ This machinic process of desire-production is very similar to Nietzsche's perception of the world as an interrelated multiplicity of forces—the world of becoming, flux, and change—with desire occupying the same place in the former conceptualisation as the will to power does in the latter, that is to say, it is affirmative, positive, and productive, rather than (as Freud teaches us) negative and destructive.

'It is at work everywhere,' is the first sentence of *L'Anti-Oedipe*, '[w]hat a mistake to have ever said *the id*. Everywhere *it* is machines—real ones, not figurative ones: machines driving other machines, machines being driven by other machines, with all the necessary couplings and connections.'²¹⁵ The hand-machine that produces a flow of words is connected to the eye-machine. A flow-producing machine is always connected to another machine that interrupts or draws off part of this flow, and this first machine is in turn connected to another whose flow it interrupts or partially drains off (the hand-machine draws on the brain-machine which in turn draws on the ear-machine, the eye-machine, etc.).²¹⁶ Desiring-machines are thus binary machines: one machine is always coupled with another. At the same time it is a matter of binarism *ad infinitum*, thus creating a linear series. This theory of desiring-machines is a return in a Guattarian guise of Deleuze's virtual realm which, as we have seen, was also populated by partial objects:

Desire constantly couples continuous flows and partial objects that are by nature fragmentary and fragmented. Desire causes the current to flow, itself flows in turn, and breaks the flows (...) Amniotic fluid spilling out of the sac and kidney stones; flowing hair; a flow of spittle, a flow of sperm, shit, or urine that are produced by partial objects and constantly cut off by other partial objects, which in turn produce other flows, interrupted by other partial objects.²¹⁷

It was Melanie Klein who 'discovered' the partial objects—'that world of explosions, rotations, and vibrations.'²¹⁸ And this discovery is particularly appropriate because, as Deleuze and Guattari claim, 'we live today in the age of partial objects, bricks that have been shattered to bits, and leftovers.'—capitalism, the age of the second movement of deterritorialisation, the stage in which the transcendent unity of the despotic stage is radically deterritorialised (the pyramid is demolished, but it doesn't end there; even the bricks are shattered to bits).²¹⁹ Nevertheless, Deleuze and Guattari assert, Klein has failed to grasp the logic of the partial objects. Firstly, she doesn't relate these objects to a real process of production, and secondly, she cannot rid herself from the notion that they are somehow related to a whole (either a primordial totality that once existed, or a final totality that awaits us at some future date). 'Partial objects hence appear to her to be derived from global persons; not only are they destined to play a role in totalities aimed at integrating the ego, the object, and drives later in life, but they also constitute the original type of object relation between the ego, the mother, and the father.'²²⁰ Thus, Klein does not use the partial objects to shatter the 'iron collar' of Oedipus, but uses them to watter Oedipus down, to miniaturise him, to find him everywhere, in short, to help Oedipus with his migration from the outside to the interior.

But psychoanalysis (hence Klein), claim Deleuze and Guattari, is wrong in their conceptualisation of the whole. The unconscious is totally unaware of persons as such:

It seems to us self-contradictory to maintain, on the one hand, that the child lives among partial objects, and that on the other hand he [*sic*] conceives of these partial objects as being his parents, or even different parts of his parents' bodies. Strictly spoken it is not true that a baby experiences his mother's breast as a separate part of her body. It exists, rather, as a part of a desiring-machine connected to the baby's mouth, and is experienced as an object providing a nonpersonal flow of milk (...). A desiring-machine and a partial object do not represent anything.²²¹

Deleuze and Guattari do not deny the vital importance of parents or the love attachments of children to their mothers and fathers, they just oppose the reduction of the process of desire-production to parental images ('a question occurs to the child that will perhaps be 'related' to the woman known as mommy, but that is not formulated in terms of her, but rather produced within the interplay of desiring-machines,' they write).²²² This, of course, ties in with Deleuze's post-dialectical theory of difference which argues that multiplicity is irreducible to any sort of unity—be it Oedipus (a primordial totality) or the integrated ego (a final totality). Deleuze and Guattari, nevertheless, also introduce a 'whole' which they name the 'body without organs' (after a phrase from Artaud). This is a whole, however, that neither unifies, nor totalises (and is as such, like the partial objects, particularly appropriate for our radically deterritorialised age); it is a peripheral totality, rather than a primordial or final one, a totality that is produced alongside the partial objects. 'Although the organ-machines attach themselves to the body without organs, the latter continues nonetheless to be without organs and does not become an organism in the ordinary sense of the word. It remains fluid and slippery.'²²³ The body without organs—as a 'third term in the series'—is not a totality aimed at integrating the partial objects and flows of desire (and I am almost tempted to add here the local egos that we have come across in *Différence et répétition*); it rather leaves untouched the essential binary-linear character of the series of desire-production:

And when [the body without organs] operates on [the partial objects and flows of desire], when it turns back upon them (...), it brings about transverse communications, transfinite summarizations, polyvocal and transcursive inscriptions on its own surface, on which the functional breaks of partial objects are continually intersected by breaks in the signifying chains, and by breaks effected by a subject that uses them as reference points in order to locate itself.²²⁴

The parallel that can be seen here between the body without organs and the organisation of the various social machines that Deleuze and Guattari describe is not coincidental. Deleuze and Guattari establish this parallel themselves in the first chapter with the 'one purpose (...) to point out the fact that the forms of social production, like those of desire-production, involve an unengendered nonproductive attitude, an element of antiproduction coupled with the process, a full body that functions as a *socius*'.²²⁵ We have already seen that in the despotic society the body of the despot functions as this *socius*; in primitive societies it was the earth which fulfilled this role. What is inscribed on this full body of the earth are socially channeled flows of desire which are, after their production in the desiring-machines, stratified into the more or less prescribed (but nevertheless capricious and unpredictable) pathways of the savage social machine, established by filiation and alliance. Despite the territorialisation which has imposed some restrictions on the free flow of archaic desire

the savage flows of desire remain relatively close to the binary-linear series which are produced by the desiring-machines (in this respect it is interesting that Nietzsche describes these savage societies as 'as yet nomad').²²⁶ This is specifically manifest in the primitive surface-organisation of representation: the connotative order which, as we have seen, establishes a polyvocal network radiating in all directions and which, similar to the process of desire-production, cannot be contained within an order of meaning. The way in which the magic triangle of the voice-graphy-eye (which could be seen as a representation of the binary-linear series with its three terms) is replaced in the in-depth dimension of barbaric representation by the familial triangle, is illustrative of the becoming sign of desire, that is, of the perversion of productive desire and its subsequent curtailed efficacy. Instead of producing realities and remaining with its craving itself (the desire to desire) within the process of desire-production, 'it now produces only images, shadows, and representations [the desire for persons]: it realizes itself indirectly, symbolically; it dies as desire and is reincarnated as (a chain of) signification.'²²⁷ One partial object (or local ego) jumps from the rhizomatic connotative network and establishes a transcendental position which organises a more rigid channeling of desire—not of desire to desire, but rather of desire for persons, the representation of desire. This transcendental object (or ego) conceptualises a whole which is, in contrast to the body without organs, totalising and unifying; it conceives of the integrated ego, giving direction and meaning to desiring-machines and partial objects, making them into signs, representations of something, 'representations of parental figures or of the basic patterns of family relations'.²²⁸ Enter Oedipal totalisation, the representation of the territorial representation of the primary process of desire-production, the deterritorialised process of desire-production itself—the process of desire-production made *unconscious*.

But, albeit displaced, the process of desire-production is not suppressed: 'it continues to rumble, to throb beneath the representative agency that suffocates it'.²²⁹ That is why Oedipus, instead of being the totalising representation which drives this process to the unconscious from outside, wants to migrate to the heart of the process and become the representation of desire itself. This migration is supposed to be fulfilled in capitalism.

The civilised capitalist stage does, in contrast with the despotic stage, develop gradually from the stage that precedes it. That is why many characteristics of the despotic stage persist in the capitalist stage, either changed or unchanged. In a way, the civilised stage is simply a reinforced continuation of the process of deterritorialisation that was set in motion in the barbaric stage, but instead of realising this through overcoding, the capitalist machine accomplishes this 'second great movement of deterritorialisation' through the *decoding* of flows. This decoding alone, however, is not enough to induce the birth of capitalism and the rise of a new socius. Deleuze and Guattari describe the specific conditions under which the decoded flows will resist the recoding of the state. 'In brief,' they write, 'the capitalist machine begins when capital ceases to be the capital of alliance to become filiative capital.'²³⁰ And capitalism becomes filiative, they continue, only when money begets money, or value a surplus value, when, as Marx writes, 'Value (...) suddenly presents itself as an independent substance, endowed with a motion of its own, in which money and commodities are mere forms which it assumes and casts off in turn. Nay more: instead of simply representing the relations of commodities, it enters now, so to say, into relations with itself. It differentiates itself as original value from itself as surplus-value; (...) for only by the surplus-value of £10 does the £100 originally advanced become capital.'²³¹

The birth of capitalism automatically entails a new *socius* because society is no longer organised by the despot. With the becoming capital of money s/he has lost one of his or her principal repressive instruments, that is, money. It is decoded (or ‘demonetised’ or ‘dematerialised’) as an instrument of exchange, and becomes *credit money* (or commercial credit), giving to infinite debt its capitalist form. Instead of the despot, capital now becomes the full body, the new *socius* that appropriates all the productive forces, effecting a tighter and tighter control over them. But this doesn’t, as I already mentioned, involve the total eradication of despotic mechanisms (Deleuze and Guattari speak of ‘*post-mortem* despotism’; it might be dead, but, I would say, as a subject of investigation it still plays a vital role). Exchange money continues to exist next to credit money, the first going into the account of the wage earner, the second into the balance sheet of the enterprise. The state remains to play an important role as a regulator that ensures a principle of convertibility of credit money, either directly by tying it to gold, or indirectly through a mode of centralisation that comprises a guarantor of the credit, a unity of capital markets, etc.²³² Similarly, Deleuze and Guattari write, ‘*filliative industrial capital (...) functions only through its alliance with commercial and financial capital*’—the forms of capital that were inserted into the interstices of the old social body.²³³ Machinic surplus value, which develops along with automation and productivity, is ultimately dependent on machinic innovation, and this innovation can only be tested on its profitability when alliance capital is taken into consideration; whether or not a technique will be implemented should always be decided on in relation to market forecasts, interest rates etc. ‘In brief, the flows of code that are “liberated” in science and technics by the capitalist régime engender a machinic surplus value that does not directly depend on science or technics themselves, but on capital.’²³⁴ Machines (and thus capital) produce value ever more efficiently than humans, that consequently cease to be constituent parts of the production process, in order to become adjacent to this process (functioning alongside the machine). So both what we could call the ‘knowledge flow’ and the ‘labour flow’ are ultimately determined by capital and are accordingly decoded and deterritorialised. This does not mean that either intellectual labour or manual labour is actually liberated:

Doubtless it can let a certain number of scientists—mathematicians, for example—‘schizophrenize’ in their corner, and it can allow the passage of socially decoded flows of code that these scientists organize into axiomatics of research that is said to be basic. But *the true axiomatic* is elsewhere. (...) The true axiomatic is that of the social machine itself, which takes the place of the old codings and organizes all the decoded flows, including the flows of scientific and technical code, for the benefit of the capitalist system and in the service of it ends.²³⁵

So capitalism is organised by an extremely rigorous *axiomatic*—a term used by the Bourbaki-group to designate ‘intuitions’ that are ‘linked to resonances and conjunctions of structures’, rather than to a Taylor system or a mechanical game of isolated formula.²³⁶ This axiomatic prevents the autonomous individual that it creates with one hand from becoming actually nomadic with the other. One would say, that workers, possessed with a flow of income, or, ‘purchasing power’, must have a certain amount of influence on this axiomatic, which, after all, organises capitalism as a system regulated by the free market. Deleuze and Guattari, however, explain in a highly abstract passage that this is hardly the case. The deterritorialisation of the flow of purchasing power is analogous to the becoming *impotent* of it.²³⁷ The individual and even the group is deprived of the power of unlimited freedom of choice; choice is reduced to what I would like to call a

negative choice, that is, the freedom of choice that is related to the concept of negative (liberal) freedom as it is theorised by Isaiah Berlin.²³⁸ The liberal market reduces the individual to no more than a particularity in the capitalist system, to paraphrase Marx again, s/he is but one of the wheels of the capitalist machine (s/he is twirled by this machine, moving but always in a circle, with capital as its pivot).

The individual is liberalised rather than liberated. The same goes for the economy. The axiomatic organises all decoded and deterritorialised flows in terms of what we, following Georges Bataille, could call the 'unlimiting of economy': not only is there no aim but the production of a surplus value (there's only production of production), but there's always the movement towards a maximisation of the surplus value, no matter what it costs (the destruction of the environment, the ruin of traditional sectors in the periphery, that is, in the underdeveloped countries, the creation of immense zones of underdevelopment within developed countries to ensure cheap labour etc.). All unrealised surplus value is as if not produced and becomes embodied in unemployment and stagnation (think for instance of the discussion about Schiphol airport). The state is no longer an apparatus of antiproduction in the old—despotic—sense, that is, a bureaucratic and/or military instance that limits or checks production 'from above'; parallel to the migration of Oedipus to the heart of the process of desire production, anti-production has moved to the heart of production itself. What the state absorbs, write Deleuze and Guattari, 'is not sliced from the surplus value of the firms, but added to their surplus value by bringing capitalist economy closer to full output within the given limits, and by widening these limits in turn—especially within an order of military expenditures that are in no way competitive with private enterprise, quite the contrary (it took a war to accomplish what the New Deal had failed to accomplish).'²³⁹ The antiproduction at the heart of production produces lack in the midst of the abundance of aggregates by means of a continual absorption of resources. Furthermore, it produces stupidity in the midst of knowledge and science, that is, an axiomatised stupidity, which roughly corresponds to all commercial forms of entertainment (connected directly or indirectly—that is, via advertisement—to consumption): from television's continuous flow of game-shows, melodrama, and infotainment, radio's perpetual repetition of hits, Hollywood's boundless pursuit for box-office success, through to stultifying recreation parks, interchangeable tourist resorts, and franchised—that is, standardised—restaurants and stores (where people go for an afternoon of 'fun-shopping'). All workers, from simple manual labourers to highly educated professionals, are so absorbed in capital that 'the reflux of organized, axiomatized stupidity coincides with him, so that, when he [*sic*] goes home in the evening, he rediscovers his little desiring-machines by tinkering with a television set.'²⁴⁰ In Hans Magnus Enzensberger's words, it is 'completely clear to the viewer that it does not concern an apparatus for communication, but rather a means to refuse communication. You switch the TV-set on, in order to switch yourself off.'²⁴¹

Television is a medium that is preeminently suitable to transmit *nothing*, Enzensberger continues: 'Moving images with arbitrary meaning.' When we turn to capitalist representation we see that this is an accurate observation. The overcoding of despotic representation is replaced by a process of decoding, as is illustrated ingeniously by Raymond Hains and Jaques de la Villegé's *Hépérile éclaté*. This is an unreadable book 'written' in 'ultra-letters'—written signs which are shattered by means of filters of fluted glass, making it rather a work of visual or plastic art than a work of literature.²⁴² The 'poetry' of the two artists is paradigmatic for the double movement of language and representation in the transition from the despotic to the capitalist stage. Firstly, the ultra-letters are indifferent to the signifier that strangles and overcodes the flows of language in the despotic stage; the shattered poems dispose the text of its original meaning and

establish a language of decoded flows. Secondly, the ultra-letters bring us, as I said, to the terrain of the plastic arts; 'Writing has never been capitalism's thing,' write Deleuze and Guattari, 'capitalism is profoundly illiterate'; it is much more a visual or 'figural' culture.²⁴³

Signs become nonsigns, or rather nonsignifying signs, point signs having several dimensions, flow-breaks or schizzes that form images through their coming together in a whole, but that do not maintain any identity when they pass from one whole to another.²⁴⁴

Like the partial objects the nonsignifying signs have no meaning; they just function, simply flow. They can have a temporal 'direction' when a flow enters in a relationship with another flow—similar to a breast-machine which is coupled to a mouth-machine and for the time of the attachment produces a flow of milk which is directed towards the later. But like the body without organs, the constellation in which the schizzes or break-flows become figurative remains fluid and slippery, dissolving regularly in order to be replaced by another temporary integration. 'Three million points per second transmitted by television, only a few of which are retained.'²⁴⁵

But like many other characteristics of the despotic stage, writing has survived in the capitalist era, for instance in the form of Saussurian linguistics. Obviously, as poststructuralists, Deleuze and Guattari are determined to deny any current relevance to Saussure's theories. Instead, they hail Louis Hjelmslev's glossematics which, they write, 'implies the concerted destruction of the signifier' because it 'shatters the double game of the voice-graphism domination.'²⁴⁶ In this dismantling of the signifier Hjelmslev is tantamount to Lyotard who shows that what is at work in the plastic arts, in dreams, but also in language and writing itself, is 'not the signifier but a figural dimension underneath'.²⁴⁷

Thus Lyotard everywhere reverses the order of the signifier and the figure. It is not the figures that depend upon the signifier and its effects, but the signifying chain that depends upon the figural effects—this chain itself being composed of asygnifying signs—crushing the signifiers as well as the signifieds, treating words as things, fabricating new unities, creating from nonfigurative figures configurations of images that form and then disintegrate. And these constellations are like flows that imply the breaks effected by points, just as the points imply the fluxion of the material they cause to flow or leak: the sole unity without identity is that of the flux-schiz or the break-flow. The pure figural element—the 'figure matrix'—Lyotard correctly names desire, which carries us to the gates of schizophrenia as a process.²⁴⁸

Capitalism, like schizophrenia, also thrives on decoded flows. The notion of the break-flow thus seems to define both capitalism and schizophrenia. It would, nevertheless, be a serious error to consider the capitalist flows and the schizophrenic flows as identical. They evolve from one and the same economy, one and the same production process, but the schizophrenic process is constantly arrested by capitalist production and transformed into a confined clinical entity. We see here the remains of the despotic function of overcoded stupidity, which not only, as decoded axiomatised stupidity does, keeps revolutionary potential in check via the destruction of all creativity, but also effects the integration of individuals and groups into the 'sane'

system via the mechanisms which we have already seen in *Différence et répétition* and which produces the schizophrenic as a sick person along the lines sketched by Foucault in his *Folie et déraison* and *Naissance de la clinique*. When decoded flows escape the socius, that is, when they are not absorbed in capital by axiomatised stupidity, capitalism sees them as dangerous and consequently brings in action a gigantic machine for social-psychic repression aimed at ‘what nevertheless constitutes its own reality’—the decoded flows.

That is the schizophrenic reality of capitalism, the most radical of all systems, the limit of all societies, insofar as it brings about the decoding of the flows that other social formations coded and overcoded—undercutting anything that represses the autonomous individual (alliance, filiation, religion, despotism, etc.). But it remains merely the *relative* limit of all societies, it effects mere *relative* breaks, because it substitutes for the codes an ‘extremely rigorous axiomatic that maintains the energy of the flows in a bound state on the body of capital as a socius that is deterritorialized, but also as a socius that is even more pitiless than any other.’²⁴⁹

Schizophrenia, on the contrary, is indeed the *absolute* limit that causes the flows to travel in a free state on a desocialized body without organs. Hence one can say that schizophrenia is the *exterior* limit of capitalism itself or the conclusion of its deepest tendency, but that capitalism only functions on the condition that it inhibit this tendency, or that it push back or displace this limit, by substituting for it its own *immanent* relative limits, which it continually reproduces on a widened scale.²⁵⁰

Capitalism axiomatises with one hand what it decodes with the other, and it is impossible to distinguish between these two operations. For capitalism to survive it is a question of binding the schizophrenic charges and energies into a world axiomatic that always opposes the revolutionary potential of decoded flows with new interior limits. It is here that Deleuze and Guattari show their Frenchness: this axiomatic is so complicated—always pushing back and enlarging limits, adding axioms, preventing saturation of the system, always grinding, sputtering, and starting up again—that it requires a technocracy, a bureaucracy, a ‘whole apparatus of regulation’, and what else than the state, from being at first the transcendent unity, becomes immanent within the field of capitalist forces (antiproduction becoming immanent to production), and is as such the unequivocal regulator of the decoded and axiomatised flows.²⁵¹ And this state, Deleuze and Guattari continue, substantiating their leftist sympathies, is entirely in the service of the ‘so-called’ ruling class. What follows, however, is not an archetypical Marxist analysis of the state—this would of course not be in line with Deleuze’s postdialecticism—but rather an analysis that follows Nietzsche. ‘From the viewpoint from the capitalist axiomatic there is only one class,’ they assert, ‘the bourgeoisie.’²⁵² Within this class everyone is a slave, a slave of the social machine. Furthermore, as we have seen before, with the rise of the bourgeoisie, enjoyment disappears as an end and is replaced by abstract wealth. When we make this comparison with Nietzsche’s theories, capitalism could indeed be seen as the final stage of history; a titanic *pars destruens* is drawing nigh, the air in Müller’s coffin is almost used up. But where Nietzsche stages his *Übermensch*, Deleuze and Guattari postulate the schizophrenic as the hero that escapes the axiomatisation of the decoded and deterritorialized flows, the shutting down of desire-production, in short as the line of flight from the end of history, the *pars construens* that enables the flows of particles and energy to go *jusqu’au bout*. ‘Comment procède-t-il sortir de ses démolitions?’ wonders Deleuze.²⁵³ How to escape the end of history? The answer

seems to lay in a becoming schizophrenic. This would seem a way out of the self-constructed annihilation that the enlightenment has brought down on itself. This annihilation does not so much refer to a process of evolution brought to completion—a symbolical second coming, a separation of the good (the mad(wo)men) and the bad (the blind). The end of history should, I would say, rather be comprehended as an exhaustion of the common or sophisticated conception of past events that was long secreted by Western modernity, in short, the coming of postmodernism, the era in which history is replaced by historicity.²⁵⁴ In this sense, the escape from the end of history is an escape from the negative nihilism that some thinkers, in the wake of poststructuralism, seem to see as the only possibility to get rid of Enlightenment certainties as if the history of ideas, ever since Plato and the Sophists, ceaselessly oscillates dialectically between essentialism and relativism. At the same time as Deleuze and Guattari are engaged in the destruction of the categorical image of thought, they are already aware of the possible dangers of poststructuralism and deconstruction. Becoming schizophrenic not only offers a way out of the deadlock that psychoanalysis, as a categorical system of thought, has created, but also an alternative for what Guattari will later call the ‘postmodern impasse’ and the ‘dead end’ postmodernism of thinkers like Lyotard and Baudrillard who, in his view, are suspicious of the least desire for large-scale social action.²⁵⁵ Schizoanalysis does not only have, what Deleuze and Guattari call, a negative task—that is the overthrow, or deconstruction, of psychoanalysis—but also two positive tasks. These do not leave (schizophrenised) individuals in what Guattari calls in *Les années d'hiver* a black hole of history, but leads them to the discovery of the available lines of flight from the capitalist axiomatic, enabling them to escape both essentialism and relativism, encouraging them to follow the flow of their own desire-production.

Schizoanalysis: Towards a Nomadic Subjectivity

The confined man is outside the fray, said Artaud, ‘Outside the fray is the place of the confined man, walled inside madness, in the indecipherable echo of battle.’²⁵⁶ This battle is a non-dialectical one, that is to say, a real rather than a virtual struggle, one that desires the actual death of the antagonist.²⁵⁷ The basic opposition is between ‘the’ class and those who are outside of the class (*les hors-classe*); ‘Between the servants of the machine, and those who sabotage it or its cogs and wheels. Between the social machine’s régime and that of the desiring-machines.’²⁵⁸ This antagonism ties in with the anthropological bipolar opposition between the so called sacral and profane complexes, which are the complexes that reside in the lexical context of respectively the stable, statical, reactionary, dominant, and reactive (that which more or less coincides with what Deleuze and Guattari label *molar*) and the unstable, unbound, marginal, revolutionary, and active (corresponding to what they tag *molecular*).²⁵⁹ Here we see the two poles between which capitalism vacillates: on the one hand the territorialities and overcodings of the primitive and despotic stage are deterritorialised and decoded toward an absolute threshold, and on the other hand these deterritorialised and decoded flows are reterritorialised and recoded as if it would like to resuscitate the Urstaat. These movements belong to capitalism as two sides to a coin. The social axiomatic is torn in two directions, write Deleuze and Guattari: archaism and futurism, paranoia and schizophrenia (this would explain, for instance, why an originally revolutionary effort, like the Russian revolution, can suddenly turn fascist, or how a folklore can sometimes become charged with a revolutionary power). It is here that Capitalism turns to Oedipus, the migrated one, in order to ensure the axiomatisation and reterritorialisation of the decoded and deterritorialised flows, to make sure that the

autonomous individual is not swept along by the schizophrenic figure, but remains calmly under the influence of the signifier.

The movement Oedipus makes from the molar aggregates which he organises ‘from on high’ to the apparently molecular—that is, the miniaturised Oedipus that is watered down, as it were, by Klein’s great divide—is compared by Deleuze and Guattari to the way one goes from Parmenidean being to the atoms of Democritus. But Democritus’ atomic flows are similarly only ostensibly molecular; in reality they resuscitate Parmenides’ static rationalism which holds that matter is essentially unchangeable. Oedipus creates the illusion of a free autonomous individual, released from transcendentalism (and thus he creates the illusion of the molecular and the nomadic) while in fact he cunningly leads the individual right back to the shores so recently left behind, that is, the molar aggregates. Again we see that the subject is liberalised rather than liberated (it is like a denationalised enterprise; it gets rid of the strict constraints of government bureaucracy only to fall under the spell of the rigidity of the free market). Released from the territorialisation of (new) alliance and (new) filiation, it is all the more ironic that this ‘folding operation’ takes place through the family. This has become possible because in capitalism the family is no longer coextensive with the social field. The coding and overcoding of (new) alliance and (new) filiation are being replaced by the axiomatic, and the territorialisation and deterritorialisation that they effected in the primitive and barbaric stages are replaced by a reterritorialisation that does not go through familial reproduction but rather through economic reproduction, that is to say, capital. In Aristotle’s language, the family is now ‘simply the form of human matter or material that finds itself subordinated to the autonomous social form of economic reproduction, and that comes to take the place assigned it by the latter.’²⁶⁰ The private person has become an image of the second order, a simulacrum, an image which represents the first order image of the social person. Thus what Aristotle, as we saw, had already predicted has come true in capitalism: the private person is citizen first:

Individual persons are social persons first of all, i.e., functions derived from the abstract quantities (...). They are nothing more or less than configurations or images produced by the point-signs, the break-flows, the pure ‘figures’ of capitalism; the capitalist as personified capital—i.e., as a function derived from the flow of capital; and the worker as personified labor capacity—i.e., a function derived from the flow of labor.²⁶¹

It is Freud, the Darwinist psychologist, who directed Oedipus to the interior and thereby creates a subjectivity that is highly pertinent to capitalism.²⁶² He gathered that human desire—which he essentially defines as sexual desire and labels libido—could no longer be repressed by a transcendental organiser in the capitalist stage. Following Hegel, Freud insists that desire that goes *jusqu’au bout* is destructive and anti-social and thus needs to be restricted. The transcendental Oedipus pushed the process of desire-production to the unconscious, where it remained to throb. Oedipus, now, must become immanent to this process of desire-production; he cannot remain a displaced represented but must migrate to the heart of desire, that is the unconscious, and there capture the free flows within his familial triangle. Oedipus then becomes the interior limit which repels the absolute, exterior limit of schizophrenia. In it only in capitalism that this has become possible. Everywhere else the familial position is merely a stimulus to the investment of the social field by desire: ‘the familial images function only by opening onto social images to which they become coupled or which they confront in the course of struggles and compromises; so that what is invested through the breaks

and segments of families is the economic, political, and cultural breaks of the fields in which they are plunged,' write Deleuze and Guattari.²⁶³ But in capitalism the flow of the investment of desire, traveling from the familial stimulus to the social organisation or disorganisation, is as it were 'covered over by a reflux that flattens the social investment onto the familial investment serving as a pseudo organiser.'²⁶⁴ In other words, the family has become the locus of retention and resonance of all the social determinations. Desire is always desire for the mother and desire to kill the father. The flows of desire are no longer organised by a transcendental organiser, but by an immanent organiser that internalises guilt and the law of the father—the super-ego. So the ego now oscillates between the id and the super-ego, the desiring-machines and the symbolic law. Freud's work in that respect parallels the achievements of Luther: Catholicism spiritualises transcendently, the reformation, however—following Luther's Ninety-five Theses which hold, among others, that the individual achieves salvation only through inner religious feeling and a sense of contrition for sins—realises the becoming immanent of the laws of God, resulting in the self-repression of all sinful desires and, consequently, the bringing about of bad conscience, which is, according to Deleuze and Guattari, in private persons, the correlate of the cynicism of social persons.²⁶⁵

Sophocles turns the myth into a tragedy, just like Freud turns history into a tragedy. In Eugene O'Neil's *Mourning Becomes Electra* (1931), fate is no longer the cause of the tragic misfortunes of the protagonists, but rather the fact that the family is trapped in a triangle of Freudian complexes.²⁶⁶ In the third act of Deleuze and Guattari's history of desire-production, psychoanalysis symbolically blinds the autonomous individual. Consequently, this individual, like Willy Loman in Miller's *The Death of a Salesman*, works towards his or her own downfall because his or her aspirations reflect the axiomatised values of capitalist society, that is, because s/he inhibits his or her desires by binding them to the simulacra of the restricted family. This is not tragedy, but rather a resonance of tragedy, says Rushdie: 'The authentic original, they say, is no longer available to modern men and women.'²⁶⁷ Tragedy-become-melodrama, or to quote Rushdie again 'a farce for a degenerated fake-age in which clowns imitate what heroes and kings once did.' The hero-become-antihero—petty, ignominious, passive, myopic—is paralysed by farcical domestic simulacra instead of by a fate decreed by the Gods, blinded by cynicism and self-hatred rather than by a hamartia like hubris. But being blind is not the end of everything; the blind just have to be led, and here Deleuze and Guattari seem to follow the Earl of Gloucester, who in one of Shakespeare's great tragedies declares: "'Tis the time's plague when madmen lead the blind'".²⁶⁸ When we, as they propose, let ourselves be led by the 'schizo' who resists—as we have seen—Oedipalisation; when we let ourselves be swept along by the schizophrenic figure instead of remaining tranquilised under the influence of the despotic signifier, we could indeed escape the nihilist dead end that late-capitalism presents us with. 'To overturn the theatre of representation into the order of desire-production: this is the whole task of schizoanalysis.'²⁶⁹

The interest in the schizophrenic is hardly idiosyncratic in modern literature and philosophy. This tendency can be traced back to romanticism in which writers such as Ludwig Tieck and E.T.A. Hoffmann already wrote about 'good madmen'.²⁷⁰ The latter had, as a frequent visitor to the asylum at St Gertreu, outside Bamberg in Middle-Germany, seen many of the forms taken by mental derangement, writes Ronald Taylor:

[He] had even been permitted to watch, unobserved, the psychiatric processes by which Marcus [a befriended psychiatrist, RvdW] treated his patients. Many of the almost clinically precise details in

Hoffmann's descriptions of states of mental aberration are to be traced to these experiences. It is to the portrayal of such states of mind—their causes, their manifestations, their inner meanings—that Hoffmann devoted much of his literary energy. (...) In that he gave himself over so enthusiastically to the investigation of such phenomena, he was but a child of his time: he is not the only practitioner of *Schauerromantik*. But no other German writer has absorbed so fully, and re-lived so intensely, the psychological facts of schizophrenia (...) and of other irregular and irrational conditions of the mind. Above all, no other German author has pursued so relentlessly the conviction that *in such conditions of the mind, when the forces of the unconscious hold sway, certain truths are made evident whose significance is denied to 'normal' men*, truths of revelation with a power to explain what cold, analytic reason can not.²⁷¹

This is exemplified, for instance, by the character of Serapion, a nobleman who has cut himself off from society and lives as a hermit under the delusion that he is the monk Serapion, who had been martyred by the emperor Decius; he has deliberately turned his back on the material realities of life (and in this sense his madness is self-induced to a large extent) and has escaped to the realm of dreams.²⁷² This is why the world regards him as insane, but it is, at the same time, what offers him 'sudden glimpses of the truth' (which could be explained by his disregard for the 'lower' signs of Deleuze's taxonomy of Proustian signs). 'I hold Serapion's madness in veneration,' says Lothar, one of the *Brüders* that come to admire his remarkable gift for realistic storytelling, 'because through it the spirit alone of the finest—nay, let me rather say, of the true—poet can be apprehended.'²⁷³

Ever since romanticism the veneration of the 'good madmen' has endured—think for instance of Nietzsche and Artaud—reaching a new zenith in the anti-psychiatry movement of the 1960's and 1970's. The parallels between the postulates of the two movements are not coincidental. The latter movement is to a large extent a reaction against psychoanalysis which, in its turn, is a reaction against the romantic idealisation of the irrational and its concurrent surge of interest in 'unscientific' theories about the healing powers of magnetism and hypnosis, the psychological facts of telepathy etcetera.²⁷⁴ The founders of the anti-psychiatry movement, the British psychiatrists R.D. Laing and David Cooper, suggested that the 'fragmented personality may possess a superior truth, both resulting from, yet reapplicable to, the world of the isolated nuclear family and the manic commodity culture of late capitalism.'²⁷⁵ Classical psychiatry, in their view, is the end of a process of pathologisation and banishment, the ultimate repression. The analogy with some of the arguments Foucault advances in *Folie et déraison* is striking and the English translation of this book, which appeared in 1965, is consequently hailed by the anti-psychiatric movement, much to the delight of Foucault whose book had, until then, attracted relatively little—mainly academic—attention in France. The reading of *Madness and Civilization* in Britain was broad and distinctly political and practical. Consequently, by the time the anti-psychiatric wave crossed the channel, progressive psychiatrists, that had originally adopted a mild stance on Foucault's theories, had taken a radically different position toward the book, denouncing its ideological position as disastrous for the psychiatric practice.²⁷⁶ This condemnation is, we could conclude, much more a denunciation of anti-psychiatry than of the philosophical and historiographical theories put forward by Foucault.

To a large extent, this fate was shared by Deleuze and Guattari. As we have seen, the reception of *L'anti-Oedipe* was particularly hostile, not in the last part because it has been linked to anti-psychiatry. But

despite the various parallels between the argumentation of Deleuze and Guattari on the one hand and Laing *et al* on the other, there are also a number of profound differences, most important of all, that their work is practical not in a therapeutic but rather in a political sense. The schizophrenic process of deterritorialisation—the final goal of schizoanalysis—is clearly distinguished from schizophrenia as a clinical entity.²⁷⁷ In opposition to Laing and Cooper's theories, schizoanalysis is not designed for a therapeutic environment, but is rather aimed at the 'liberation' of 'normal' people outside the walls of the asylum. It is not so much a reaction against psychiatry in its totality but rather an attack of the so-called second psychiatric revolution, that is, psychoanalysis, and its greatly strengthened Lacanian orthodoxy. Anti-psychoanalysis would therefore be a more appropriate label.²⁷⁸

Schizoanalysis—in the end it is a very simple philosophy. It aims to discover beneath the familial reduction the nature of the social investments of the unconscious:

The schizoanalytic argument is simple: desire is a machine, a synthesis of machines, a machinic arrangement—desiring-machines. The order of desire is the order of *production*; all production is at once desire-production and social production. We therefore reproach psychoanalysis for having stifled this order of production, for having shunted it into *representation*.²⁷⁹

Psychoanalysis devises an unconscious that no longer produces but is content to *believe*—in Oedipus, in castration, in the law. That is why schizophrenics are of particular interest to Deleuze and Guattari: they do not believe in Oedipus, they are not repressed by the *instance représentative*, by the given mythic and tragic presentation of the family. They instinctively walk the schizoanalytic path; when the forces of the unconscious hold sway the simulacrum is pushed to the point where it ceases to be an image of an image, so as to discover the abstract flows, the schizzes-flows that it harbours and conceals. But even schizophrenics cannot always completely evade Oedipalisation: often they are persuaded, as Foucault remarks, to speak about themselves in the language of (medical) science and are thus subdued by a secondary web of restraining language, partially inserted into what Lacan has termed the 'parade of the signifier' and the 'three-dimensional register of the symbolic'—the whole theatre of representation.²⁸⁰ The questions raised by Henry Miller seem pertinent in this respect: 'are we *born* Hamlets? Were *you* born Hamlet? Or did you not rather create the type in yourself? Whether this be so or not, what seems infinitely more important is—*why revert to myth?* (...) In myth there is no life for us.'²⁸¹ Myth, tragedy, dream and fantasy have little to do with unconscious desire-production. They are rather, as Miller writes, born out of consciousness; in Deleuze and Guattari's words: 'The psychoanalyst parks his circus in the dumbfounded unconscious, (...) in the fields and in the factory.'²⁸² They are the representative series that psychoanalysis substitutes for the line of production (social and desire-production)—'A theatre series, instead of a production series.'²⁸³ At the same time desire-production is stifled by this vaudeville irruption, desire is reintroduced into the symbolic order itself, but only through castration, that is to say, defined as lack. Every time that production, rather than being apprehended in its originality, in its reality, becomes *reduced* to a structure, identified with a structural and theatrical representation, it can no longer have any value except by its own absence, and it appears as a lack within this representational space:

It is in the structure that the fusion of desire with the impossible is performed, with lack defined as castration. (...) For a *structural unity* is imposed on the desiring-machines that joins them together in a molar aggregate; the partial objects are referred to a totality that can appear only as that which the partial objects lack, and as that which is lacking unto itself while being lacking in them (...) Such is the structural operation: it distributes lack in the molar aggregate. The limit of desire-production—the border line separating the molar aggregates and their molecular elements, the objective representations and the machines of desire—is now completely displaced. The limit now passes only within the molar aggregate itself, inasmuch as the latter is furrowed by the line of castration. The formal operations of the structure are those of extrapolation, application, and biunivocalization, which reduce the social aggregate of departure to the familial aggregate of destination, with the familial relation becoming ‘metaphorical for all the others’ and hindering the molecular productive elements from following their own line of escape.²⁸⁴

In short, the displaced limit no longer passes between objective representation and desire-production, but between the two poles of subjective representation, as infinite imaginary representation, and as finite structural representation. ‘We have repudiated and lost all our beliefs that proceeded by way of objective representations,’ write Deleuze and Guattari. ‘The earth is dead, the desert is growing: the old father is dead, the territorial father, and the son too, the despot Oedipus. We are alone with our bad conscience and our boredom, our life where nothing happens; nothing left but images that revolve within the infinite subjective representation.’²⁸⁵ Desire then becomes a desire for what one lacks, that is, unity—the unity of a point of orientation. This is offered to them in the form of the illusion of the ‘good representation’ of Oedipus.²⁸⁶ ‘We are all Archie Bunker at the theatre, shouting out before Oedipus: there’s my kind of guy!’ continue Deleuze and Guattari.²⁸⁷ The great territorialities are deterritorialized, but the structure proceeds with subjective and private reterritorialisations—shadows of archaisms projected on a stage.

Lacan was not content to turn inside the wheel of the Imaginary and the Symbolic; he refuses to be caught up in the Oedipal Imaginary and the Oedipalising structure and in fact discovers the reverse side of the structure, the real inorganisation of molecular elements. But his endeavour is compared by Deleuze and Guattari to the story of the resistance fighters who, wanting to destroy a pylon, balanced the plastic charges so well that the pylon blew up and fell back into its hole. And it remained there, more fixed than ever. Again we are led back to places we were made to believe to have left behind (the social aggregate of departure reduced to the familial aggregate of destination). Whereas Deleuze has developed the concept of the plane of consistency for the elicitation of the structure from the machines (a complicated concept which defines a unifying field which is produced as a whole next to its parts just like the body without organs), Lacan remains dependent on planes of structuration. In the later case, the absolute transversity of the connections of the molecular elements necessarily appears as the *absence* of ties, no longer as a positive force. The asignifying signs are consequently turned into signifiers by its reference to an absent despotic symbol: ‘the production of desire can be *represented* only in terms of an extrapolated sign that joins together all the elements of production in a constellation of which it is not itself a part.’²⁸⁸ Serge Leclair shows how Lacan organises the structure around this ‘missing term’, or rather this ‘signifier of lack’: ‘It is the elective signifier of the absence of a link, the phallus, that we find again in the unique privilege of its relation to the essence of lack—an emblem of difference par excellence—the irreducible difference, the difference between the sexes. (...) If man

[sic] can talk, this is because at one point in the language system there is a guarantor of the irreducibility of lack: the phallic signifier.²⁸⁹

So, again, what the ideology of lack culminates to is what Deleuze and Guattari call the anthropomorphic representation of sex: there is only one sex, the masculine sex, in relation to which the feminine sex is defined (the woman as a castrated man). While Lacan tried to define what Marx has called the 'nonhuman' sex ('the true difference is not the difference between the two sexes, but the difference between the human sex and the nonhuman sex'), that is the reverse side of the structure ('with the "o" as machine and the "O" as nonhuman sex'), the structure itself overtakes him: 'The great Other as the nonhuman sex gives way, in representation, to a signifier of the great Other as an always missing term, the all-too-human sex, the phallus of molar castration.'²⁹⁰ In short, psychoanalysis—both Freudian and Lacanian—offers us, in Deleuze's words, a fairly imbecile image of sexuality, and even Klein's attempt to define the female sex by means of positive characteristics does not by any means escape castration.²⁹¹ Schizoanalysis, on the contrary, knows nothing of castration, because it concerns the molecular unconscious and its partial objects which lack nothing and form free multiplicities:

Making love is not just becoming as one, or even two, but becoming as a hundred thousand. Desiring-machines or the nonhuman sex: not one or even two sexes, but n sexes. Schizoanalysis is the variable analysis of the n sexes in a subject, beyond the anthropomorphic representation that society imposes on this subject, and with which it represents its own sexuality. The schizoanalytic slogan of the desire-revolution will be first of all: to each its own sexes.²⁹²

Here we see, again, the opposition to binary thinking. Like the schizophrenic, the nomadic subject refuses to refer to him- or herself with the word 'I' and to refer to other people in the third person. This constitutes the fractured 'I' who does not so much distinguish the self from the other—a clear instance of binary thinking—but rather refuses to observe boundaries between them. This apparently defective, schizophrenic thinking by association represents, according to Deleuze and Guattari, an alternative logic: no longer the old exclusive logic of 'either/or' ('either the self or the other') but a non-exclusive logic of 'either...or...or' ('either myself or Madonna or Brad Pitt'). This anoedipal use of the inclusive, nonrestrictive and affirmative connective synthesis or disjunction is typical for our modern experience of the concept of identification in our capitalist age of advertisements in which the chain of identification is intended to stretch from product to person/image to consumer.²⁹³

'Destroy, destroy. The task of schizoanalysis goes by way of destruction,' write Deleuze and Guattari. 'Destroy Oedipus, the illusion of the ego, the puppet of the superego, guilt, the law, castration.'²⁹⁴ And they are not talking of Hegel-style destructions. What is shattered is the idea of the topographical psychic network, against which psychoanalysis seeks to give form to individual subjectivity. The unconscious is no longer the private mnemonic (familial) latent psychic reality which is to be discovered merely through self-analysis, but it comprises, instead, social and political roles and public and historical events, thus, the external, active public faces which psychoanalysis tends to dismiss as mere symptoms. It is now redefined as the political domain of over-determined roles, stereotypes and flux: 'cops, robbers, Vietnam, *Apocalypse Now*, racial issues, economic crisis, (...), *Neighbours*, TV stars, the media and so on.'²⁹⁵ No regression, no origins—the subject as a polyvocal chain of signs which cannot be regressed back to determinate meanings,

and which thus sets the text in motion. The desiring-machines produce perpetually changing flows which are distributed across the body without organs, establishing the nomadic subject, the free autonomous subject which is becoming indefinitely, which is ceaselessly changing, never in a definitive form, always in a state of flux. It is schizoanalysis which helps the subject to discover the available lines of flight; its task is 'that of tirelessly taking apart egos and their presuppositions; liberating the prepersonal singularities they enclose and repress; mobilizing the flows they would be capable of transmitting, receiving, or intercepting; establishing always further and more sharply the schizzes and the breaks well below conditions of identity; and assembling the desiring-machines that countersect everyone and group everyone with others. For everyone is a little group and must live as such.'²⁹⁶

The subjectivity that Deleuze and Guattari imply, though never formulate, is not simply another theory of subjectivity to add to an already extensive repertoire. Rather, it is a form of politics which aims to determine new collective arrangements—a collective subjectivity—that can counter not so much a particular order, but rather the principle of order as such (whether it manifests itself in the state, in the psychiatric institution, in grammar etc.)²⁹⁷ Its task is to expose that the postulates of psychoanalysis (and in fact of all 'scientific' theories that belongs to the rational tradition of categorical thought) project an image of reality at the expense of reality itself ('it has accustomed us to see the figure of Man behind every social event'), to expose that it blinds us to perceive other realities, and especially the reality of power as it subjugates us.²⁹⁸

But although political, schizoanalysis is not a political programme. It is political in a molecular sense; it does not advocate that everyone do the same thing but rather that everyone does what they feel is best, that everyone lives and acts more directly as desiring-machines. To each its own desires! To each its own life! That this life is per se revolutionary and goes by way of destruction is simply a result from all varieties of molar fascism that confines desire within a straitjacket that we call individuality: 'from the enormous [fascisms] that surround us and crush us to the petty ones that constitute the tyrannical bitterness of our everyday lives.'²⁹⁹ For nomadic living requires a curettage, a *pars destruens*; one must destroy the fascisms which prevent us to live our lives as nomads, to live our lives on our own terms. In the end schizoanalysis does not tell us what to do; rather it motivates us to go further, to find our own revolutionary paths. To each its own revolution! To each its own desire-revolution!

To wind up, I would say that *Anti-Oedipus* is in the first place a critique, and in this sense it continues the lines set out in the earlier works and actions of both Deleuze and Guattari. It is a critique of reason, a critique of 'State-happy,' representational philosophy, as much as it is a commentary on pro-party versions of Marxism and school-building strains of psychoanalysis—seperately or in various combinations the dominant intellectual currents at the time of writing.³⁰⁰ In a second instance, what emerges from this critique is a multiplicity of larval proposals for a new post-Freudian (and post-Marxist) nomadic subjectivity—an assemblage of lines of flight from the molar aggregates (the stable subjectivity, the rocklike identity, 'universal' thruth, international economic structures, bureaucracy, technocracy, and so on). 'Nomad thought,' writes Brian Massumi, 'does not immure itself in the edifice of an ordered interiority; it moves freely in an element of exteriority. It does not repose on identity; it rides difference. (...) The concepts it creates do not merely reflect the eternal form of a legislating subject, but are defined by a communicable force in relation to which their subject, to the extent that they can be said to have one, is only secondary. They do not reflect upon the world but are immersed in a changing state of things.'³⁰¹

Although not fully elaborated, the contours of nomad thought and its nomadic subjectivity—its implications and potentialities—can be deciphered and it is to her understanding of this image of thought that Carter, in my view, reacts. In the next chapter I will return to *Dr Hoffman* and try to outline what I believe to be its main theme, that is, a rejection of Deleuze and Guattari's subjectivity because of its negative implications for women, and, at the same time, a recognition of the usefulness of Deleuze's critique of the categorical image of thought for feminism.

Chapter Three: Carter

We should be wary not to put the cart before the horse and claim Carter was a philosopher. Carter was first and foremost an artist, and thus she was rather immersed in concretions than in abstractions.¹ 'Artistically speaking,' she wrote, 'the shakier the intellectual structure, the better art it produces.'² It is to me to draw a consistent 'meaning' from the book. Nevertheless, and I plagiarise Carter herself here, her art is, in the deepest sense, philosophical—that is, 'art created in terms of certain premisses about reality, and also art that is itself a series of adventures in, or propositions and expositions of, this philosophy.'³

I think that is how we should see *Dr Hoffman*: as a series of adventures in, or propositions and expositions of Carter's 'philosophy'. The picaresque structure of her novel feeds the idea that we should see the different parts as separate propositions or adventures in contemporary and historical theory and art. It can be situated on the soft edge between art and criticism and can thus rightfully be described, as some have done, as poetic criticism—a literary criticism which depicts the truths of its visions by imaginative constructions, and will thus, intellectually, remain shaky. It will not be *scientific* in the sense that it lays claim to generalisability, but it is 'knowledge', nevertheless—intuitive knowledge in the Proustian sense, that is to say, a libidinal illumination of enveloped essences.

The use of the plural 'essences' is not incidental here, for Carter's essential philosophy is not an organic or totalising unity that would explain *Dr Hoffman*. It is not a principle of creation, but rather a unity—as difference in itself—produced as an effect. Literature is composed of aesthetic figures; it does not create concepts in an absolute form but rather sensations of concepts. It develops, so to say, ideas, but these ideas remain prephilosophical⁴. Again, it is to me to 'demystify' the different propositions so as to '(re)create' these prephilosophical ideas, concepts which might be enveloped or implied in the aesthetic adventures, but which need to be explicated in order to enhance our view of Carter's 'premises about reality'. It is this creative interpretation which might, in the end, establish an idea of a propositional, libidinal, and evanescent 'meaning' which germinates in the interplay between *Dr Hoffman* and (my interpretation of) the outside world.

I believe that this hermeneutical endeavor should start with a characterisation of the overall arrangement of the text, after which we can begin to experiment with the various propositions of the author—sometimes given in separate chapters, sometimes as a distinct *Leitmotif*. This overall arrangement should, however, not be seen as a definitive structure in which the separate expositions should be squeezed, but rather as a first exploration of the central questions that the work addresses.

Because of the limited scope of this thesis I have chosen, however, to focus solely on one of the main questions or central propositions which I believe to be expressed throughout the novel and its separate adventures, although it finds its apotheosis, as is appropriate, in its final chapter. My ensuing analysis will, consequently, focus only on what I read as Carter's in-depth analysis of subjectivity. I am aware of the fact that this will remain a very limited reading of the novel, but I have preferred this tactic above a more inclusive but necessarily more superficial reading of the novel because of three reasons. Firstly I believe that every in-depth reading of a specific aspect of a novel will, as a rule, touch upon the underlying epistemological assumptions of the writer, and will thus, inevitably enhance, however limited, our view of the 'premises about reality' of the writer and the work in question. In this respect we can wonder whether not all readings, however inclusive they are intended, remain partial, because a reading depends not only on the content of the

novel but also on the ever changing context in which it is read. Secondly, I believe that an analysis Carter's questioning of subjectivity will shed a light not only on her general 'premises about reality' but also on her specific position vis-à-vis Deleuze and Guattari's conceptualisations regarding our postmodern condition. This relation has, as far as I know, not been considered before, and I think it is worthwhile and productive to focus on it. I think it is invaluable for an understanding of Dr Hoffman's seemingly bizarre desire machines and useful for an understanding of Carter's ideas on subjectivity. Furthermore, it is truly original, and as such, a rewarding subject of research: despite the limited scope of this thesis, I can nonetheless feel it does make a (theoretical) difference. Thirdly, my reading is intended only as a starting point, as I will propose in my conclusion. I really do hope someone will take from it what s/he can use and develop a much more exhaustive reading. I think literary criticism is not about making sweeping statements or answering questions, but rather about addressing nuances and posing new questions. To quote Deleuze: 'The point is not to answer questions, but to escape to emerge.'⁵ The point is not to establish a meaning, but to make sense, to survive, to swim along.⁶

I would like to start this analysis not with a detailed examination of the analogy between the desire machines, but with an evaluation of the second most prominent intertextual reference of the book—the one that can also be found in the title. I refer, of course, to the name of the malignant doctor himself which could be read as a intertextual allusion to the famous German romanticist E.T.A. Hoffmann. Besides using his name and the name of one of his characters, Drosselmeier, Carter also uses his tales as a structural model for her story. In various stories, among which 'The Golden Pot', 'Councillor Krespel', and 'The Sandman'⁷ a young man falls in love with the beautiful but mysterious daughter of a brilliant but peculiar father who prevents the love from being consumed. Furthermore, Hoffmann's worldview, especially the one put forward in his fairy tales, is an dualistic one: 'Zwei Reiche, zwei Prinzipien stehen einander gegenüber, scheinbar in vollkommener Unvereinbarkeit.'⁸ This is typical for the (late) eighteenth century which was the heyday of both the rationality of the Enlightenment and the 'irrational' beliefs of the Romantics in the supernatural. Hoffmann is indebted to both sides: he borrows extensively from the late eighteenth-century Gothic and fantastic fiction, but is nevertheless 'decisively bound up' with the technological innovations of the Enlightenment.⁹ He is critical towards the careless celebration of the imagination, but he nevertheless believes, as we have seen in Chapter Two, that when the forces of the unconscious hold sway certain truths can be found—'truths of revelation with a power to explain what cold, analytic reason can not.'¹⁰

We can clearly see parallels with Carter's overall story. Desiderio falls in love with the beautiful but mysterious daughter of a brilliant but peculiar father who, indeed, prevents the love from being consumed. The world we are presented with is indeed a seemingly dualistic one which opposes rationality to irrationality. Nevertheless, the irrational mirages are transmitted through Dr Hoffman's very rationally constructed desire machines, and thus the two opposites are indeed decisively bound up. And finally, Carter, as we have seen in Chapter One, also seems critical towards the careless celebration of the imagination, but nevertheless gives sympathy to Dr Hoffman's assertion that 'reason cannot produce the poetry disorder does.' (p. 206)

While these similarities do, I think, substantiate a link between the two writers, I do not want to go as far as to say that *Dr Hoffman* is an early example of Carter's characteristic method of rewriting fairy tales. The text does not refer to any specific tale of Hoffmann (besides the three stories mentioned above, also 'Nutcracker and Mouse-King' is identified as a key to the novel) but rather to his work as a whole.¹¹ Perhaps the allusion to his work is even less specific and serves only as a reference to the late eighteenth century,

defined by Carter as a 'period of conflicting ideologies', a phrase she has also used for the 1960s¹². Her own borrowing from Gothic stories, her allusion to Marquis de Sade, and her verbal echo's of Blake certainly point to the time immediately following the French revolution as an important source of inspiration for her novel. Nevertheless, Hoffmann's work can be seen as emblematic of that period and furthermore it shares two important themes with Carter's novel: firstly, a preoccupation with the unconscious and secondly a concern with the growing mechanization of life and the alienation caused by rationalism and capitalism and thus with modes of domination.¹³

This first theme, the concentration on the unconscious, is part and parcel of the Romantic period which saw an growing emphasis on individuality:

In German post-Kantian philosophy (...) the human mind—what was called the 'Subject' or 'Ego'—took over various functions which had hitherto been the sole prerogative of Divinity. Most prominent was the rejection of a central eighteenth-century conception of the mind as a mirrorlike recipient of a universe already created, and its replacement by the new concept of the mind as itself the creator of the universe it perceives.¹⁴

This can be linked directly to *Dr Hoffman* in which Albertina claims that all subjects and objects she and Desiderio encountered in the 'loose grammar of Nebulous Time' were derived from a similar source: their desires, their unconscious (p. 186) and that she has 'been maintained in [her] various appearances only by the power of [Desiderio's] desire.' (p. 204)

Correlating desires to the unconscious, however, would not be the first thing a Romantic would do. In the eighteenth century the concept of the unconscious takes the form of a religious myth: God is the absolute 'universal unconscious', suggests the Romantic philosopher Friedrich Schelling (and thus the transcendental continues to exercise influence on the Ego) and, thus, in moments of other-worldly inspiration one comes closer to the divine purpose of life.¹⁵ Consequently the unconscious is per definition good. Why, then, does Albertina speak of the 'dark abysses of the unconscious' (p. 186) from which emanates a desire for her own gang-rape? Even atheist Romantics valued the irrationality which emanated from the unconscious positively; at best the forces of the unconscious were seen as messengers of both good and evil principles. Carter is clearly influenced by Freud's ineluctable appropriation of the concept. It was Freud, the pessimist, and, above all, the rationalist, who defined the unconscious singularly in terms of 'dark' instincts and desires which formed a threat to civilisation. Carter's conceptualisation does allude to the eighteenth century notion of the unconscious, as does her whole setting, but it is mediated by the Freud's sceptical considerations.

The term 'mediated' is very appropriate because Freud, in his turn, was influenced by the Romantic notion of the unconscious. We can see this influence very clearly in Freud's paper 'The Uncanny' (1919) in which he, ironically enough, arrives at his gloomy conceptualisation through an observation of Schelling himself. 'Unheimlich,' says the latter, 'sei alles, was ein Geheimnis, Im Verborgenen bleiben sollte und hervorgetreten ist.'¹⁶ 'An uncanny experience', writes Freud, 'occurs either when infantile complexes which have been repressed are once more revived by some impression, or when primitive beliefs which have been surmounted seem once more to be confirmed.'¹⁷ An exemplary illustration of such an experience can be found in Hoffmann's story 'The Sandman'. In a recollection from his childhood, the student Nathaniel presents the lawyer Coppélius as the personification of the feared Sandman who tears out children's eyes and feeds them

to his children who peck them up with their hooked beaks. The anxiety about one's eyes, writes Freud, can be paralleled to the fear of being castrated, and he points at Oedipus' self-blinding to validate this claim (as we can see, primitive beliefs and infantile complexes are closely connected). What follows, in a footnote, is a psychoanalytical reading of the tale which sheds an interesting light on the relationship between Desiderio and Albertina. Olympia, the automatic doll with which Nathaniel falls desperately in love, is 'exposed' by Freud as 'nothing else than a materialisation of [Nathaniel's] feminine attitude towards his father in his infancy.'¹⁸ (What this 'feminine' attitude exactly comprises remains obscure: possibly it refers to the fact that he does not actually kill his father, or even does not wish to do so, while he is supposed to, according to the Oedipus-complex). Freud claims that the diabolical Coppélius, who threatens to blind/castrate him, and the 'good' (real) father, who prevents this, together represent the father-*imago* 'split by his ambivalence.' Olympia is thus nothing more than a 'dissociated complex' of Nathaniel's, and expresses the student's obsessive fixation upon his father which obstructs the possibility of loving his betrothed Clara.

Desiderio and Albertina are entirely the same except for their sex (p. 199). Thus, we could see Albertina as the materialisation of Desiderio's 'feminine' attitude towards his father, whom he has never known, but whose place is taken symbolically by the Minister. The Doctor, being the father of Albertina, is also Desiderio's father. Together these two men represent the opposites into which the father image is split. The novel could then be read as the account of Desiderio's socialisation. The Doctor, his 'bad' father, representing lawlessness, immorality, and unbridled carnal desire (which, as we have seen in the previous chapter, psychoanalysis values as anti-social and destructive), is killed, and thus the elongated oedipus complex (represented by Albertina) is resolved in favour of rationality and an ordered and harmonious society. Desiderio rids himself of the complex but is consequently defined in relation to lack, which is, as we have seen, highly appropriate in psychoanalytic theory. Thus, psychoanalytically speaking, the novel has a positive ending for Desiderio, in opposition to Nathaniel who kills himself, grows old in perfect contentment.

It seems a little far-fetched, but Carter was probably well aware of Freud's reading of 'The Sandman' for she alludes terminologically to Freud's paper with the 'reality-testing' practices of the determination police.¹⁹ And even if this phrasal reverberation is accidental, Carter's familiarity with the theories of Freud, to whose *Interpretation of Dreams* she even refers directly in a footnote (p. 186) can be expected to be ample enough as to be able to predict this possible reading of the text herself. I think Carter self-consciously played with psychoanalysis, but does not seriously subscribe to all of Freud's postulates, for one thing because they mythologise the unconscious by binding it to myths like Oedipus (which serves as a transcendental element). Furthermore, if she had to give up the Surrealists, whom she admired, because they 'were not good with women', as we have seen in Chapter One, she certainly has to give up Freud, whom she said to have loved 'as though he were an uncle', because he is an archetypal misogynist.²⁰ Carter does not appear to be particularly inclined to a total liberation of the unconscious because she believes it to contain both productive and destructive desires, but she does seem to be working towards a demythologisation of it because it dips into our conscious life as a conservative element. It furnishes the, what she—as we have seen—named, 'false universals' with a natural, and thus unchangeable, veneer. When we realise that unconscious desires are by and large culturally determined and are not derived from some innate self or essence (although of course pathological factors can have a determining role) we could arrive at a more authentic, dynamic conceptualisation of the unconscious and, as a result, paint a more realistic picture of human subjectivity.

In this Carter parallels Hoffmann's interest in the unconscious. He too wants to undo the unconscious of a transcendental element (in his case God). Not necessarily validating irrational emanations from the unconscious as 'good' because of its alleged divine origin, he points out the dangers of an uncritical acceptance of a supernatural dreamworld. Hoffmann does believe that attentive inquiry into the irrational parts of the mind can reveal truths which cannot be found by cold, analytic reason, just like Carter seems to think there is truth in the statement that reason cannot produce the poetry disorder can, but they both warn for unreflected romanticism and a world of free flight of personal desires.²¹ There is nothing supernatural about the unconscious, contend the committed materialist Carter and the materialist *avant la lettre* Hoffmann; it is simply that intuitions, desires, and fantasies *can* be creative and fertile and offer '*real possibilities for changing human and productive relationships*.'²²

And here we come to the second theme which links Carter and Hoffmann: their joint concern with the growing mechanisation of life and the alienation caused by rationalism. Hoffmann lives and writes at the transitional period from feudalism to capitalism. He is, already in this early stage of capitalism, cautious about the alienation which it might cause. His tale 'The Golden Pot' (1814) opens with the student Anselmus knocking over a basket of apples and cakes set out for sale. 'This accident turns out to be the major dramatic conflict of the story,' writes Jack Zipes, 'market versus human values.'²³ The two entities seem mutually exclusive. Hoffmann is similarly apprehensive about the possible side-effects of the growing mechanisation of life as a result of the rationalisation process. The figure of the automaton, a mechanical doll that was a popular kind of entertainment at scientific exhibitions and fairs, is employed to represent the 'tendency of early capitalism which caused humans and human relations to assume the properties of things and machines while the real productive power and quality of human beings became distorted and obscured.'²⁴

This apprehension is comparable to the reaction of Carter. She, too, is wary about the alienating tendency of capitalism and mechanisation, although her considerations, in line with her time and her contemporaries, pertain to a very specific kind of technological alienation: electronic representation. The transmitters of Dr Hoffman are clearly modelled on the satellite dishes which broadcast the stultifying multiplicity of television images which can be said to be alienating in the Situationist sense that they partake in the distancing of real life by means of representation. Carter's analysis of the apparatus which had become the central medium in the Western hemisphere during the 1960s, does not seem to be far from Debord's: 'it functions (...) as (...) a method of relating to the real world by proxy.'²⁵ Television is a simulacrum, she writes, real life is not like it is on 'the box'. But one cannot fool all of the people all of the time, and thus, she continues, television is 'implicitly radical'. She seems to agree with Enzensberger that the medium is potentially revolutionary for it could, for example, do away with educational privileges of the bourgeoisie. As it is, however, she writes, television is engaged in *consciousness shaping* rather than in *consciousness raising*.²⁶

Carter's analysis resembles those of a host of cultural critics, ranging from Hoffmann to Marcuse, who are not so much anti-technological or anti-rational, but rather wary about the uses to which it might be or has been put.²⁷ The central text of this paradigm is, I think, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno's *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. Their thesis holds that enlightenment rationality has been used instrumentally: to dominate rather than to emancipate. And this domination, Horkheimer and Adorno say, is effectuated by an instrumentalisation of culture. Cultural expressions, they assert, are mediated by an industry which seeks to make the masses into consuming automatons not autonomous beings.²⁸

Hoffmann can, in this light, be seen as an early defender of the unfettered creative individual and an unrestrained, though enlightened, imagination. The instrumentalisation of the imagination, which can be seen, for instance, in Hoffmann's tale 'Little Zaches Named Zinnober', and the socialisation process that wants to drain the individual of creative and critical qualities, which is evident in, for example, 'The Golden Pot', is the result of what he believes to be a betrayal of the real humanitarian principle of the Enlightenment and of the freedom of the individual that was promoted by the French revolution.²⁹

As I said, Dr Hoffman's emissions bear a strong likeness to television broadcasts. It might look like real imagination, but it is in fact instrumentalised imagination. It is imagination which is intricately bound up with what we have defined as categorical thought. Hoffmann might be an adversary of this image of thought but Carter depicts her character Hoffman as someone who is closely connected to it. He builds his ambiguous liberation on physics; the Doctor is thus not as anti-rational as he pretends. The liberation of 'man' is effected by 'the liberation of the unconscious' (p. 208). But the unconscious is not truly released. 'He penned desire in a cage and said: "look! I have liberated desire!"', judges Desiderio (p. 208). 'He was a hypocrite,' he continues, who demands 'absolute authority to establish a regime of total liberation.' (p. 38) In the end, Desiderio is given the casting vote between the Minister's and the Doctor's philosophy, and his decision resolves in favour of the Minister's logical positivism. 'I might not want the Minister's world', he concludes, 'but I did not want the Doctor's world either' for '[the Doctor] might know the nature of the inexhaustible plus but, all the same, he was a totalitarian.' (p. 207)

I do not think Dr Hoffman is a direct figuration of Ernst Hoffmann. Rather the character alludes, besides to Hoffmann as a representative of Romanticism, to, amongst others, a host of 'libertarians' like Laing and Marcuse, the embodiments of the counterculture, and André Breton, the chief exponent of Surrealism who had, as we have seen, according to Carter, 'like many libertarians (...) a marked authoritarian streak'.³⁰ What these critics have in common is a strong humanistic essentialism, and it is, I think, this belief in a human 'self' which separates Carter from these critics. Hoffmann, for instance, believes that rationality and mechanisation alienates people from their humanitarian core. His preoccupation with the unconscious was only fueled by a wish to define this essence; his denunciation of the divine as origin of human actions serves to postulate a humanist and materialist essentialism. Laing, Marcuse, and Breton all adhered to Freud's conceptualisation of subjectivity.³¹ They do not question the idea of a static self from which all conscious and unconscious actions and thoughts can be derived, but only challenge the belief that the unconscious should remain repressed in the interest of civilisation. Liberating the human core and its desires from the restraints of the capitalist *rationale* is their ultimate goal.

Thus while Romanticism, the counterculture and Surrealism do break with grand narratives like Enlightenment optimism and objectivity of truth and morality, they still adhere to two important myths which are intricately bound up: the humanist conception of the individual and a fallogocentric metaphysicism which holds that all questions of meaning are referred back to a singular founding presence which is imagined to be behind a representation rather than 'fluctuating in and around its particular usage or cultural application'.³² The messianistic utopianism of the aforementioned movements clearly reflects the typically Hegelian notion of a core of human essence which strives to realise itself.³³ Hence the revolutionary experiments of these libertarian movements remain, despite their demands for an unlimited freedom of desires, creativity, and imagination, ultimately bound to the dialectic. Similarly, the search for meaning outside representation—detached from the aesthetic experimentation, possibly even hidden more profoundly by it—and the

interpretation of language as an expression of the subjectivity of the speaker, hinders the possibilities for direct political change through art and language. It denies the fact that the (political) actuality which fluctuates in and around the artifact or expression could be as bizarre, non-logical, nonchronological, paradoxical, or heterogeneous as that artifact or expression itself, thereby implying the idea of an ordered and logical metaphysical realm underlying our chaotic existence. This idea, of course, is inextricably entangled with the image of the subject as a 'bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe; a dynamic centre of awareness, emotion, judgement and action.'³⁴

Carter, however, does extend her criticism to the underlying epistemological assumptions of humanism and fallogocentrism, for she comes to realise that the political and cultural climate of the sixties is still very much male-centred and thus remains a partial *pars destruens*. It is poststructuralism which offers her paradigmatic starting-points for this criticism of the fundamental patriarchal makeup of sixties radicalism, for this 'movement' parallels her own feminist venture on some key points, such as the rejection of the humanistic concept of subjectivity and the renunciation of the dialectical image of thought. Whereas liberal feminists persisted in their belief in the unified, apparently ungendered humanist subject, and radical feminists tried to recapture their essential femaleness through a separate women's culture, British materialist feminists, like Carter, partook in the displacement of the subject which was started by structuralism and refined by poststructuralism. This was caused by the fact that the theoretical debates of British socialism and Marxism were profoundly influenced by Althusser.³⁵

In the early 1960s, British socialism and Marxism, against some Marxian conceptions, believed in the constitutive subject, as a result from the influence of Raymond Williams, who advanced a left-liberal, culturalist and empiricist socialism. This position was attacked during the 1960s by a self-conscious New Left, which sought to be theoretical, scientific, and rationalist. Using the Althusserian concept of relative independence between base and superstructure, they are able to integrate Marx' famous assertion that it is not people's consciousness that determines their existence, but on the contrary, their social existence which determines their consciousness, and the feeling that the individual ostensibly heads over his or her own determination. This, ultimately, rests on a psychoanalytical understanding of the subject as unconscious and therefore as subject of desire. While, in the Althusserian conception, the social formation terminates in the subject, in the process (or the discourse) of desire, which the subject enters when constituting him/herself as a subject, the subject is always constitutive though only within the terms of the social formation within which it is formulated.³⁶

Materialist feminists, however, came, at that point, in a precarious position. Marxism, despite the relative independence proposed by Althusser, remained to see everything into terms of class. An adherence to the strict, structurally informed, Althusserian school would not, in the end, lead to an understanding of the acquisition of a gendered subjectivity because his account of the subject as ideologically constituted is, as Hirst and Woolley have demonstrated, not consummensurate with the psychoanalytic understanding of the subject on which it rests.³⁷ It was this psychoanalytical appropriation which could give answers to the questions of gender in the construction of the subject. What was needed was a theory which could account for an affiliation between Marx and Freud, and certain poststructuralist investigations, amongst which, prominently, Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus*, offered chances for this realignment. Their concern with both psychoanalysis and Marxism leads to a historical sketch of the interrelationship of desire and power which corresponds to the research of Foucault on discursive fields—described by Chris Weedon as

'arguably' the most interesting poststructuralist theory for feminists.³⁸ Taking their place at the junction of Lacanian, Althusserian and Foucauldian poststructuralism, I think Deleuze and Guattari's theories are very useful for (British) materialist feminism in general and for Carter in particular.

What unites Carter and Deleuze and Guattari is their ambiguous relation to psychoanalysis, both Freudian, and Lacanian.³⁹ While Deleuze and Guattari launch a full-scale attack on psychoanalysis, they are, as I have shown in Chapter Two, seriously indebted to Lacan for their intellectual development. Their flippant and parodic critique is only directed against the most reductive version of orthodox psychoanalysis; some of their conceptualisations are actually very close to Freud's original writings, such as for instance their concept of the inclusive disjunction.⁴⁰ And while they conflate the Freudian and Lacanian discourses and make fun of them, they do acknowledge that Lacan has saved psychoanalysis from the 'frenzied oedipalisation to which it was linking its fate' but then immediately reproach him for having 'brought about this salvation (...) at the price of a regression' towards the despotic age, for 'the unconscious (...) would be reinterpreted starting from [the despotic] apparatus, the Law, and the signifier—phallus and castration, yes! Oedipus, no!'⁴¹

Carter's relation to psychoanalysis is similarly indeterminate. She is involved in a conscious play with both Freudian, as I have shown earlier, and Lacanian discourse, to which she refers, for instance, in the second exhibit of the peep-show called 'The Eternal Vistas of Love' (p. 45) which alludes to the Lacanian idea of the self being an endless pursuit of reflections in the eyes of the other.⁴² 'I soon realised I was watching a model of eternal regression', comments Desiderio, thereby admonishing Lacan's conception of the self. The prevalent feminist response to psychoanalysis in the early 1970s was almost as negative as Deleuze and Guattari's. Kate Millet, for instance, argued in her influential *Sexual Politics* against the biologically based psychic structuring of femininity which she saw as central to Freud's work. Millet was aware of the contradictions in Freud's texts, but, nevertheless, highlighted his theory of femininity which holds that the anatomical difference directly affects the structure of the feminine character.⁴³ Other readings of Freud suggest, on the contrary, that psychoanalysis breaks with this anatomical determinism and that gender identity is structured by a psycho-sexual development which is social rather than biological. The subject remains fixed by these universalist psycho-sexual structures (like the Oedipus-complex), but not in the same way or to the same degree as it is by biology and thus, they claim, psychoanalysis does provide some possibilities for change.⁴⁴ Lacan's linguistic appropriation of Freud's theories appears to extend this reading by liberating the subject from both biology and Oedipus, but it, nonetheless, rehabilitates the sexual difference as central to psychoanalysis by means of the phallus as the transcendental signifier which guarantees control of desire. While, in theory, no one can possess the phallus, a constant sliding in Lacan's texts between the phallus as Other and the phallus as male sex-organ, reveal that the symbolic order is, quintessentially, a patriarchal order. This has been emphasised by feminist psychoanalyst thinkers like Hélène Cixous and Luce Irigaray who tried to appropriate psychoanalysis for feminist purposes. They arrived, however, despite their anti-essentialist and anti-biologistic ambitions, according to Toril Moi, at a positive theory of femininity, and thus seemed not to escape the very essentialism which Carter abhors.⁴⁵ Despite this seeming anti-productiveness of psychoanalysis for feminism, Carter cannot dismiss it. She shares the Lacanian view that desire is the motivating principle of life and remains preoccupied with the notion of the unconscious. Just like Deleuze and Guattari, Carter is much indebted to psychoanalysis for her intellectual development, for it enabled her to move from her intuitive feminism to an understanding of the gendered acquisition of subjectivity and the relation between desire and domination. It led her, furthermore, to the conviction that myths are extraordinary

lies designed to make people unfree. Thus her goal is to denaturalise and demythologise the unconscious—unconscious desires and processes, yes! Phallus or Oedipus, no!

Besides their ambiguous stance towards psychoanalysis, Carter's oeuvre and Deleuze and Guattari's work parallel each other on many other points. Carter and Deleuze share, for instance, an interest in sado-masochism and hermaphroditism, and are both deeply suspicious of myths and Plato.⁴⁶ Their works furthermore show a concern with representation (both written and visual), marginalised groups and power. *Dr Hoffman* mirrors Deleuze's study into Proust, for Carter alludes to the *Recherche* via the name Albertina, and Deleuze's contemplations about time and love, for the novel sets up complex theories about these two phenomena.⁴⁷ The most prominent allusion, however, is, as I have claimed repeatedly before, Carter's description of Dr Hoffman's desire machines. It is time to substantiate this claim.

In a cavern underneath Dr Hoffman's castle Desiderio is guided round the laboratory containing the desire machines. 'Here, where the dungeons should have been,' he recalls, 'there were white-tiled corridors soundlessly floored with black rubber and lit by a strip lighting far more brightly than day.' (p. 209) 'It was a very sterile place.' (p. 210) The Doctor and Desiderio enter a 'busy, deserted laboratory' in which numerous 'glass vats and tubes were bubbling with a faintly luminous, milky, whitish substance.' (p. 209) In this distilling plant, the Doctor explains, 'the secretions of fulfilled desire are processed to procure an essence which has not yet pullulated into germinal form. Even with an electron microscope it is impossible to detect the slightest speck of root, seed or fundament in this, as it were, biochemical metasoup and it is safe to say we have cooked up for ourselves in our glass casseroles a pure, uncreated essence of being.' This metasoup is 'precipitated' in the reality modifying machines which, 'formulated on the model of objective chance, taking "objective chance" as the definition of the sum total of all the coincidences which control an individual destiny', 'spontaneously [generate] the germinal monecule of an uncreated alternative.' Issuing from the 'essential undifferentiation', described as a 'whirling darkness shot through with brilliant sparks' these germinal molecules of 'objectified desire', once agitated, form themselves in 'divergent sequences' called 'transformation groups' in order to bring a 'multi-dimensional body' into being 'which operates only upon an uncertainty principle'. (pp. 210-211). These bodies appear on screens 'something like TV screens' which showed 'a confusion of endlessly swelling and diminishing ectoplasmic shapes formed around central nuclei of flashing lights.' (p. 210) 'It requires extreme persistence of vision,' continues Dr Hoffman his explanation, 'to make sense of the code at this stage. Nevertheless, those formless blobs are, as it were, the embryos of palpable appearances. Once these undifferentiated yet apprehendable ideas of objectified desire reach a reciprocating object, the appearance is organically restructured by the desires subsisting in latency in the object itself. These desires must, of course, subsist, since to desire is to be.' (p. 211).

Here we are presented with the Doctor's version of the cogito: 'I desire therefore I exist'. This cogito is similar, as we have seen in Chapter Two, to Deleuze and Guattari's, but this is certainly not the only analogy between Deleuze and Guattari's *machines désirantes* and Carter's imaginative production line. Carter's description could be seen as a visualisation of Deleuzoguattarian conceptualisations.

The biochemical metasoup of essence of being can be seen to refer to Deleuze's virtual realm of ideas—the groundless, unfounded chaos in which the singular points, characterising problems without solutions, have no fixed identity, function or location but only a differential relation with other singular points and a potential for various forms of embodiment. This virtual realm parallels the Proustian essences and the Nietzschean perception of the world as an interrelated multiplicity of forces, with desire occupying the same

place in Deleuze's virtual realm as the will to power does in Nietzsche's world of becoming, flux, and change. This latter analogy is exceedingly apt when the dice throw metaphor is recalled. Carter writes that the reality modifying machines are formulated on the model of objective chance, taking this as the definition of the sum total of all the coincidences which control an individual destiny, and thus the trajectory from essential metasoup to the multi-dimensional body parallels the Nietzschean throw of the dice as the affirmation of chance and multiplicity *and* necessity and unity. The germinal monocyte mirrors the molecular movement of the deterritorialised and decoded flows which are not reducible to a primordial or final unity, but nevertheless form divergent sequences (or series) towards the Body without Organs/multi-dimensional body which constitutes a peripheral unity; a body which, as we can see on the television screens, remains fluid and slippery. As I have argued in Chapter Two, this multi-dimensional/Body without Organs mirrors the figurative constellation in which decoded signs, which have become nonsigns or point signs that are multi-dimensional (!), temporarily integrate. Both Carter and Deleuze and Guattari refer, at this point, to television as radically deterritorialised medium: three million flashes of light per second transmitted by television; it requires extreme persistence of vision to make sense of the code at this final stage of history. Nevertheless, as Carter writes, these formless blobs are the embryos of palpable appearances. Once these undifferentiated yet apprehendable ideas reach a *reciprocating subject*, thus not a free, emancipated subject but one that moves mechanically backwards and forwards like a piston, they, in convocation with the desires subsisting in latency in the subject itself (the unconscious), restructure the appearance (the conscious). I think it is appropriate to recall Carter's conclusion that television is a medium engaged in consciousness shaping rather than consciousness raising. Dr Hoffman's desire machines are, similar to television, implicitly radical. As it is, however, they are engaged in consciousness shaping rather than consciousness raising; the potential radicalness of the machines is 'controlled' by the set of samples (p. 211). These samples 'represented everything it was possible to believe by the means of either direct simulation or a symbolism derived from Freud' (p. 108). And these images are all explicitly sexual, if not misogynist: 'The legs of a woman, raised and open as if to admit a lover' (p. 44), offering a good view of 'the landscape of the interior', (this exhibit is appropriately called 'I have been here before'), 'a candle in the shape of a penis of excessive size', (p. 46) and 'a wax figure of the headless body of a mutilated woman' with a knife in her belly' (p. 45-46). The last, seventh, exhibit which Desiderio describes foreshadows what Dr Hoffman has in mind for him. It is called 'perpetual motion':

As I expected, here a man and woman were conducting sexual congress. (...) [T]hey were so firmly joined together it seemed they must have been formed in this way at the beginning of time and, locked parallel, would go on thus for ever to infinity. They were not so much erotic as pathetic, poor palmers of desire who never budged as much as an inch on their endless pilgrimage. (p. 46)

While Dr Hoffman's desire machines seem productive in an emancipatory sense, they rather aim to restrict desire by binding it to Freud's interpretation of the unconscious, which defines desire solely in terms of sexual libido. This image of desire fuels the desire machines, as can be seen in the last part of the tour round the laboratories, which brings the two men to the love pens:

All along the mirrored walls were three-tiered wire bunks. In the ceiling above each tier of bunks, were copper extracutors of a funnel type leading into an upper room where a good deal of invisible machinery roared with a sound like rushing water but the noise of the machinery was almost drowned by the moans, grunts, screams, bellowsings and choked mutterings that rose from the occupants of those open coffins, for here were a hundred of the best-matched lovers in the world, twined in a hundred of the most fervent embraces passion could devise. (p. 213-4)

This is, of course, not an image of the 'total liberation' which the Doctor says to strive for. The starkly naked lovers form 'a pictorial lexicon of all the things a man and a woman might do together within the confines of a bed of wire six feet long by three feet wide.' (p. 214) They are, thus, (sexually) liberated within the given confines. This might look like liberation but is, I would say, more like permissiveness. But the lovers, who all volunteered, don't see this and choose to remain in their glass coffins because their desire is effectively managed in the direction of (erotic) passion.

As Weedon has argued, a theory of the unconscious which is solely linked to a sexually based concept of desire, is not productive for feminism. Worse, I would say, it reaffirms the patriarchal structure of society and its misogynist content. Dr Hoffman is thus exposed as the dialectical 'other' of the Minister: they are both, as Robinson writes, 'complicit in the same ideological agenda: they both posit Man as an imperialist subject whose desire gives free reign to exploitation and domination'.⁴⁸

Dr Hoffman can consequently be seen as a diabolical genius who, while purporting to liberate desire, wants to channel it in order to gain total control. The secretions of this channelled desire are 'gathered up three times a day by means of large sponges' (p. 214) and are subsequently, as we have seen, processed to procure pure essence of being. The verb 'to procure' has a double meaning: firstly to derive by careful exploration, and secondly to provide a woman for someone else's sexual satisfaction. I think Carter's use of the verb refers to both meanings. Essence is procured from a faintly luminous, milky, whitish substance. Could sperm not be described by those adjectives? Essence of being, then, is constituted by male desire. Being thus remains to be defined as masculine. Women, nevertheless, are provided in order to facilitate and ensure male satisfaction, which is required for the necessary secretions. Hence, women are mere agents that are employed to continue the patriarchal structure of society. Read in this light, it is inevitable that Dr Hoffman's desire machines had to be destroyed in the end. They might seem revolutionary but, in the last instance, are uncovered as instruments which reaffirm the patriarchal structure of society, which sustain the complicity between desire and domination.

Extending this criticism to Deleuze and Guattari's *machines désirantes*, we can find support for this reading in various feminist texts. Deleuze and Guattari's conceptualisations seem to be productive for women, but are, after careful scrutinisation, unveiled as processes which arrive at the opposite: the disappearance of women from discourse and history by making them mere agents of the liberation of mankind. That is not to say, however, that my conclusions regarding the usefulness of Deleuze and Guattari's ideas for materialist feminism are erroneous, as we will see.

'Like most modern thinkers,' writes Rosi Braidotti, 'Deleuze's starting point is the death of the subject, defined in terms of the dissolution of identity.'⁴⁹ The desiring machines are, as we have seen in Chapter Two, their conceptualisation of a denaturalised, post-humanist, desexualised human body—rid, thus, of its polarised genders. They are 'less a metaphor than a diagram, illustrating the process of formation of

the subject.⁵⁰ This subject is seen as the field of intersection of the various forces which impinge upon him/her, notably desire, the main dynamic force, which creates lines of connection between material subjectivities. As we have seen in Chapter Two, the concept desiring machines is closely connected to the Bodies without Organs, the material surface on which the codes of language interact and which are totally denaturalised and desexualised. Both concepts emphasise the non-centrality of phallogocentrism in the construction of subjectivity. There is no centre: whereas the molar aggregates fix the flows of desire to a static core of human being, the molecular or the nomadic, represents not so much a 'being', but rather a 'becoming' which flows through (rather than to) the desiring machines and only finds a temporary integration in the peripheral body without organs. Becoming, write Deleuze and Guattari, always tends toward the periphery, the marginal, the minority. Minority is not defined quantitatively but rather qualitatively, that is, normatively: 'women and children, Blacks and Indians, and so on, will be minorities in comparison to the standard constituted by any American or European white-Christian-male-adult-city-dweller of today.'⁵¹ Deleuze and Guattari's path of liberation now follows this becoming-minority, the obvious example being, as we have seen, the becoming-schizophrenic. They, however, also point to a becoming-woman because man has been the main point of reference in the binary opposition that has defined women as the structural 'other' of the classical system of representation.

So far, Deleuze and Guattari's proposals for a new post-humanist, post-Freudian subjectivity seems to parallel the materialist feminist venture: it proposes to denaturalise and to demythologise, as we have seen in the previous chapter. The problem, however, lies in the fact that they also propose to *desexualise* the body. On the one hand, of course, this is the logical extension of the desired de-essentialisation and depolarisation of oppositions. On the other hand, however, it denies a voice to the, especially in the 1960s and 1970s, rapidly growing number of women (including materialist feminists) who assert the everyday reality of their lives as the affirmation of sexual difference.⁵² 'My life has been most significantly shaped by my gender,' writes Carter.⁵³ How then can she, or any other feminist, do away with this gender altogether. Luce Irigaray's often quoted questioning of Deleuze and Guattari's postulates is very pertinent in this respect:

I am certainly not seeking to whipe out multiplicity, since women's pleasure does not occur without that. But isn't a multiplicity that does not entail a rearticulation of the difference between the sexes bound to block or take away something of women's pleasure? In other words, is the feminine capable at present, of attaining [Deleuzoguattarian] desire, which is *neutral* precisely from the viewpoint of sexual difference? Except by miming masculine desire once again. And doesn't the 'desiring machine' still partly take the place of women or the feminine? Isn't it a sort of metaphor for her/it, that men can use?⁵⁴

Deleuze has denied this, saying that he does not believe that sexuality plays a part in the infrastructure of desire.⁵⁵

The problem of the desiring machine, in its essentially erotic character, is not at all to know if a machine could ever give 'the perfect illusion of woman.' It is on the contrary: [to know] in which machine to put Woman, in what machine does a woman put herself in order to become the non-oedipal object of desire, that is to say non-human sex? In all desiring machines, sexuality does not

consist of an imaginary couple woman-machine as a substitute for Oedipus, but of the couple machine-desire as the real production (...) of a non-oedipal woman.⁵⁶

That this sort of mystification is needed in order to cover up the fact that the desiring machines, which are like Dr Hoffman's desire machines essentially erotic, is revealing. Not much later Deleuze and Guattari, as the former writes, 'had to give up Félix' beautiful word (...) for it is not propitious to assume leaving behind the human body by reducing sexuality to the construction of little perverse or sadistic machines that lock sexuality in a theatre of phantasms.'⁵⁷ They increasingly preferred to denaturalise the human body by means of their Body without Organs. That concept, however, is also questionable, as Irigaray insists:

[C]an this 'psychosis' be 'women's'? If so, isn't it a psychosis that prevents them from acceding to sexual pleasure? At least to *their* pleasure? This is, to a pleasure different from an abstract—neuter?—pleasure of sexualised matter. That *jouissance* which perhaps constitutes a discovery for men, a supplement to enjoyment in a phantasmic 'becoming-woman,' but which has long been familiar to women. *For them isn't the organless body a historical condition? And don't we run the risk once more of taking back from woman those as yet unterritorialised spaces where her desire might come into being?* (...) To turn the 'organless body' into a 'cause' of *jouissance*, isn't it necessary to have had a relation to language and to sex—to the organs—that women have never had?⁵⁸

We are here caught by one of feminism's most complicated predicaments: the process which Alice Jardine has called *gynesis*, the putting into discourse of 'woman' and 'the feminine'.⁵⁹ Should one continue to follow what seems to be a consistent continuation of the poststructuralist dispersal of the subject, a project which has been invaluable for the opening up discourse for women, when this presumably results in women's redisappearance from the scene of history, when this leads, again, to the *putting out of* discourse of 'women' and 'the feminine' as real, empirical, that is to say non-metaphorical, category? Braidotti's answers to this question is clear:

[W]hen this 'becoming-woman' is disembodied to the extent that it bears no connection to the struggles, the experience, the discursivity of real-life women, what good is it for feminist practice? Deleuze's multiple sexuality assumes that women conform to a masculine model which claims to get rid of the sexual difference. What results is the dissolution of the claim to specificity voiced by women. The gender-blindness of this notion of 'becoming-woman' as a form of 'becoming-minority' conceals the historical and traditional experience of women: namely of being deprived of the means of controlling and defining their own social and political and economic status, their sexual specificity, their desire and *jouissance*. *A 'multiplicity' or polysexuality that does not take into account the fundamental asymmetry between the sexes is but a subtler form of discrimination. It reiterates and reinforces women's subordinate position.*⁶⁰

Carter's final denunciation of Dr Hoffman might be explained along these lines. The Doctor is a thoroughly poststructuralist thinker resembling, as I have argued before, Deleuze on many points. He advances instead of

‘an either/or world’ an ‘and+and’ world and explores the ‘gaps between things and definitions’ (p. 206). He disintegrates people resolving them to their constituents—‘a test-tub of amino-acids, a tuft or two of hair.’ (p. 54) and is receptive to margins and the marginal. He nevertheless, also like Deleuze, believes in the ‘inherent symmetry of divergent assymetry’ (p. 213) and thus does not take the fundamental asymmetry between the sexes into account, reiterating and reinforcing women’s subordinate position as agents of male subjectivity.

Albertina, too, is the ‘harmonious concatenation [a very appropriate word in this respect, RvdW] of male and female.’ (p. 213) She remains as such, despite (or maybe because of) her elevated status, a mere agent of the Doctor. She too is supposed to volunteer for her ‘pathetic endless pilgrimage’ in Dr Hoffman’s love pens. This will not bring about her liberation, but rather reiterates and reinforces her and other women’s subordinate position. Albertina is merely a ‘dream made flesh’ (p. 215): a my(s)tical other materialised. In her becoming-multiple she is a paragon of Deleuze’s fluid subjectivity, but the trajectory towards her final destination, a ‘pilgrimage’ which could be likened to the ‘becoming-woman’ as a misogynist trajectory, points towards the place assigned to women in the Deleuzoguattarian discourse, that is, mere agents of the liberation of mankind, and therefore she and her father had to be imaginatively killed.

Robinson, in her analysis of *Dr Hoffman*, also refers to Jardine’s *Gynesis*.⁶¹ She asserts Carter in her text brings to the surface that women, in most male texts, become merely ‘foils’ or ‘prizes’ in the stories of male subjectivity: ‘The notion of woman as “ideational femaleness” that “can take amazingly different shapes” in Carter’s text resonates thematically with the philosophical trend chronicled by Jardine in *Gynesis*. Hoffman is a figure intent on liberating the repressed of culture, on exploring the margins of philosophy and reason—precisely, the “feminine” disorder that complements masculine order.’⁶² Robinson, however, focusses on Jardine’s description of Derrida’s appropriation of ‘woman’: ‘Woman, in Desiderio’s narrative, (...) is like Derrida’s “affirmative woman,” an object put into circulation according to the logic of male desire.’⁶³ How then, however, does she explain the Doctor’s ‘tactical victory’? Why is Desiderio’s remaining life defined only in relation to the ‘desire to see Albertina again?’ (p. 14) Quite a few feminists are not intent on seeing Derrida’s ‘affirmative woman’ again.⁶⁴ Braidotti, for instance, wonders how Derrida’s appropriation of ‘woman’ differs from more traditional forms of mysogyny.⁶⁵ Deleuze’s contemplations, on the other hand, are not rejected *tout court*. ‘Without retracting any of the criticism outlined earlier,’ writes Braidotti, ‘I do think that the theoretical programmes suggested by Foucault and Deleuze respectively are, in contemporary philosophy, the least harmful to women (...) and may be useful to women’s struggle.’⁶⁶ What is particularly of interest about these philosophers, she says, is that their theories efface the nature/culture opposition which, as we have seen, serves the interests of the phallogocentric system of thought.⁶⁷ Thus, it is not what Deleuze and Guattari have to say about women that is useful for feminism, but rather their (or Deleuze’s) redefinition of the image of thought, from which I have sketched the outlines in the previous chapter, that is invaluable. The erasure of binary logic (especially the opposition nature/culture) without the rejection of difference is a necessary condition for the alignment (and redefinition) of a biological conception of psychoanalysis and the socially based postulates of Marxism, the prerequisite for a materialist feminism: a post-dialectical progressive politics which is susceptible to the questions of real-life women. So I repeat that Deleuze and Guattari’s work, at the junction of Foucauldian, Freudian/Lacanian, and Marxian/Althusserian discourses, is of particular interest for a materialist feminism, and thus for Carter. That her novel shows a foregrounding of the notion of ‘woman’ (mostly in a stereotyped way) without referring to an original model, is the result, I believe, of her creative appropriation of the subjectivity Deleuze and Guattari proposed. This

practice can be paralleled to the theoretical efforts of feminists to propose an embodied but de-essentialised feminist subjectivity.

Taking the notion of asymmetry between the sexes as a starting point for the search for a new subjectivity runs the risk of arriving at the abhorred essentialism. However, the appropriation of Deleuze and Guattari's ideas about bodies as a surface of intensities and pure simulacra, can solve this problem. Seeing the body as a site of interaction of material and symbolic forces, which no longer opposes nature to culture, can lead to a non-fixed, de-essentialised idea of subjectivity which is nevertheless connected to bodily sexed reality of real human beings. The body is both biologically and sociologically inscribed; it is the 'point of overlap between the physical, the symbolic, and the material social conditions.'⁶⁸ This postmetaphysical figuration of the nomadic subject is always 'becoming', always changing, and serves, thus, as an agent of change. And this figuration, while not taking back the criticism about the way it is put to service in the Deleuzoguattairian project, can offer a way out of the phallogocentric image of thought which has confined women to a subordinate position in relation to men.

Carter's novel exhibits a parade of the stereotyped, misogynist images to which women have been objectified by phallogocentrism. We are presented, amongst others, with the sexually receptive, Ophelia-like Mary Anne, the ritually degraded females of the centaurs and with the caged girls in the house of anonymity:

Each [of the caged girls] was circumscribed as a figure in rhetoric and you could not imagine they had names, for they had been reduced by the rigorous discipline of their vocation to the undifferentiated essence of the idea of the female. This ideational femaleness took amazingly different shapes though its nature was not that of Woman; when I examined them more closely, I saw that none of them were any longer, or might never have been, woman. All, without exception, passed beyond or did not enter the realm of simple humanity. They were sinister, abominable, inverted mutations, part clockwork, part vegetable and part brute. (p. 132)

These images of objectified women are simply constructed by men (and they reflect the automata which figure in Hoffmann's tales). They are, like the poststructuralist figurations of women, not real, but are necessary preconditions for masculine subjectivity to exist. The stereotypes emphasise the asymmetry between masculinity and femininity and their representations. Carter works through all these stereotyped and misogynist images of women not in order to substantiate them, but rather, in a textual strategy parallel to Irigaray's mimesis, in order to retrace backward the 'multilayered levels of signification, or representations, of women' so as to find a point of exit from the phallogocentric definitions of 'woman'.⁶⁹ She pushes, like Irigaray, the masculine representation of women to its limits and thus foregrounds its problematic character. 'Woman,' writes Braidotti, 'is the anchoring point from which, through strategically motivated repetitions, new definitions and representations can emerge.'⁷⁰ Difference and repetition: it is an active process of becoming. 'Transformation,' she continues, 'can only be achieved through deessentialized embodiment or strategically reessentialised embodiment—by *working through* the multilayered structures of one's embodied self. (...) It is the metabolic consumption of the old that can engender the new.'⁷¹ And this is exactly what Carter does: she does not relinquish the signifier, as would be appropriate, before she has worked through the multiple layers of signification of it. She does not leave behind women's history, but uses it to arrive at the truly new, the *pars construens* of a female subjectivity: a de-essentialised embodied nomadic subject which

goes beyond the gender dichotomy but which, nevertheless, is sensitive to gender difference. Carter turns to Deleuze's 'materialist metaphysics' in order to conceptualise such a post-dialectical view of difference, difference placed at the centre of repetition, a decentering that inhabits all repetition. Thus the repetition of stereotyped objectified images of women will eventually release the dark precursor; not a female essentialism, but rather a femininity which is not a ground nor a final, Utopian goal or intergation; a femininity as a pure multiplicity, a free and fluid subjectivity which always affirms difference, becoming Other, becoming new. A subjectivity which affirms that women, too, can have acces to places of enunciation, that women can be agents of political change as and for real-life female subjects, not as male constructs, nor for the reaffirmation of a masculine subjectivity.

Conclusion: Towards a Materialist Metaphysics, or: Finding Your Own Voice

Too much criticism is about pettifogging details or pettifogging authors. It's the fault of the doctoral system, I suppose: the student has to engage in original research, which nearly always means something so trivial it hasn't been done before. (...) I've known at least a dozen students who have produced perfectly plausible proposals that have come to nothing. Usually the problem is the 'influence' question. One student (...) wanted to do a doctorate on the influence of Post-Impressionist painting on Virginia Woolf (...) and spent twelve months discovering that, although her great friend Roger Fry had organised the first Post-Impressionist exhibition in England, and although her sister Vanessa, her sister's husband Clive Bell, and her sister's lover Duncan Grant had all been intimately involved in it, Woolf's own sense of art appreciation never got beyond the 'but I know what I like' level.

—Richard Burns, *Fond and Foolish Lovers*

Minister: Metaphysics are no concern of mine.

Ambassador: Dr Hoffman will make metaphysics *your* business.

—Angela Carter, *Dr Hoffman*

Throughout my thesis I have been careful to establish parallels (and divergences) between Deleuze and Guattari on the one hand and Romanticism, the counterculture and Surrealism on the other. These three movements have all, as we have seen in Chapter One, been seen as important 'sources' for Carter's narrative. Similarly, Lacan, Freud, Derrida and even Nietzsche have been identified by various critics as prominent 'referees' with respect to Carter's novel in general and the character of Dr Hoffman in particular.¹ I have also, at various points, expanded on the (dis)similarities between these thinkers and Deleuze and Guattari.

That there are certain similarities between the work of these two theorists and Carter's fictional criticism is thus hardly surprising. I believe, nevertheless, that the terminological and thematic echoes of Deleuze and Guattari in *Dr Hoffman* are not merely the result of the aforementioned correspondences. Rather, I would say, on the basis of the resemblances between Deleuze and Guattari's desiring-machines and Hoffman's/Carter's desire machines, we could conclude that Deleuze and Guattari's work can be seen as a direct 'source' for Carter's narrative. As I have said in Chapter One, however, I do not intend to rest my case on this direct relationship: this thesis is not only about the 'influence question'. What is more important, I think, is the question whether the 'bringing into resonance' of Carter and Deleuze and Guattari is productive. And I believe it is.

The dialogue between Carter's novel and Deleuze and Guattari's conceptualisations sheds, to a certain extent, a new light on the novel. No longer do I grope in the dark or am I lost in bewilderment but I have, instead, become convinced that *Dr Hoffman* contains a consistent and positive message. While the novel airs a sense of melancholy and disillusionment, I do not believe it to be a pessimistic novel. Rather, I would say, it has a thoroughly optimistic tone. The 'acrobats of desire', who 'dismember themselves limb by limb' and 'as the *pièce de résistance* juggle with their eyes' (which, as we have seen, symbolise the phallus), 'have come' thus the 'void' called 'nebulous time is almost upon us' (pp. 113-114, 165). Similarly, the male philosophers of desire have disintegrated the subject and the nihilistic void of postmodernism is subsequently almost upon us. But the negative, reactive nihilism of people like Baudrillard and Derrida is, as I have argued in Chapter Two, opposed by the positive, active nihilism of people like Deleuze and Guattari. They work towards a new 'ethics' of thought which tries to locate value and meaning within the postmodern void. They seek a middle between a 'fixed' morality and an interminable relativism. They seek for, what Foucault has called, a 'materialist metaphysics' and it is, I believe, exactly this conception that Carter uses to mediate

between the British position which—as put forward by influential critics like Kate Millet and Toril Moi—is radically anti-essentialist and anti-psychoanalytic and the French position—represented by, for instance, Irigaray—which remains psychoanalytic and has consequently been accused of essentialism. To bridge the gap between these seemingly mutually exclusive positions, Carter turns to Deleuze and Guattari's redefinition of a psychoanalysis which is nor biologically nor sociologically essentialist; a post-dialectical frame of thought which 'deconstructs' the binary polarity between physics and metaphysics. In Foucault's words:

Logique du sens should be read as the boldest and most insolent of metaphysical treatises—on the basic condition that instead of denouncing metaphysics as the neglect of being, we force it to speak of extra-being. Physics: discourse dealing with the ideal structure of bodies, mixtures, reactions, internal and external mechanisms; metaphysics: discourse dealing with the *materiality* of incorporeal things—phantasms, idols, and simulacra.²

Psychoanalysis should, thus, be understood as a metaphysical practice since it concerns itself with phantasms. It is this thoroughly revised psychoanalysis, this metaphysics freed from its original profundity (biologism) as well as from a supreme being (Oedipus), this de-essentialised materialist frame of thought that can be useful for women because it, as Foucault writes, concerns the materiality of the simulacrum, and that is exactly what women has become (again) in poststructuralist theory: simulacra of men.³ Thus Deleuze's theory is useful for feminism, despite of itself: it deals with the materiality, with the bodily roots of subjectivity and thus reconnects the woman to her own gendered body. This is not an essentialised body, however, but rather a body as a surface on which different forces interact, a body as a metaphysical surface of integrated material and symbolic elements.⁴ The material and the symbolic are no longer opposites but come together: biological characteristics of the female sex do, undeniably, have social/symbolic implications whereas social/symbolic inscriptions of women certainly have emotional, bodily effects (in Carter's words: 'There is a materiality to symbols').⁵ We can, thus, leave behind binary polarity without doing away with difference altogether as a result of Deleuze's criticism of the categorical image of thought. Indeed, as Foucault writes, after Deleuze, new thought is possible. Deleuze and Guattari open up possibilities for feminist thought, but there is still a long way to go, as Carter's and other feminist's criticism point out.

Carter makes a speculative start towards a post-poststructuralist thought which does attack the nihilistic tendencies of some branches of postmodernism that hail the end of all difference including the sexual difference (think for instance of Baudrillard's notion of the trans-sexual), but does not take (sexual) difference as a ground for a new, politically correct morality which grants minorities a morally superior position. I would say that *Dr Hoffman*, like *Anti-Oedipus*, is a book of ethics. It also asks questions about value in these postmodern/poststructuralist times. In my limited reading of the novel I have mainly focused on the questions she poses regarding women and the feminine. What is the value and meaning of women and the feminine—not only of these signifiers but also of their everyday experience. Her speculative answers do not postulate women as the better sex, nor does it scold men for their alleged repression of women throughout history (with history extending into the present). This, in her view, would be a vulnerable (because dialectical) position. Its meaning and value, rather, seems to be political, that is to say, directed at political change. She seems to say that women, too, can have access to places of enunciation and should demand this right to speak as and for themselves. This, I think, is what she achieves in *Dr Hoffman*. She no longer speaks as a male impersonator, but starts, instead, to speak as herself. She finds her explicitly gendered but nevertheless unique 'voice' which

cannot be reduced to and be denounced as a politically correct feminist who, as John Bayley writes, sticks to the 'party line' of a postmodern 'militant orthodoxy'.⁶ I refer, again, to the fierce criticism of several important feminists, among which Andrea Dworkin and Susanne Kappeler, on Carter's work but also to my own valuation of *Dr Hoffman* in order to invalidate Bayley's reproach. Rather, I would say, she produces an 'ex-centric', radical 'fictional criticism' which optimistically/positively affirms the possibilities for difference without dualism, female subjectivity, female desire, feminist enunciation, and political change. As the last line of the novel professes: 'Unbidden she comes' (p. 221). And she's here to stay.

postscript

The closer you come to the end, the more there is to say. The end is only imaginary, a destination you invent to keep yourself going, but a point comes when you realise you will never get there. You might have to stop, but that is only because you have run out of time. You stop, but that does not mean you have come to an end.

—Paul Auster, *In The Country of Last Things*

As a final remark I wish to emphasise, again, the limited scope of this thesis. I have concentrated solely on the question of subjectivity which I believe to be one of the main themes of *Dr Hoffman*. As I have pointed out in this conclusion, I think the novel is a book of ethics, and as such concerns value in this postmodern era. At the same time, and closely connected to it, I nonetheless believe it is also, again like *Anti-Oedipus*, a book of semiotics, dealing with questions of meaning in this deconstructing textual/visual world which lead, I am tempted to say, to a materialist metafiction which denounces depoliticised postmodern nihilism as ‘mannerist’ and ‘fun but frivolous’.¹ In the end, however, I believe this semiotic trail also leads to the radical materialism that I have identified as the central underlying epistemological assumption of Carter’s work (think, in this respect, about Carter’s remark about the materiality of symbols). Therefore I repeat the first of the reasons I have given in Chapter Three as to why I have chosen to focus only on one aspect of the book: an in-depth analysis of a specific aspect, in my view, enhances our knowledge of the writer’s ‘premises about reality’ at least as much as, if not more than, an all-inclusive but, as a consequence of limited time, necessarily more superficial reading. And, as I have written, Carter’s questioning of subjectivity leads, I believe, to a more original analysis than a examination of the relation between the signifier and the signified would have led to, because of the light it sheds on the relation between Carter and Deleuze and Guattari.

I have gone to great length, especially in my discussion of Deleuze’s work anterior to *Anti-Oedipus*, to establish the fundamental ties between Carter and Deleuze and Guattari. Especially in the light of this elaborate treatment of Deleuze’s ‘materialist metaphysics’ and Deleuze and Guattari’s history of desire-repression, my analysis of the relation between the writers, which focusses mainly on the desire machines/desiring-machines, might seem scanty. Again: this is due to limited time. I believe, as I have said before, that one can also expand on, for instance, the parallels and divergences between Deleuze and Guattari’s history of capitalism and desire-repression and Carter’s anthropological ‘adventures’ with the river people and the centaurs, or the (dis)similarities between Deleuze’s work on Sacher-Masoch and Carter’s exposition of the count’s philosophy. As I have also said, I really do hope someone will, one day, look at these parallels in more detail and that my thesis can help as a starting point for this further exploration. I feel, however, that, while the variation in length of the different parts of this thesis does in a sense lead to an unbalanced piece of writing, my conclusion cannot do without the elaboration on Deleuze’s criticism of the categorical image of thought. Furthermore, the whole work is a cartography of my intellectual development of the last three years. It maps, I believe, my own ‘finding my own voice’. It is not a brilliant piece of work (just as I think *Dr Hoffman* is not a brilliant novel) but rather, as Rushdie says, an interim report of the development of my consciousness, and as such an, at least for me, interesting record of my journey through feminism and poststructuralism. I will stop here, but, to speak with Auster, I have not come to an end. I hope, with Margaret Atwood, that my final period will be like a ‘pinprick in the paper: you could put your eye to it and see through, to the other side, to the beginning of something else.’²

Notes to Preface

1. Cf. Suleiman, p. 136.
2. Bogue, pp. 4-7, 165 n 8.
3. Carter (1983a), p. 38.
4. Cf. Sage, p. 32.
5. Cf. Jordan (1990, 1992, 1994), Sage (1994), p. 41.

Notes to Chapter One

1. Carter (1983a), p. 70.
2. Lipovetsky, p. 214.
3. Chavannes.
4. Punter, p. 211.
5. quoted in Christensen, p. 64.
6. Suleiman, p. 133.
7. Ibid., p. 133.
8. Ibid., p. 126.
9. Ibid., p. 134.
10. Marcuse quoted in Suleiman, p. 134.
11. Debord quoted in Suleiman, p. 135.
12. Ibid., p. 135.
13. Ibid., p. 136.
14. quoted in Moore-Gilbert and Seed (1992), p. 5.
15. Cf. Chapter 2.
16. quoted in Moore-Gilbert and Seed (1992), p. 4.
17. Jordan (1990), p. 32.
18. Manlove, pp. 153-4.

19. Bonca, p. 59.
20. Ibid., p. 59.
21. Ibid., pp. 59-61.
22. Ibid., pp. 60-1.
23. Gasiorek, p. 129.
24. Ibid., p. 128.
25. Ibid., p. 128.
26. Ibid., p. 130.
27. Ibid., p. 130.
28. Ibid., p. 130.
29. Ibid., p. 131.
30. Ibid., p. 126.
31. Gamble, p. 97.
32. Ibid., p. 114.
33. Ibid., p. 113.
34. Ibid., p. 94.
35. Carter (1972b), p. 155.
36. Ibid., pp. 155-7.
37. Gamble, p. 95.
38. Sage, p. 27.
39. Ibid., p. 28.
40. Carter quoted in Sage, p. 28.
41. Carter (1983a), p. 39.
42. Carter (1983a), p. 37-8.
43. Carter (1979), p. 13.
44. Gamble, p. 103.

45. Carter (1983b), p. 49.
46. Brian McHale in his *Postmodernist Fiction* (London: Methuen, 1987), for instance, completely disregards Carter's feminist position.
47. Gamble, p. 97.
48. Punter, p. 209.
49. Ibid., p. 210.
50. Gasiorek, p. 131.
51. Manlove, p. 158.
52. Gamble, p. 114.
53. Robinson, p. 100.
54. Suleiman, p. 136.
55. Carter (1978), pp. 510-512.
56. Carter quoted in Gamble, pp. 97-8.
57. Carter (1972b), p. 155.
58. Carter (1983a), p. 37.
59. Cf. Rosemarie Buikeman en Anneke Smelik (ed.) *Vrouwenstudies in de cultuurwetenschappen*, Muiderberg: Coutinho, 1993. — The prefix 'ur' is used by Carter (1980).
60. Carter (1980), p. 230.
61. Carter (1980), p. 230.
62. Carter (1983a), p. 42. — About myths involved cf. Carter (1980), p. 230.
63. Cf. Jordan (1990, 1992, 1994), Sage (1994), p. 41.
64. The formulation of this question is based on Robinson (1991), p. 103.
65. Robinson, p. 103.
66. quoted in Robinson, p. 107.
67. Ibid., p. 116-7.
68. especially on p. 61.
69. Bonca, p. 59, quotation modified.

70. Carter (1978), p. 509.
71. Cf. Waugh (1995), p. 195, Robinson, p. 98, Sage, pp. 2, 26.
72. Cf. Robinson, p. 3.
73. See also Kristeva (1981) for more on this so called 'third phase of feminism'.

Notes to Chapter Two

1. Bogue (1989), p. 59.
2. Ibid., p. 67.
3. Deleuze borrows this mathematical model from the French mathematician and philosopher Albert Lautman who is, even more than the philosopher Emmanuel Kant, his main inspiration for the interpretation of ideas as problems.
4. Bogue (1989), p. 69.
5. Ibid., p. 60.
6. Deleuze himself uses the Saussurian account of the phonological structure of language as an example of a linguistic idea. This, however, would rather complicate than illuminate the theory, because he simultaneously demonstrates his conception of ideas and denounces the negative and oppositional aspects of Saussurian linguistics. See: Deleuze (1968), pp. 203-4.
7. Bogue (1989), p. 61.
8. Ibid., pp. 61-2.
9. Deleuze (1968), p. 253.
10. Carter (1992), p. 606.
11. Cf. Foucault, esp. pp. 170-71.
12. These early essays are collected in *Psychoanalyse et transversalité* (Paris: Maspéro, 1972). Some of these essays (among which 'Transversality') have appeared in English translation in Guattari (1984).
13. For those who are not familiar with poststructuralism, I will give a short exposition of its basic outlines: Poststructuralism, as the term implies, is a theoretical perspective which surpasses structuralism—the dominant intellectual movement in France during the 1950s and 1960s. It employs, among others, the model of Saussure's structural linguistics—which serves as the foundation for structuralism—in a way that undermines the grounds both of Saussure's theories and of structuralism itself. Saussure's synchronic study of linguistics lies at the basis of structuralism in that it aims at the conception of a cultural phenomenon, like literature, as a signifying system with an implicit systematic 'grammar'. This is analogous to Saussure's distinction between *parole* and *langue*: 'The parole is any particular utterance, spoken or written. The langue is the implicit system of elements, of distinctions and oppositions, and of principles of combination

shared by members of a language community, which makes it possible for a speaker to produce, and the auditor to understand, a parole. The linguist's primary concern, in Saussure's view, is to establish the nature of the underlying linguistic system, the *langue*.' [Abrams, p. 215] Similarly, structuralist criticism aims to make explicit the implicit structure, features, and rules of the underlying signifying system.

One important poststructuralist thinker who subverts Saussure's linguistic system is the French philosopher Jacques Derrida. He builds his alternative conception of 'the radically "undecidable" play of linguistic meaning' primarily on Saussure's claim that in a linguistic sign-system both the *signifiers*, the actual spoken or written utterances, and the *signifieds*, their conceptual meanings, owe their seeming identity to their *differences* from other signifiers/signifieds. [Abrams, p. 204] Derrida then claims that, strictly spoken, signified meanings are neither 'present' to us in their own identity nor 'absent'. Derrida introduces the term *différance*, its spelling indicating the double sense of the French verb 'différer'—meaning both 'to be different' and 'to defer', to capture the paradox that on the one hand there is an illusory 'effect' of meaning produced by negation, but on the other hand this 'effect' is perpetually deferred because it 'can never come to rest in actual presence.' [Abrams, p. 204—for more on *différance* see: Leitch (1983), pp. 41-3] Therefore, there is no ground for attributing determinate meaning.

It is important to note, however, that while many poststructuralist thinkers take as their *locus classicus* Saussure's *Cours de linguistique générale* and its ensuing structuralism, their real unifying basis lies in large part in their endeavours to evade the Hegelian foundations which had come to dominate the theoretical horizon as an 'ineluctable centrepiece of philosophical speculation, social theory and political practice' in post-war Continental theory. [Hardt, p. x] The German philosopher Georg Hegel, an heir of the Enlightenment, constructed an 'all-embracing metaphysical system, which attempted to explain all reality and uncover the fundamental nature and meaning of the universe and human history.' [Perry, p. 355] He asserted the existence of an ultimate reality, an Absolute Spirit, which is unfolded dialectically in the arena of world history, that is through a tension between opposing ideas or forces. 'The struggle between one idea (thesis) and its adversary (antithesis) is evident in all spheres of human activity. This clash of opposites gains in intensity, ending in a resolution that unifies both opposing views. Thought and history then enter a new and higher stage, that of synthesis, which, by absorbing the truths within both the thesis and antithesis, achieves a higher level of truth and a higher stage of history. Soon this thesis itself becomes a thesis that enters into another conflict with another set of opposing ideas; this conflict, too, is resolved by a still higher synthesis. Thus, the dynamic struggle between thesis and antithesis (...) and its resolution in a synthesis accounts for movement in history (...) [The] Spirit is closer to realization.' [Perry, p. 356.]

Derrida's *deconstruction*, like many other poststructuralist theories, opposes this conception and asserts alternatively that there is 'no final stability, no authority and no centre.' [Bertens and D'Haen, p. 31] 'Quoi du reste aujourd'hui, pour nous, ici, maintenant, d'un Hegel?' Derrida asks in the first sentence of *Glas*. [quoted in Leitch (1983), p. 208. 'What remains today, for us, here, now, of a Hegel?'] What remains after Derrida's deconstructive enterprise seems to be answered in the final sentence of the book: 'Aujourd'hui, ici, maintenant, le débris de.' [Today, here, now, the debris of.] Derrida undertakes to show that all philosophical attempts to demonstrate an 'ultimate referent'—a self-certifying absolute, ground, or foundation—are illusory. [Abrams, p. 204].

This radical rejection of what Derrida calls *logocentric* metaphysics obviously not only problematises the foundations of Hegelian philosophy, but the foundations of the philosophical tradition *tout court*. Plato's theory of ideas, for instance, is based on a metaphysical conception of essences. Poststructuralism, however, is not involved in the total rejection of the tradition of political and philosophical discourse, but more importantly 'in the articulation and affirmation of alternative lineages that arise from within the tradition itself.' [Hardt, pp. ix-x.] Deleuze, who is also labelled a poststructuralist thinker, writes in *Dialogues*: 'I loved authors that seemed to be a part of the history of philosophy, but who some way or other escaped the discourse.' [Deleuze and Parnet, p. 34] Similarly, the whole generation of French thinkers that came to maturity in the 1960s admired philosophical 'rebels' like Friedrich Nietzsche, Karl Marx, Henry Bergson, and Sigmund Freud. Especially Marx, and to a lesser extent also Nietzsche and Freud, have been identified as heirs of Hegel, for instance by the French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty who writes, 'Hegel stands at the fundaments of the important developments of the last hundred years, like for instance, marxism, Nietzsche, German phenomenology, psychoanalysis. He has given the impetus for an effort to explore the irrational and its integration into a broad definition of the rational.' [Eribon, p. 35.] That

this has not been recognised by the generation of the 1960s, he continues, is caused by the fact that Marx and others focus specifically on which parts of Hegelianism they have rejected instead of highlighting which parts of his heritage they have build upon.

With more or less the same precursors and opponents, theorists as diverse as Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan, Julia Kristeva, and Louis Althusser share a number of similar principles, including the rejection of reason as universal or foundational, rejection—or at least reevaluation—of polarities, problematisation of linguistic reference and textual interpretation, decentering of the subject, suspicion of totalizing narratives, affirmation of the nexus of knowledge/interest/power, interrogation of established disciplinary and intellectual boundaries, and a sensitivity to differences, exclusions, anomalies, and margins. [Leitch (1992), p. xiii.] These similarities have prompted American theorists to draw a line of affinity around these people and call them poststructuralists. This remains, however, a very elusive category. For one thing, the identified theorists have—as a result of the Parisian myopia fuelled by envy, loyalties, and competition—never really been forming a common project. Also, some of these philosophers are often referred to as structuralists, most notably Lacan, Foucault, Derrida, and Althusser. Both labels are correct, however, because the structuralist movement of the 1960s soon disintegrated. ‘The novelty of [structuralism] is that it has not had to await its fate at the hands of subsequent generations—the traditional manner in which movements decline—for the structuralists were the first to disown their allegiance.’ [Donald F. Bouchard in the introduction to Foucault (1977), p. 16.]

14. Bogue (1989), p. 5.
15. Ibid., p. 85.
16. For an description of the traditional Oedipus-complex, see: Henry Gleitman, *Psychology*, 3rd ed. (New York: Norton, 1991), pp. 425-6.
17. Guattari quoted in Bogue (1989), p. 86. Bogue continues: “the very fabric of my most intimate existence [writes Guattari] is made up of the events of contemporary history, at least of those which have marked me in various ways.” The psychotic, far from being out of touch with reality, is spread “across the four corners of the historical universe; the delirious person starts talking in foreign languages, hallucinates history: class conflicts, wars become the instruments of self-expression.”
18. Stivale (1985).
19. Bogue (1989), p. 86.
20. Ibid.
21. Guattari quoted in Stivale (1985).
22. Cf. Eribon (1989), p. 74.
23. Guattari quoted in Bogue (1989), p. 87. On the same page Bogue writes: ‘Capitalism tends to undermine traditional customs and social relations, but to substitute for them other forms of repression: the more capitalism “decodes”, “deterritorializes” (...) the more it tries to create or recreate artificial territorialities.’

Guattari elaborates on this constant movement of de- and reterritoralisations in an 1985 interview. Asked to comment on the Mitterand government he delineates one of the processes of capitalism which this government has failed to recognise and respond to as follows: ‘[One] operation of (...) capitalism is an operation of integration, i.e. its objective is not an immediate profit, a direct power, but rather to capture subjectivities from within, if I can use this term. And to do so, what better technique is there to capture subjectivities than to produce them oneself? It’s like those old science fiction films with invader themes, the body snatchers; integrated world capitalism takes the place of the subjectivity, it doesn’t have to mess around with class struggles, with conflicts: it expropriates the subjectivity directly because it produces subjectivity

itself. It's quite relaxed about it; let's say that this is an ideal which this capitalism partially attains. How does it do it? By producing subjectivity, i.e. it produces quite precisely the semiotic chains, the ways of representing the world to oneself, the forms of sensitivity, the forms of curriculum, of education, of evolution; it furnishes different age groups, different categories of the population, with a mode of functioning in the same way that it would put computer chips in cars, to guarantee their semiotic functioning.

Yet, with this in mind, this subjectivity is not necessarily uniform, but rather very differentiated. It is differentiated as a function of the requirements of production, as a function of racial segregations, as a function of sexual segregations, as a function of x differences, because the objective is not to create a universal subjectivity, but to continue to reproduce something that guarantees power with a certain number of capitalistic elites that are totally traditional, as we can witness quite well with Thatcherism and Reaganism. They aren't in the process of creating a renewed and universal humanity, not at all; they want to continue the traditions of American, Japanese, Russian, etc., aristocracies.

Thus, there is a double movement, of deterritorialization of subjectivities in an informational and cybernetic direction of adjacencies of subjectivity in matters of production, but a movement of reterritorialization of subjectivities in order to assign them to a place, and especially to keep them in this place and to control them well, to place them under house arrest, to block their circulation, their flows. This is the meaning of all the measures leading to unemployment, to the segregation of entire economic spaces, to racism, etc.: to keep the population in place.' [Stivale (1995)]

24. The importance of Lacan on the development of Guattari's thought should, however, not been underestimated. In the 1985 interview with Charles Stivale he says: 'Deleuze never took Lacan seriously at all. (...) I remember certain conversations of that period, and I realize that [Deleuze and Foucault] considered [Lacanianism] as rather simplistic, superficial. That seems funny because it's such a sophisticated, complicated language. (...) What was important for me with Lacan is that it was an event in my life, an event to meet this totally bizarre, extraordinary guy with extraordinary, crazy even, acting talent, with an astounding cultural background. (...) That's what Lacan was; he was above all a guy with guts; you can say all you want about Lacan, but you can't say the contrary, he had no lack of guts. He possessed a depth of freedom that he inherited from a rather blessed period, I have to say, the period before the war, the period of surrealism, a period with a kind of gratuitous violence. (...) He had a dadaist humor, a violence at the same time, a cruelty; he was a very cruel guy, Lacan, very harsh. (...) [I]t was important for me to have a model of rupture, if I can call it that, all the more so since I was involved in extreme leftist organizations, but still traditionalist from many perspectives. There was all the weight of Sartre's thought, of Marxist thought, creating a whole environment that it wasn't easy to eliminate. So, I think that's what Lacan was. Moreover, it's certain that his reading of Freud opened possibilities for me to cross through and into different ways of thinking.'
25. Guattari uses the term 'machine' as early as 1966 in a paper called 'A propos de la psychotherapie institutionelle' (Reflections for Philosophers on Institutional Psychotherapy). In this article he 'referred to the alterity of the subject as a "signifying machine which predetermines what must be good or bad for me and my peers in one or another area of consumption."' [Stivale (1985)].
26. Stivale (1985).
27. The number is taken from Melissa McMahon and Stephen O'Connell, 'Gilles Deleuze 1925-1995', on-line obituary excerpt from *Virtuosity*, newsletter of the Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy, vol. 1 (april 1996).
28. Deleuze and Parnet (1977), pp. 60-1.
29. Bogue (1989), p. 10.
30. Deleuze and Parnet (1977), p. 65.

31. Ibid., p. 66.
32. Ibid., p. 66.
33. Bogue (1989), p. 10.
34. Deleuze quoted in Bogue (1989), p. 10.
35. Deleuze and Parnet (1977), pp. 52-3.
36. Other examples can be found everywhere throughout his books, for instance his conceptualisation of philosophy which he describes in *Empirisme et subjectivité* (1952) as a 'development to the fullest extent of the necessary implications of a formulated question' [quoted in Bogue (1989), p. 10] and almost forty years later in *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?* (1991) as 'a question posed in a moment of quiet restlessness, at midnight when there is nothing more to ask. It was asked before; it was always being asked, but too indirectly or obliquely (...) too artificial, too abstract.' [Deleuze and Guattari (1991), p. 1]
37. (Paris: PUF, 1962), tr. Hugh Tomlinson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983).
38. For an account of Deleuze's Bergsonian period, see: Hardt (1993), pp. 1-25.
39. Foucault writes in the introduction of *Anti-Oedipus*: 'I would say that *Anti-Oedipus* (may its authors forgive me) is a book of ethics.' (p. xiii).
40. translations of respectively *der Wille zur Macht* *la volonté de puissance* and *die ewige Wiederkunft* or *Wiederkehr* *l'éternel retour*.
41. 'As Deleuze himself asserts while reading Nietzsche, in order to gain an adequate understanding of a philosophical project one must recognize against whom its principal concepts are directed.' [Hardt (1993), p. xviii.]
42. Bogue (1989), p. 18.
43. Perry (1993), p. 355.
44. Deleuze quoted in Hardt (1993), p. 27.
45. Ibid., p. 33.
46. Ibid., p. 31. — 'The "impersonal" interpretative strategy can (...) be seen as a political selection. In fact, Deleuze's reading has made such a profound impression on Nietzsche studies partly because it succeeds in making so much of Nietzsche's thought while avoiding or effectively diffusing the force of arguments about Nietzsche's individualism and reactionary politics, nearly all of which are centered around a "personalist" interpretation and selection.' [Hardt, p. 31.]
47. I will use a neuter pronoun when referring to the personae slave and master, because they do explicitly not refer to a person.
48. see for an account of the invention of Christianity: Perry, pp. 449-450.
49. Bogue (1989), p. 17.

50. Deleuze quoted in Bogue (1989), p. 17.
51. Bogue explicates the matter as follows: "The master says, "I am good, therefore he is bad." The slave says, "He is bad (i.e. not good), therefore I am good (i.e. not not-good)."' [p. 17.]
52. Deleuze quoted in Hardt (1993), p. 32; my italics.
53. Matthews (1996) gives a very clear exposition of Bergson's critique of determination under the heading 'Individuality and Freedom', pp. 22-7.
54. Hardt (1993), p. 34.
55. '[U]nlike the positivists, [Bergson] regarded metaphysics not only as possible, but as the central concern of philosophy (...). But what he meant by 'metaphysics' shows him as in revolt, not only against positivism, but against the whole mainline tradition of Western philosophy since Plato. Metaphysicians in that tradition have held that the ultimate reality which underlies the world of sense-perception (...) is timeless and unchanging (...). For Bergson, by contrast, the ultimate metaphysical reality was to be found precisely in what is alive and constantly changing, in the world of Becoming and concrete particularity, and our mode of access to that ultimate reality was by means of what he called "intuition" rather than by mathematical reason.' [Matthews (1996), p. 16.]
56. Hardt (1993), p. 29.
57. Bogue (1989), p. 20.
58. Deleuze quoted in Bogue (1989), p. 20.
59. Deleuze quoted in Hardt (1993), p. 34.
60. Hardt (1993), p. 34.
61. Deleuze quoted in Hardt (1993), p. 35.
62. It is here that Deleuze makes the move away from ontology into the field of ethics and politics. The conception of power which is internal to its manifestation finds its basis in Spinozian ontology. Spinoza, however, has written extensively on ethics and politics. He believes that both politics and ethics should be subservient to the realisation of our full potential and consequently rejects all political systems and ethical values that could prevent a force to go to its limit. [see: Jostein Gaarder, *De Wereld van Sofie*, (Antwerpen: Houtekien, 1994), pp. 268-277.] Deleuze immediately directs his Nietzschean analysis of power against the values of the slave in an attack on juridicism ('law (...) expresses the triumph of the weak over the strong (...) of reaction over action.'), and thereby traverses into the field of ethics and politics. [Deleuze quoted in Hardt (1993), p. 36.]
63. Hardt (1993), p. 36.
64. Hegel quoted in Hardt (1993), p. 39. — I refer to note 17 of this chapter for an explication, if necessary, of this quote.
65. It goes too far to detail this negation for my purposes. For those interested, Hardt (1993) gives a clear exposition of Hegel's master-slave logic on pp. 38-45.
66. Hegel quoted in Hardt (1993), p. 43.

67. Hardt (1993), p. 42.
68. Deleuze quoted in Hardt (1993), p. 42.
69. Deleuze quoted in Bogue (1989), p. 22. 'Force is what can, will to power is what wills.'
70. Bogue (1989), p. 20.
71. Deleuze quoted in Bogue (1989), p. 23.
72. Bogue (1989), p. 23.
73. Deleuze quoted in Hardt (1993), p. 47.
74. Hardt (1993), p. 19.
75. Deleuze quoted in Bogue (1989), p. 30.
76. Bogue (1989), p. 30.
77. Deleuze quoted in Hardt (1993), p. 48.
78. quoted in Hardt (1993), p. 48.
79. Ibid., pp. 48-9.
80. Bogue (1989), p. 31.
81. Hardt (1993), p. 49.
82. Bogue (1989), p. 31.
83. Hardt (1993), p. 50.
84. Ibid.
85. Deleuze quoted in Bogue (1989), p. 27.
86. Bogue (1989), p. 27.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
89. Deleuze quoted in Bogue (1989), p. 27.
90. Ibid., p. 32.
91. The basic opposition between the master and the slave reverberates into a host of polarities—high and low, noble and base—that convey internal hierarchy. We could conclude that Nietzsche here creates his own static conservatory of fixed values, but he insists that the categories are relative and unstable. In his original writings most of the derivatives of the terms master and slave are written as relative nouns (*dem Stärkeren/der Schwächeren, dem Grösseren/das Kleinere*). The terms master and slave, in Deleuze's

impersonal reading reduced to mere theoretical concepts, derive their relation from a specific hierarchy that is temporary, rather than permanent. The hierarchical system can change, and thus the positions of the slave and master can be inverted, that is, a master can become a slave when the overall hierarchy changes (but also within a hierarchy a slave can be master, that is, master of a slave which is even lower in rank. Here we again see the relativity of the terms: a slave can be at the same time master, just as a master is also a slave from a higher master.). Its transformative potentiality is nevertheless limited: it cannot transform its inherent structure, in other words, the hierarchy can never converge. There will always be hierarchy because valuation takes place on the basis of the differential values of the master and the slave. It is this rather elitist notion of hierarchy that constitutes the heart of the Nietzschean project. His genealogical philosophy 'seeks to evaluate values by tracing their lineage to their origin. (...) Genealogy signifies the differential element of values from which their value itself derives. Genealogy thus means origin of birth, but also difference or distance in the beginning.' [Deleuze quoted in Bogue (1989), p. 16.] Indeed, we should not deny that difference is everywhere, and thus also 'different ways of being' and 'modes of existence of those who judge and evaluate'. The fact that there is a hierarchy (or various 'moral types of being which can be distinguished by the force of falseness that they make use of' [Patricia Pisters, 'Het plezier van bedrog', in: *Skrien*, v. 212 (1997)]) which places these different ways of being in relation to one another, is the solution Nietzsche offers to prevent the world from absolute relativism. This organising principle is, as far as I know, not detailed any further in Nietzsche's work, but nevertheless betrays the ultimately hierarchical nature of his thought (Some critics have, as a result of this foundational principle, even contended that Nietzsche has not succeeded in his effort to evade Hegelian recuperation and has merely created a new metaphysical system or a 'naturalistic anthropology'. [see: Dohmen, pp. 446-456 for his critique.]) Despite Deleuze's efforts, I remain unconvinced that Nietzsche's Will to power, which is, as we have seen, build on the master-slave hierarchy, is suitable as the foundation for a non-hierarchical ethical system. This does, however, not diminish my conviction that such a system is possible (or even vital), nor, obviously, my admiration for Deleuze's efforts to conceptualise such a system—an endeavour which, notwithstanding my scepticism concerning its foundation, contains many indispensable insights.

92. Deleuze and Guattari (1991), p. 5.
93. Bogue (1989), p. 19.
94. Ibid.
95. Deleuze quoted in Bogue (1989), p. 17.
96. Bogue (1989), p. 19.
97. Deleuze quoted in Bogue (1989), p. 19.
98. Bogue and Deleuze quoted in Bogue (1989), pp. 23-4.
99. Jacques Bersani, specifically referring to the first edition which differs from later editions, called it one of the three most important studies of Proust in a collection of Proust criticism which appeared in 1971. [Cf. Bogue, p. 167 n 2.] Julia Kristeva praised it as a 'magnificent reading' and uses it as one of the foundations for her own *Proust and the Sense of Time* (1993).
100. Stephen Bann, 'foreword' to Kristeva (1993), p. ix.
101. Ibid., p. vii.
102. Deleuze quoted in Bogue (1989), p. 38.
103. Bogue (1989), p. 45.

104. Cf. Deleuze and Guattari (1991), p. 1.
105. Bogue (1989), p. 45.
106. Bogue (1989), pp. 37, 38.
107. Hardt (1993), p. 69.
108. quoted in Hardt (1993), p. 69 — *Spinoza et le problème de l'expression* (Paris: Minuit, 1968).
109. Bogue (1989), p. 40.
110. Proust quoted in Bogue (1989), p. 39.
111. Deleuze (1968), p. 76. For an exposition of why a perpetual present is impossible: Ibid., p. 77.
112. Deleuze (1968), p. 79.
113. Ibid., p. 84.
114. Deleuze quoted in Bogue (1989), p. 41.
115. It goes too far for my purposes to explicate why this is so. Deleuze (1968) explains this on pp. 70-85.
116. Deleuze (1968), p. 85, modified.
117. Ibid., p. 85.
118. Kristeva (1993), pp. 44-5.
119. Proust quoted in Kristeva (1993), p. 44-5.
120. Proust quoted in Stambolian (1972), p. 145.
121. Cf. Stambolian (1972), pp. 144-5.
122. Deleuze (1964), p. 14.
123. Proust quoted in Stambolian (1972), p. 142.
124. Poulet quoted in Stambolian (1972), p. 165.
125. Proust quoted in Stambolian (1972), pp. 142, 160, 165. Deleuze: 'La contradiction de l'amour consiste en ceci: les moyens sur lesquels nous comptons pour nous préserver de la jalousie sont les moyens mêmes qui développent cette jalousie, lui donnant une espèce d'autonomie, d'indépendance à l'égard de notre amour.' [Deleuze (1964), p. 15].
126. Proust quoted in Stambolian (1972), p. 163.
127. '[A]dressés à nous, appliqués à nous, ils expriment pourtant des mondes qui nous excluent, et que l'aimé ne veut pas, ne peut pas nous faire connaître. Non pas en vertu d'une mauvaise volonté particulière de l'aimé, mais en raison d'une contradiction plus profonde, qui tient à la nature de l'amour et à la situation générale de l'être aimé.' [Deleuze (1964), p. 16].

128. Proust quoted in Stambolian (1972), p. 148.
129. Deleuze (1964), p. 17. 'Intersexual loves are less profound than homosexual ones, they find their truth in homosexuality.'
130. Stambolian (1972), p. 152.
131. Proust quoted in Deleuze (1964), p. 17. 'It is a terrible *terra incognita* that I then discovered, a new phase of never expected suffering unfolded. And the deluge of reality that submerges us is enormous, even after the timid suppositions which she had given rise to. (...) The rival does not resemble me, her arms are different, I can not effect a battle on the same terrain, give Albertine the same pleasures.'
132. In a strictly Foucauldian sense, the history of Europe, as set forth in his *Les mots et les choses* is divided by three great fault lines, separating four periods, namely, a first period of pious belief in God's instantaneous creation of the universe and the various species of animal and plant life in a finished and permanent form distinct from other species, a second period of a tabular, classifying conception of how reality is composed, a third period of historicity, in which time is connected to the ordered rational conception of the second period, and finally, a fourth period, the one which we are right now trying to find some way to live through. [Cf. Clifford Geertz, 'Stir Crazy', in *New York Review of Books*, January 26, 1978, reprinted in *Documenta X - the book: Politics Poetics* (Ostfildern: Cantz Verlag, 1997), pp. 438-43.] I choose, however, to adapt this theory and take the early and late (or post-) enlightenment (the second and third period) together for reasons of simplification. The underlying metaphysical system of these two periods could be said to be more or less similar. This, however, forced me to be not too specific about actual dates. Darwin published his *Origin of the Species* only in 1859, at a time when the influence of the philosophes had diminished, nevertheless I have presented Social Darwinism and the thought of the philosophes as dialectical opposites, while I should have opposed Social Darwinism with the thought of an heir of the Enlightenment like Marx. This, however, is not essential for my argument and would complicate rather than illuminate things.
133. Saussure quoted in Frank (1984), p. 367.
134. Frank (1984), p. 362.
135. Ibid., p. 367.
136. Ibid., p. 360. See also my exposition of Guattari's work.
137. Ibid., p. 360.
138. For the preceding and ensuing paragraph, cf. Frank (1984), pp. 361-3.
139. Ibid., p. 365.
140. Foucault (1977), p. 188.
141. Cf. note 132.
142. Deleuze (1968), p. 85.
143. Cf. Deleuze (1968), p. 86.
144. Husserl quoted in Frank (1984), p. 233. Husserl claims that this difference is only virtual (i.e. a difference that evolves only on the basis of a prior unity). Derrida, however, convincingly deconstructs this claim in *La voix et le phénomène*. Cf. Frank, pp. 230-4.

145. Phenomenology systematically disregards external reality. Husserl defines external life ('the psychical') as something derivative over against the transcendental ego, something 'transcendentally secondary'.
146. Kant rephrased in Perry (1993), p. 354.
147. Foucault (1977), p. 168.
148. Deleuze quoted in Melehy (1995).
149. Ibid.
150. Foucault (1977), p. 167.
151. Deleuze quoted in Melehy (1995).
152. Ibid, pp. 107-8.
153. Deleuze (1968), p. 96.
154. Ibid.
155. Ibid, p. 97.
156. Ibid, p. 98.
157. Cf. Deleuze (1968), pp. 96-99.
158. Let me quote one of these examples: 'A child who begins to walk does not only bind excitations in a passive synthesis, even supposing that these were endogenous excitations born of its own movements. No one has ever walked endogenously. On the one hand, the child goes beyond the excitations towards the supposition of the intentionality of an object, such as the mother, as the goal of an effort, the end to be actively reached 'in reality' and in relation to which success and failure may be measured. But *on the other hand and at the same time*, the child constructs for itself another object, a quite different kind of object which is a *virtual* object or centre and which then governs and compensates for the progress and failures of its real activity: it puts several fingers in its mouth, wraps the other arm around this virtual centre, and appraises the whole situation from the point of view of this virtual mother. The fact that the child's glance may be directed at the real mother and that the virtual object may be the goal of an apparent activity (for example, sucking) may inspire an erroneous judgement on the part of the observer. Sucking occurs only in order to provide a virtual object to contemplate in the context of extending the passive synthesis; conversely, the real mother is contemplated only in order to provide a goal for the activity, and a criterion by which to evaluate the activity, in the context of an active synthesis.' [Deleuze (1968), p. 99.]
159. Deleuze (1968), p. 100.
160. Ibid, p. 101.
161. Cf. Ibid, p. 103.
162. All questions, Ibid, p. 104.
163. Ibid, pp. 104-5. On the displacement of the virtual object and its relation to Lacan's phallus, see: *ibid.*, pp. 102-6.

164. Ibid., p. 88.
165. Ibid., p. 111.
166. Ibid., p. 117 — ‘These differential systems with their disparate and resonating series (...) are what we call simulacra or phantasms. The eternal return concerns only simulacra, it causes only such phantasms to return.’ [Ibid., p. 126.]
167. Foucault (1977), p. 195.
168. Deleuze (1973).
169. Deleuze and Guattari (1972a), p. 2.
170. Ibid.
171. Deleuze (1973)
172. Ibid.
173. Deleuze (1973).
174. Ibid.
175. Flieger (1997) gives a detailed account of the actual similarities between *L’Anti-Oedipe* and some of Freud’s writings.
176. See for an introduction of clinical schizophrenia: Michael Gelder, Dennis Gath, and Richard Mayon, *Oxford Textbook of Psychiatry*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 289-114. — Deleuze and Guattari claim toward the end of their book that they ‘do not at all think that the revolutionary is schizophrenic or vice versa,’ and that they have ‘consistently distinguished the schizophrenic as an entity from schizophrenia as a process.’ [Deleuze and Guattari (1972a), p. 379]. At many points throughout their book they have indeed distinguished clinical schizophrenia from the active schizophrenia they advance, at other points, however, I feel they have not retained this strict division.
177. Foucault in the introduction to Deleuze and Guattari (1972), p. xii. — Frank (1984), p. 317.
178. Frank (1984), p. 317. — For a short sketch of the influence of Deleuze and Guattari outside the philosophical discours, see for instance ‘Mille Gilles’, documentary film for NPS television (1997).
179. See: Deleuze and Guattari (1972b), p. 47.
180. Ibid., ‘Felix spoke to me about what he had already called desire machines: a complete theoretical and practical conceptualisation of the unconscious machine, the schizophrenic unconscious.’
181. Guattari (1969), p. 111.
182. Deleuze quoted in Guattari (1969), p. 111n2.
183. Stivale (1985).
184. Guattari (1969), p. 112.

185. Cf. Hughes (1975), p. 136.
186. Guattari (1969), p. 114.
187. Ibid.
188. Deleuze and Guattari (1972b), p. 47 'This is inevitable since he is so much indebted to Lacan (so am I). But I have decided that it would be so much better when he would find adequate concepts which would replace not so much the notions that Lacan has created, but the orthodoxy which surrounds him.' The quote is followed by a piece which sounds cynical: 'C'est Lacan qui dit: on ne m'aide pas. On allait l'aider schizophréniquement. Et nous devons d'autant plus à Lacan, certainement, que nous avons renoncé à des notions comme celles de structure, de symbolique ou de signifiant, qui sont tout à fait mauvaises, et que Lacan, lui, a toujours su retourner pour en montrer l'envers.' I do, however, think that they are to a certain extent serious. We should not, for instance, forget that it was Lacan who initially seized on the metaphor of the subjectless machine.
189. Artaud (1947), p. 13. 'It isn't man [*sic*] but the world which has become abnormal.'
190. Deleuze and Guattari (1972a), p. 23.
191. Vonnegut (1969), p. 70.
192. Deleuze and Guattari (1972a), p. 217. — Deleuze and Guattari quoted in Frank (1984), p. 325.
193. Cf. Deleuze and Guattari (1972a), p. 194.
194. Ibid., p. 146.
195. Ibid., p. 195.
196. Ibid., p. 199.
197. Cf. Deleuze and Guattari (1972a), pp. 203-4.
198. For more on the 'seeing' eye that does not read: Deleuze and Guattari (1972a), p. 204.
199. Ibid.
200. Ibid., p. 205.
201. Cf. Ibid.
202. Cf. Ibid., p. 206.
203. 'Magin, Faith, and Healing,' in: *A Ndembu Doctor in Practice* (New York: Collier, Macmillan, 1964).
204. Deleuze and Guattari (1972a), p. 168, my italics.
205. Ibid., pp. 168-9.
206. Kardiner quoted in Deleuze and Guattari (1972a), p. 177.
207. Ibid., p. 254.

208. Müller (1977a), p. 20. 'Thinking at the end of the Enlightenment, that has started with the death of God, is the coffin in which He is buried, decomposing with the body. Life confined in this coffin.' Müller continues: 'Der Blitz, der das Bewußtsein Artauds gespalten hat, war Nietzsches Erfahrung, es könnte die letzte sein. Artaud ist der Ernstfall. Er hat die Literatur der Polizei entrissen, das Theater der Medizin. Unter der Sonne der Folter, die alle Kontinente dieses Planeten gleichzeitig bescheint, blühen seine Texte. Auf den Trümmern Europas gelesen, werden sie klassisch sein.'
209. Steijn (1993), p. 75.
210. Cf. Wakefield (1990), pp. 142-3.
211. Müller (1977b), p. 47. 'I want to be a machine, (...) without pain, without thoughts.'
212. Cf. Steijn (1993), p. 75 — 'arms to clutch, legs to walk.'
213. Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, 5, II, 31-2. — Cf. Frank (1984), p. 318.
214. Cf. Werner Hofman, *De schilderkunst van de twintigste eeuw*, (Utrecht: Prisma, 1959), p. 69.
215. Deleuze and Guattari (1972a), p. 1.
216. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
217. *Ibid.*, p. 5-6.
218. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
219. *Ibid.*, p. 42.
220. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
221. *Ibid.*, p. 47.
222. *Ibid.*, p. 48.
223. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
224. *Ibid.*, p. 43.
225. *Ibid.*, p. 10, modified.
226. Nietzsche quoted in Frank (1984), p. 321. — I would like to emphasise here that the basis of the Oedipal myth is, as Deleuze and Guattari also acknowledge, not an invention of psychoanalysis, but a biological inevitability.
227. *Ibid.*, p. 322.
228. Deleuze and Guattari (1972a), p. 46.
229. *Ibid.*, p. 296.
230. *Ibid.*, p. 227.

231. (Marx quoted in) Ibid., p. 227.
232. Cf. Ibid., p. 229.
233. Cf. Ibid.
234. Ibid., p. 234.
235. Ibid., p. 233.
236. Ibid., p. 251.
237. This, I would say, could however also be explained by several concrete capitalist practices, of which I will here only mention two. Firstly, the dispersion of anti-production amongst production (a feature of capitalism that I will deal with later) not only leads to a withering of the strong, centralised state—and thus of direct democratic influence on, or the limitation of the economy—but also of the decline of the effective power of the unions. Secondly, banks, have been given a relative freedom for the creation of—to speak with Bernard Schmitt—‘debts owing to themselves’, that is, on the basis of a small amount of exchange money they are allowed to advance large amounts of credit money, making them relatively independent from consumer savings.
238. Berlin distinguishes between positive and negative freedom. Negative freedom is defined as the area in which one can do whatever one desires without interference from others. This conception is linked to liberalism. Positive freedom, on the other hand, is characterised by the desire to be someone and not just a representant of everyone (thus to be an individual rather than a particularity); to be someone who is responsible for his or her deeds rather than a desireless tool of external powers and forces. This conception of freedom, says Berlin, is connected to the the freedom of choice. In a situation of negative freedom one can choose between product A, B, and C, but this is not done on the basis of individual ideas and goals, rather it is led by advertisements, image, price, etc. Cf. Hans Blokland, ‘Sociaal-democratische politiek en cultuur in een marktliberaal tijdperk,’ in: Hans van Dulken en Paul Kalma (ed.) *Sociaal-democratie, kunst, politiek* (Amsterdam: Wiardi Beckman Stichting/Boekmanstichting, 1993), pp. 12-3.
239. Ibid., p. 235.
240. Ibid., p. 236.
241. Quoted in Sanders (1998).
242. Cf. reprinted fragments of the prospectus of *Hépérile éclaté* in *Documenta X - the book: Politics Poetics* (Ostfildern: Cantz Verlag, 1997), pp. 260.
243. Deleuze and Guattari (1972a), p. 240.
244. Ibid., p. 241.
245. Ibid.
246. Ibid., p. 242-3. The despotic signifier, as the sign of the (territorial) sign, is ‘destroyed’ by glossematics because this theory asserts that ‘the form of language exists in two equipollent substances, graphic and phonic’.[Vachek, Josep (1972) ‘The present State of Research in Written Language’ in: *Folia Linguistica* 6, The Hague; (1976) reprinted in: *Selected Writings in English and General Linguistics*, Prague: Academia, p. 139.] The two substances are, in opposition to the structuralist view, unrelated, and can thus, as we have seen, not be contained within an order of meaning, and even less within a signifier. (Jakobson draws upon

an analogy from the domain of music to denounce the glossematic thesis. He writes that it would be just as untenable 'to state that musical form is manifested in two variables—notes and sound' [quoted in: Vachek, pp. 139-40]. Vachek continues: 'In Jakobson's opinion, "just as musical form cannot be abstracted from the sound matter it organizes, so form in phonemics is to be studied in relation to the sound matter which the linguistic code selects, readjusts, dissects and classifies along its own lines." (...) This objection must be evaluated in connection with Jakobson's categorical statement that written or printed utterances are symbols of symbols. This, however, was true only for the oldest stages of putting down spoken utterances in writing—as soon as some writing tradition develops in a given language community, a strong tendency asserts itself towards the establishment of a direct link between the written utterance and the extralingual reality referred to by that utterance. In other words, written utterances soon tend to become symbols of the first order, not symbols of symbols, as was originally the case.' [p. 140.]

247. Deleuze and Guattari (1972a), pp. 243-4.
248. Ibid., p. 244.
249. Ibid., p. 246.
250. Ibid.
251. Traditionally France is an example of a strong, centralised, and all pervasive state. Most decisions are made in Paris, the city where a small elite of politicians, bureaucrats, and business(wo)men, who all know each other either directly or via friends (a result of the centralised educational system), decide virtually everything that could concern the state—certainly including business matters (not only in the big state-owned or formerly state-owned companies and multinationals). We could see the French system as one of the three main systems of state-organisation in the west, the others being the Rhineland model (Germany, Netherlands, Scandinavian states) and the Anglo-Saxon model (U.K., U.S.A). If we take Belgium as a country under the influence of the French model of state-organisation, we can see the recent political machinations concerning the takeover of the General Bank by the Fortis conglomerate (competing with the Dutch ABN-AMRO) as a clear example of the strong association between the state and the business world. No wonder that Deleuze and Guattari immediately appoint the role of organiser of the capitalist axiomatic to the state.
252. Ibid., p. 253, spelling corrected. The working class has been given its own axiom and has thus become immanent within the capitalist system.
253. Deleuze quoted in 'introduction' to Deleuze and Parnet (1977), p. 7. 'How does someone escape his [*sic*] annihilation.'
254. Cf. Serge Gruzinski, 'Europa: Journey to the End of History', in: Documenta (1997), p. 513. For more on postmodern historicity, see for instance: Thomas Docherty *After Theory: Postmodernism/Postmarxism* (London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 7-10. 'Historicity (...) involves a seeming contradiction of history proper, for it depends not upon a notion of chronological accuracy or placement, but rather upon *anachronism*. This anachronism, however, is not an anachronism at the level of the historiographical narrative, but is rather more fundamentally an anachronism interior to the referent of any such a historiography. This is the historicity which has made such a difference to French philosophy as practiced not only by an expressed postmodernist such as Lyotard but also to the work of thinkers such as Deleuze.' [pp. 7-8].
255. Cf. Guattari (1986): 'Are [we] condemned to remain helpless before the rise of this new order of cruelty and cynicism that is about to overwhelm the planet, an order that seems determined, it would seem, to persist? It is to this regrettable conclusion that a number of intellectuals and artists, especially those influenced by postmodernist thought, have arrived. (...) For Lyotard, postmodernism represents the collapse of what he

calls the grand narratives of legitimation (for example, the discourses of the Enlightenment, those of Hegel's accomplishment of the Spirit and the Marxist emancipation of the workers). It would always be wise, according to Lyotard, to be suspicious of the least desire for concerted social action. (...) In this way, Lyotard joins other theorists, such as Jean Baudrillard, for whom the social and political have never been more than traps, or "semblances", for which it would be wise to lose one's fondness. (...) [W]e ought to take care of our own backyards first and, preferably, in conformity with the habits and customs of our contemporaries. Don't rock the boat! Just drift with the currents of the marketplace of art and opinion that are modulated by publicity campaigns and surveys.' [pp. 109-111]. It is interesting that Deleuze and Guattari already in *L'Anti-Oedipe* refer to capitalism as the age of cynicism.

256. Jean-François Chevrier paraphrasing Artaud in 'The Spiral: Artaud's return to Poetry', in: *Documenta* (1997), p. 40.
257. Deleuze and Guattari write that capitalism sees schizophrenia as 'the image of its own death coming from within'. (1972a), p. 245.
258. *Ibid.*, p. 255.
259. Cf. Frits Bienfait and Meindert Fennema, 'Link-rechts denken is nog altijd springlevend', in: *de Volkskrant*, 9 May 1998.
260. Deleuze and Guattari (1972a), p. 253.
261. *Ibid.*, p. 264.
262. Frank Sulloway argues in *Freud, Biologist of the Mind*, that Freud is an evolutionary biologist.
263. Deleuze and Guattari (1972a), p. 269.
264. *Ibid.*
265. *Ibid.*, p. 268.
266. Cf. Abrams (1985), p. 192.
267. Rushdie (1988), p. 387.
268. Shakespeare, *King Lear*, VI, 1, 47.
269. Deleuze and Guattari (1972a), p. 271, modified.
270. Cf. Frank (1984), p. 330.
271. Taylor (1963), pp. 70-1, my italics.
272. *Ibid.*, pp. 30, 32.
273. Hoffmann quoted in Taylor (1963), p. 33.
274. Cf. Taylor (1963), pp. 66-104.
275. Wakefield (1990), p. 84.

276. Cf. Eribon (1990), pp. 145-150.
277. Cf. note 176.
278. Whereas Deleuze and Guattari's schizo remains an 'untheorised' theoretical concept for practical political action, the abstract, speculative model that anti-psychiatry proposes comes to stand for concrete persons, and there, I would say, anti-psychiatry makes the same mistake as psychoanalysis. See for instance Sera Anstadt *Al mijn vrienden zijn gek: De dagen van een schizofrene jongen* (The Hague: BZZT&H, 1983) esp. Chapter 6, for a description of the disastrous results of the theories of Laing *et al* when put to practice in an actual clinical environment. This is not to say that anti-psychiatry did not have positive effects on the development of psychiatry in general with its plead for a more humane treatment of patients in psychiatric hospitals.
279. Deleuze and Guattari (1972a), p. 296.
280. Wakefield (1990), p. 86. — Frank (1984), p. 337.
281. Miller quoted in Deleuze and Guattari (1972a), p. 298.
282. Deleuze and Guattari (1972a), p. 298.
283. *Ibid.*, p. 305.
284. *Ibid.*, pp. 306-7.
285. *Ibid.*, p. 308.
286. Frank (1984), p. 334.
287. *Ibid.*
288. *Ibid.*, p. 310.
289. quoted in *ibid.*
290. Marx rephrased in Deleuze and Guattari (1972a), p. 294 — Deleuze and Guattari (1972a), p. 309. — *Ibid.*, p. 310.
291. Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 295-6.
292. *Ibid.*, p. 296.
293. Cf. Wakefield (1990), p. 91 — For a clear exposition of Deleuze and Guattari's concept of the inclusive disjunction in opposition to the Oedipal use of the exclusive disjunction, see: Frank (1984), pp. 334-7.
294. Deleuze and Guattari (1972a), p. 311.
295. Wakefield (1990), p. 89.
296. Deleuze and Guattari (1972a), p. 362.
297. Wakefield (1990), pp. 95, 93. — Frank (1984), p. 341.

298. Mark Seem, introduction to Deleuze and Guattari (1972a), p. xx.
299. Foucault, preface to Deleuze and Guattari (1972a), p. xiv.
300. Brian Massumi in the translator's foreword of Deleuze and Guattari (1980), p. xi.
301. Ibid., p. xii.

Notes to Chapter Three

1. Cf. Haper, p. ii.
2. Carter ((1978), p. 508.
3. Ibid.
4. Cf. Colombat (1997), esp. pp. 585-592.
15. Deleuze and Parnet, p. 7.
6. '[C]omment procède-t-il sortir de ses démolitions?' wonders Deleuze in *Périples et Verdi* [quoted in Deleuze and Parnet, p. 7]—'How does someone escape his [*sic*] annihilation.'
7. The original German texts can be found in E.T.A. Hoffmann, *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. Walter Müller-Seidel, 5 vols. (Munich: Winkler, 1960-1965). I have read translated internet versions of 'The Sandman' and 'Councillor Krespel'.
8. Bergengruen (1947), p. 426. — 'Hoffmann's worldview (...) can be found throughout his work, but maybe most clearly in his fairy tales. It is an antitetical, a dualistic one. Two empires, two principles stand opposite to each other, seemingly in complete disagreement; but a higher, a suspected and promised, transcendental harmony brings them synthetically together.'
9. Castle, p. 10.
10. Taylor, p. 70.
11. Cf. Christensen, p. 68, Jordan (1990), p. 32, Manlove, p. 149, Suleiman, p. 129-30.
12. Carter (1977b), p. 118, cf. Sage, p. 13.
13. Cf. Jack Zipes quoted in Christensen, p. 64, E.P. Thompson and Michel Foucault rephrased in Castle, p. 6, Suleiman, esp. p. 134.
14. introduction to the Romantic Period, Abrams *et al* (1986), p. 12.
15. Taylor, p. 75-6.

16. Castle, p. 7.— “‘Unheimlich’ [is everything] that ought to have remained secret and hidden but has come to light.’ Freud, p. 225.
17. Freud, p. 249.
18. Freud, p. 232 n.
19. Carter uses the term ‘reality-testing’ in her novel for the method by which the determination police determine the reality-status of subjects and objects. This term is also used by Freud with reference to the material reality of uncanny phenomena. Cf. Freud pp. 248-9, Carter (1972a), p. 22.
20. quoted in Manlove, p. 150.
21. Christensen, p. 69.
22. Zipes, p. 39. About Hoffmann’s materialism, cf. Zipes, p. 85.
23. Zipes, p. 38.
24. Zipes, p. 38-9.
25. Carter (1979b), p. 411. — About the rise of television: Cf. Stuart Laing, ‘The Politics of Culture: Institutional Change’, in: Bart Gilmore-Gilbert and John Seed ed. (1992), pp. 74-77.
26. Ibid., p. 410-412.
27. Cf. Suleiman, p. 135.
28. Cf. Zipes pp. 97-100.
29. Ibid., pp. 38, 88.
30. Carter (1978), p. 510.
31. For other readings of Freud, cf. Weedon, chapter 2.
32. Wakefield, p. 25.
33. Cf. Bakker et al., pp. 1021-1029.
34. Geertz quoted in Sampson, p. 1.
35. For this and the following paragraphs I rely on the accounts of Easthope, especially the preface and chapters 1 and 11, and Weedon especially chapters 2 and 3. Also Kristeva (1981) has helped me shape my thoughts regarding the history of women’s liberation.
36. Easthope, p. 21.
37. Easthope, p. 21.
38. Weedon, p. 22. — Cf. Bogue p. 105 n 18.
39. Cf. Waugh (1995), p. 195.

40. Cf. Flieger, pp. 606-609.
41. Deleuze and Guattari (1972a), p. 217.
42. Cf. Waugh (1995), p. 195.
43. Weedon, p. 44.
44. Ibid., pp. 45-46.
45. Cf. Easthope, pp. 150-151.
46. Cf. Deleuze (1964) and (1968) and Carter (1979), (1977) and (1983a).
47. Cf. Deleuze (1964) and (1968).
48. Robinson, p. 99.
49. Braidotti (1991), p. 110.
50. Ibid., p. 113.
51. Deleuze quoted in Braidotti, p. 115.
52. Braidotti (1991), p. 122.
53. Carter (1992), p. 607.
54. Irigaray, p. 140-141.
55. Deleuze and Parnet, p. 152.
56. Deleuze quoted in Jardine (1984), p. 50. Jardine's article is for a large part similar to chapter 10 of her invaluable (1985).
57. Deleuze and Parnet, p. 153.
58. Irigaray, p. 141, quotation modified, my italics.
59. Cf. Jardine (1985).
60. Braidotti (1991), p. 121, my italics. — See also: Waugh (1989) and Jardine (1985) for a treatment of the questions I have addressed in the last few paragraphs.
61. Robinson, p. 80.
62. Robinson, p. 107.
63. Ibid., 101.
64. Cf. Jardine (1985), esp. chapter 9, Braidotti (1991), pp. 98-108, Gayatri Spivak 'Displacement and the discourse of woman', in: *Derrida and After*, Mark Krupnick, ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983), pp. 169-195.

65. Braidotti (1991), p. 106.
66. Braidotti (1991), p. 124-125, quotation modified.
67. Braidotti, pp. 130-131.
68. Braidotti (1994b), p. 161.
69. Ibid., p. 170.
70. Braidotti (1994b), p. 170.
71. Ibid., p. 182.

Notes to Conclusion

1. Cf. Robinson, p. 98.
2. Foucault, p. 170, my italics.
3. Cf. Robinson, p. 89.
4. Cf. Braidotti (1991), p. 282.
5. Carter in Haffenden, p. 85.
6. Cf. Lee (1994), p. 309 and Jordan (1994), p. 191.

Notes to Postscript

1. Cf. Carter in Haffenden, p. 79.
2. Atwood (1993), p. 522.

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